



Italian Political Science

THE PROFESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Co-Editors

Stefania Panebianco

Department of Political and Social Sciences
University of Catania, Italy
stefapnb@unict.it

Francesco Zucchini

Department of Social and Political Sciences
University of Milan, Italy
francesco.zucchini@unimi.it

Editorial Board

Marco Brunazzo

Department of Sociology and Social Research
University of Trento, Italy
marco.brunazzo@unitn.it

Carla Monteleone

Department of European Studies and
International Integration (DEMS)
University of Palermo, Italy
carla.monteleone01@unipa.it

Nicolò Conti

Department of Law and Economics
Unitelma Sapienza, Rome
nicolo.conti@unitelma.it

Manuela Moschella

Department of Cultures, Politics and Society
University of Turin, Italy
manuela.moschella@unito.it

IPS and **Italian Political Science** and all of the following contents are copyrighted
by the **Società Italiana di Scienza Politica**.

Italian Political Science - IPS is the professional review of the **Italian Political Science Association** (Società Italiana di Scienza Politica). **IPS** is an academic journal registered with **ISSN 2420-8434** and published, since 2013, by the University of Catania (Catania, Italy) and the University of Milan (Milan, Italy). All issues from 2007 to 2012 were edited and published by the University of Siena (Siena, Italy).

**Issue 12, Volume 2
September 2017**

In Memoriam: Pietro Grilli di Cortona

Orazio Lanza and Barbara Pisciotta
Guest Editorial

iii

*

Maurizio Cotta

In memoriam. Pietro Grilli di Cortona: a dedicated scholar and a humane person 1

Antonio Agosta

Pietro Grilli di Cortona, Faculty colleague 3

Barbara Pisciotta

Comparative analysis in the scholarly contribution of Pietro Grilli di Cortona 6

Leonardo Morlino

Why do transitions to democracy fail? A tribute to Pietro Grilli di Cortona 10

Luca Lanzalaco

Democracies in Transition. Political Change in Democratic Regimes 15

Orazio Lanza

**When Political Science and History meet.
'Legacies of the Past and Democracy' in Pietro Grilli di Cortona's Research** 20

Giampiero Cama

State building and nationalism: the lesson of Pietro Grilli di Cortona 28

Rosalba Chiarini

**The study of change and institutional persistence in
'Rivoluzioni e Burocrazie' by Pietro Grilli di Cortona** 33

Antonino Castaldo and Luca Germano

Parties and party systems in Pietro Grilli Di Cortona's research 38

María Matilde Ollier, Osvaldo Iazzetta and Hugo Quiroga

Pietro Grilli di Cortona and Argentina 43



Book Reviews

Section coordinated by Carla Monteleone

Andrea Pedrazzani (*University of Bologna*)

Elisabetta De Giorgi, *L'opposizione parlamentare in Italia. Dall'antiberlusconismo all'antipolitica* ... 45

Marco Clementi (<i>University of Pavia</i>)	
Sergio Fabbrini and Raffaele Marchetti (eds.), <i>Still a Western World?</i>	48
Justyna Zając (<i>University of Warsaw</i>)	
Iole Fontana, <i>EU Neighborhood Policy in the Maghreb</i>	51
Silvia Bolgherini (<i>University of Naples Federico II</i>)	
Maria Tullia Galanti, <i>Sindaci e manager nel capitalismo municipale</i>	54
Stefania Panebianco (<i>University of Catania</i>)	
Maria Grazia Galantino and Maria Raquel Freire (eds.), <i>Managing Crises, Making Peace</i>	56
Manuela Moschella (<i>Scuola Normale Superiore</i>)	
Leonardo Morlino and Francesco Raniolo, <i>The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European Democracies</i>	58

IN MEMORIAM: Pietro Grilli di Cortona

Orazio Lanza

Barbara Pisciotta

GUEST EDITORS

Pietro Grilli di Cortona, President of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (SISP), passed away during the night between 15 and 16 July 2015 at the age of just 61. Maurizio Cotta summed up his scholarly and human qualities very effectively at the SISP conference held in September 2015 at the University of Calabria. Pietro Grilli was reserved but friendly, sociable and wholeheartedly engaged with his inimitable style and elegance in a host of social, academic and institutional relations. Practically everyone who came into contact with him appreciated his style, elegance, affability and reliability.

When Italian Political Science asked us to edit an issue in his memory, our feelings of honour and emotion were combined with a certain degree of embarrassment at having to choose among many people at least as capable as we are of offering memories that highlight Pietro's scholarly, human and social characteristics. In the end, we opted for what we believe to be the criterion on which we were ourselves chosen as editors, namely close involvement in his academic activities over the last few years. The subjects addressed – processes of transition from totalitarian regime to democratization, historical legacy, comparative analysis, relations between state and nation, bureaucracy, political parties and the democratic crisis – encapsulate the central points of his studies. Following these paths, we asked **Maurizio Cotta, Antonio Agosta, Leonardo Morlino, Luca Lanzalaco, Giampiero Cama, Rosalba Chiarini, Luca Germano, Antonino Castaldo** and our Argentinian colleagues **María Matilde Ollier, Osvaldo Iazzetta** and **Hugo Quiroga** to contribute a personal and scholarly memory of Pietro.

They all agreed with enthusiasm and conviction, and it is with equally great enthusiasm and gratitude that we thank them while apologising at the same time to all the other friends and colleagues who would have been willing and able to contribute to this initiative.

In memoriam

Pietro Grilli di Cortona: a dedicated scholar and a humane person

Maurizio Cotta
UNIVERSITY OF SIENA

On July 16, 2015, Professor Pietro Grilli di Cortona, then President of the Italian Political Science Association (SISP) prematurely died at the age of only 61 years, after a long battle with a serious disease that he faced bravely. He is survived by his wife Barbara and three children.

The death of Pietro is a sad loss for the whole community of Italian political scientists. I was particularly moved by this event, as I had known him personally since the years when he was still a brilliant student in the Cesare Alfieri Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Florence and I was a young assistant professor there. Watching his academic progress, I remember that I was immediately struck by his serious commitment to the study of the great political phenomena of the twentieth century. Shortly after graduating from the University of Florence with a dissertation on Stalinism and post-Stalinism, under the guidance of Professor Domenico Fisichella, he moved to Rome. He became an assistant professor there in the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Roma La Sapienza. His academic career continued in the University of Trieste and he finally returned to Rome at the Roma Tre University, where he became a full professor in 2000.

Pietro Grilli should be remembered as a first-class scholar, a person ready to take up institutional responsibilities when it was required, and a deeply honest man. Starting from his dissertation, his research interests were clearly focused: Communist political systems, their internal crises, and their destinies after Soviet rule broke down were the central focus of most of his books and articles. In his first work, *Le crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti. Ungheria, Cecoslovacchia e Polonia da Stalin agli anni ottanta* (Angeli, 1989), published just before the crisis of the Soviet empire reached its climax, he had carefully explored the weaknesses of Communist rule in three satellite countries and the decisive role of the Soviet Union in preserving these regimes. Through a comparative analysis of the Hungarian insurrection of 1956, of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, and of the Polish events of 1980–81, Grilli explored the factors leading communist regimes to the brink of collapse and discussed the limited reconsolidation enabled by external intervention.

After his first work, it was almost an intellectual necessity for him to deepen his understanding of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes born from revolution and in particular of their power apparatus on the one hand; and on the other, to keep track of what happened when these regimes collapsed. He devoted the book *Rivoluzioni e burocrazie. Continuità e mutamento negli Stati rivoluzionari* (Angeli, 1991) to the first theme; and

to the second his volume *Da uno a molti. Democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in Europa orientale* (Il Mulino, 1997). The interest in what was happening in the post-Communist countries continued to stimulate his research, which was conducted also in association with other scholars (*Transizione e consolidamento nell'Europa centro-orientale*, coedited with S. Bartole, Giappichelli, 1998). The study of Communist and post-Communist countries was also a stimulus for Pietro to extend his research to a more general analysis of the problems of democratization: in this field of research we can mention his book *Come gli Stati diventano democratici* (Laterza, 2009), the edited volume (with O. Lanza) *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia* (Il Mulino, 2011); and the recent *Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes in the Third Wave. Causes, Trends and Outcomes* (Washington, New Academia Publishing, forthcoming). His comparative interest in the political transformations undergone by European states led him to also analyze some of the underlying problems related to the state- and nation-building processes (*Stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003).

Pietro Grilli, while primarily being a dedicated and active scholar did not eschew his institutional responsibilities both in the academic world and outside it, which are not always gratifying, but must be taken up. At the Roma Tre University, he was director of the Department of International Studies, member of the Senate, and was also asked to run for Rector. Until his death, he guided the Italian Political Science Association, ensuring a delicate equilibrium between innovation and respect for good traditions. In 1994, he was made a member of the national commission of the Italian government for the reform of the Constitution and of the electoral system, and in 2000 he was nominated by the President of the Republic as an expert in the CNEL (the National Council for the Economy and Labor).

Having known Pietro for many years I would like to remember him not only as a scholar and a good citizen, but also as a wise, deeply honest, and fully humane person. He had strong beliefs, but I do not think that anyone ever felt offended by him. We will miss you Pietro, but the memories of who you were and of what you have done will stay with us.

Pietro Grilli di Cortona, Faculty colleague

Antonio Agosta

ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY, ROME

It has been two years since 16 July 2015, the day when Pietro Grilli di Cortona left us after a short and inescapable illness. Two months later, on 25 September, Pietro would have turned 61. He left his family (wife Barbara, his three beloved children Bernardo, Giovanni and Sofia), his co-workers and pupils, his students, his friends and his colleagues too soon.

His life and his career were suddenly interrupted in a period marked by great achievements and significant public recognition. He had been a candidate, supported by a close-knit group as an alternative to the majority, for the election of the Rector of the *Roma Tre* University in the spring of 2013. In September of that year he was elected President of SISP, the Italian Society of Political Science (for which, in the previous year, he had coordinated the complex organisation of the annual Conference, held at Roma Tre). He had recently produced (in collaboration with Orazio Lanza, Barbara Pisciotto and Luca Germano) a manual of Political Science published by Utet. He had compiled a volume, published by Laterza, of his Master's lessons which he was particularly attached to, dedicated as they were to the processes of democratisation.

Pietro Grilli had become, in many cultural and institutional fields, a point of reference – for his human and professional style, marked by distinction and discretion, for the regularity and quality of his presence and for the clarity and consistency of his opinions on matters of University policy. And his very absence is, today, one of the most tangible and “present” elements in our national and local academic community.

I shared fifteen years teaching courses in Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science of the Roma Tre University with Pietro, and I was witness, albeit for a small part of his activity, to his constant and intense academic commitment and the mark it has made on me.

Our dialogue has never stopped. I often find myself exchanging ideas with him, with his point of view. Or at least with what I believe would have been his point of view on the many aspects of working in a university. **I learned so much from him and I have tried, without fully succeeding, to internalise his rare and wide-ranging scientific and academic expertise.**

We were different, but – I believe – complementary, even in our understanding of Political Science and education. We underwent different training, he was a pupil of Domenico Fisichella and I of Alberto Spreafico. He tending to political theory and international comparisons and I to empirical research and the study of the Italian political and institutional system.

Many times I asked myself, over the years, if Pietro had ever regretted wanting me in his Faculty, if I had been effective in his project to develop our subject area. What I found, though, was that Pietro was always willing to respect my independence, never taking on authoritative airs (which he could well have done given his prestige and rank). He was always close and supportive, especially in difficult periods of my life, in which he offered himself without reserve to help with my exams and with the needs of some of my undergraduate and PhD students.

Pietro once recounted to me the opinion of Professor Sergio Cotta – one of the greatest philosophers of law and a lecturer at the La Sapienza University, where Pietro had been a researcher for a decade – about the different vocations of university professors. There are those who favour teaching, those who are devoted primarily to research, and those who have special inclinations towards the administration and organisation of academic institutions.

But Pietro had all three gifts. **By choice he was a researcher where he had had a long, rigorous and unique scientific career** (and certainly not just a sequence of fleeting interests). Starting, moreover, from his individual work, painstaking and lonely, to come in recent years to designing investigative programmes through which he stimulated, and involved the energies of, other political scientists and younger researchers from various universities.

Pietro held several positions of organisation, directing among other things first the Department of Political Institutions and Social Sciences at our University and later the Department of International Studies. He presided over various undergraduate degree courses. He was a member of the Academic Senate of Roma Tre University. And, on behalf of the Political Science subject grouping, for a long time he was a member of the CUN, the National University Board.

Lastly, he headed the Scientific Board of the University's Political Studies Library which, for his tireless personal efforts right up to just a few days before his death, since 14 December 2015 has been named after him.

Only in the last two weeks of his life did Pietro suspend his public activities. His email of the evening of 1 July aroused much emotion in those who received it. In it, in essential and realistic terms, he wrote to the members of the Political Science Society that the deterioration in his health no longer allowed him to carry out the functions of President of the SISP (Italian Society of Political Science) effectively and therefore he surrendered the office into the hands of the Steering Committee. (So too with a view to the preparation of the annual Conference, scheduled for 10 to 12 September at the University of Calabria in Cosenza).

Even in those dramatic circumstances, his rationality and spirit of service were highlighted, leading him to lucidly examine the possible procedures for his succession, in the absence of similar precedents or specific provisions in the Charter.

Pietro was always like that – sober, balanced, without exaggeration, extremely kind and measured, even in moments of difficulty or conflict. Always involved, authoritative and reliable in academic activities, family life and social relations. And these marks of genuineness, measured response and simple elegance is also reflected in his scientific output and writing style.

Let me conclude by quoting a few lines of the last thing he wrote, posted on his blog on 22 April 2015, to remember his mother-in-law who had recently died.

“Sometimes the exceptional lies not in striking words or action but rather in a normal, honest life, marked by a sense of duty and great selflessness, and the absence of demands and self-pity.”

I think it is a moral testament and also a summary of how Pietro lived his life. As time goes on, we will feel his absence with ever greater understanding and regret.

Comparative analysis in the scholarly contribution of Pietro Grilli di Cortona. A personal recollection of my mentor

Barbara Pisciotta

ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY, ROME

These words, written by a French author in 1953, a year before Prof. Pietro Grilli was born, encapsulate the sense of my contribution:

“To see a human being reveal really exceptional qualities one must be able to observe his activities over many years. If these activities are completely unselfish; if the idea motivating them is unique in its magnanimity; if it is quite certain they have never looked for any reward; and if in addition they have left visible traces on the world – then one may say, without fear or error, that one is in the presence of an unforgettable character”.

Jean Giono, *L’homme qui plantait des arbres*, English translation, 1985

The contribution that Prof. Pietro Grilli di Cortona made to political science, and in particular to comparative analysis, is unquestionably visible and substantial. The originality of his works emerges first and foremost from their methodological approach and the attention focused on the comparatively overlooked area of communist and post-communist Europe.

His studies can be divided into three major spheres, namely the analysis of non-democratic regimes, the evolution and results of democratization processes, and the relationship between state and nation. Despite the diversity of the questions addressed, it is possible to identify the guiding thread of a rigorously and exclusively qualitative comparative approach in his strategy. A marked preference is shown in most of his publications for diachronic long-term analysis both in the explanation of processes of institutional change and in the conceptual analysis of the relationship inherent in the construction of the state and the nation.

The first sphere constituted the initial phase of his brilliant academic and scholarly career. His first article, ‘Modelli d’interpretazione del sistema sovietico’, published in the *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* in 1980, identified the specific characteristics of the Soviet regime through painstaking reconstruction of the debate on the distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism and careful consideration of the position of the post-Stalinist Soviet Union within the totalitarian model. His comparative studies

subsequently concentrated on identifying factors of instability in the regimes of the Soviet bloc with particular reference to the pre-communist political context, the role of the Catholic church and appeals to national identity, thus looking forward to the events that then led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the radical transformation of its satellite countries. His first monograph, *Le crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti. Ungheria, Cecoslovacchia e Polonia da Stalin agli anni '80*, appeared some months before the fall of the Berlin Wall and still constitutes a rigorous comparative analysis casting light on the origin and outcome of the processes of change that swept through the countries of the communist area as from the mid-1950s and constantly influenced the direction of political, economic and institutional developments.

Another important subject of his analysis is the complex relationship generated between the revolutionary processes that led to the foundation of many of the non-democratic regimes and the administrative structures of the previous institutional order. In *Rivoluzioni e burocrazie* (1991), comparative analysis of the major revolutions in Russia, China, Germany on the one hand and the smaller revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran and Algeria on the other proves an essential tool to reconstruct the different forms taken by this relationship in the different cases. The assumption of an increase in the power of the post-revolutionary bureaucracies is refuted and the important presence is instead highlighted of elements of continuity capable of surviving the revolutionary, including the persistence of cultural and structural models rooted in the past, the shortage of qualified personnel and attempts to imitate the organization of the colonizing country in order to ensure efficiency.

The other two central areas of study developed out of the first. The second, regarding processes of democratization, is unquestionably the most important, not least in terms of publications. Use of the comparative method within his long-period strategy makes it possible in the context to develop a broad theoretical model capable of explaining regime change in terms of its genesis, succession of individual phases, and possible outcomes as well as the various factors, internal and international, which influence such change (*Come gli Stati diventano democratici*, 2009).

Comparative area analysis of the diachronic kind is instead employed for the rebirth of political parties in the countries of central and eastern Europe (*Da uno a molti. Democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in Europa orientale*, 1997), where the similarities and differences between the various party systems are primarily the result of historical variables in the political development of East Europe and not only of contingent factors emerging from the respective political and institutional contexts.

His work on the Italian transition from Fascism to democracy (*Il cambiamento politico in Italia. Dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica*, 2007), which extends up to the advent of the Second Republic, paints an interesting comparative picture. The cases of France in the 4th and 5th republics and Belgium between 1962 and 1993 are thus also taken into consideration in order to explain the influence of the previous regime in the construction of republican Italy.

Diachronic analysis and the subject of transition from one regime to another also inform major studies on the legacy of the previous institutional structures in the construction of democracy in Europe and on the causes leading to crisis and, in some cases, to collapse in non-democratic regimes all over the world. Two PRIN projects, funded

respectively in 2007 (*Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il ruolo delle eredità delle democratizzazioni europee*) and 2009 (*Perché democratizzare? Le cause della crisi e del crollo dei regimi non democratici nella terza ondata*), both supervised by Prof. Grilli, resulted in the publication of three collective volumes, the last of which posthumous, constituting an important part of his scholarly legacy.

The first is a comparative diachronic analysis by area of eleven European countries – France and Germany in the west, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the south and Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia in the east – aimed at explaining the similarities and differences in the respective processes of democratization due to political, economic and institutional contexts inherited from the previous non-democratic regime (*Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia*, 2011, edited with O. Lanza). The second develops a multi-case qualitative comparison of 83 countries in every part of the world in an attempt to identify the causes of crisis and collapse in non-democratic regimes of the ‘third wave’ (*Come cadono i regimi non democratici. Primi passi verso la democrazia nei Paesi della ‘terza ondata’*, 2014, edited with L. Germano and O. Lanza). The third and last is a broad comparative analysis of the internal and international factors that have led in the various areas of the world to the fall of non-democratic regimes during the ‘third wave’ (*Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes. Lessons from the Third Wave*, 2016, edited with B. Pisciotta and E. Terzuolo).

Another important area of comparative studies developed by Pietro Grilli regards the processes involved in constructing the state and the nation, in which connection he examines the aspects related to the territorial dimension of politics and highlights the different outcomes emerging in cases of where state and nation coincide or fail to coincide in the major European countries and the resulting dynamics as regards the institutional sphere (the formation of unified or federal states) and parties (the impact of the rift between centre and periphery and the birth of nationalist parties). All this is examined in *Stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa* (2003). The study of parties and party systems is also developed through a comparative approach in collective works on East and West Europe (*Partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee*, 2007, edited with G. Pasquino). Another area of analysis within the study of the building of the state and the nation regards the relationship between the Italians and the European Union, addressed in terms both of the supranational challenge to the nation state and of the highly topical question of Euroscepticism (*Gli italiani e l’Europa*, 2004).

Further scholarly contributions worked on by Prof. Grilli up to June 2015 and published during 2016 include the following:

- the second edition of *Capire la politica* (2016), a textbook of political science co-authored with Orazio Lanza, Luca Germano and Barbara Pisciotta;
- *Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes. Lessons from the Third Wave* (2016, with Eric Terzuolo and Barbara Pisciotta), the above-mentioned American on the causes of crisis and collapse in non-democratic regimes in the various areas of the world;
- *Las Transformaciones de la democracia. Miradas cruzadas entre Europa y América Latina* (2016, ed. Osvaldo Iazzetta and Maria Rosaria Stabili), a collection of papers delivered at the Italian-Argentine conference organized by Prof. M.R.

Stabili, where the final version of Prof. Grilli's contribution on the crisis of democracy was edited by Prof. Roberta Modugno;

- *Lezioni di scienza politica* (2016, ed. Rosalba Chiarini and Barbara Pisciotta), a collection of previously unpublished contributions, proposed by Prof. Paolo Carnevale and including a selection of his lectures on political science, published by Editoriale Scientifica in the political science and comparative politics series directed by Pietro Grilli.

Attention should also be drawn here to the numerous institutional and academic posts held by Prof. Grilli during his career:

- 1994: member of the committee for reform of the Italian institutions and electoral system appointed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers;
- 1997–2006: member of the CUN;
- 2000–05: member of the CNEL, appointed as an expert by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic;
- 2001–09: Director of the Department of Political Institutions and Social Sciences, and subsequently of the Department of International Studies;
- from 2010 on: President of the educational board of the advanced degree course in European Studies and International Relations and of the advisory board of the Library of Political Studies;
- September 2013: elected president of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica.

Two years after his death, my personal memories are still vivid and the sense of loss even more painful. Pietro Grilli was my mentor. I have him to thank not only for instilling in me a passion for research and supporting me in my academic career but also and above all for teaching me this profession and devoting many hours of his time to explaining what research actually means in concrete terms. These are all things I shall never forget.

It was my good fortune to meet him at La Sapienza University of Rome at the end of 1993. Newly appointed associate professor in Trieste, he was standing in at the same time for Prof. Domenico Fisichella, holder of the chair in political science, while I had only just started work on my degree thesis.

I immediately realized that he was a serious, helpful, correct and well-balanced person, all qualities that he was always recognized as possessing. Pietro was not only this for me, however. During the twenty-two years in which we worked together, I knew him also as a witty and amusing person with a keen sense of humour capable of defusing the tensest situations and seeing the positive side of things. Many of us look back nostalgically to the cheerful and friendly atmosphere of the working lunches we shared, discussing scholarly projects or relating personal episodes of a humorous character. I miss all that more than ever today.

I regard Pietro as possessing a very rare gift in our world, namely the ability to separate people's political opinions from their personal qualities. This is something I appreciated in him from the very first moment of our meeting.

Above all, however, I must stress that he always had the courage of his convictions, even when they proved awkward and he was well aware that they would be of no personal advantage to him.

And this is exactly how I will always remember him, as an unforgettable person.

Why do transitions to democracy fail? A tribute to Pietro Grilli di Cortona

Leonardo Morlino

LUISS GUIDO CARLI UNIVERSITY, ROME

1. Introduction

As it is evident from the works by Pietro Grilli (see in this issue the articles by Barbara Pisciotta and by Orazio Lanza) the key questions that has been addressed in these years on the phenomenon of democratizations has also been object of research by him. Especially when his books published in 2000, 2009, 2011 (see bibliography) are considered, complemented by those he edited with other colleagues (see e.g. 2014 and 2016), the quality and originality of his way of doing research on that topic can be fully appreciated.

In this short piece I would like to pay a tribute to the scholar I first met as young, serious, passionate student at Cesare Alfieri in Florence several years ago and to address a topic I guess we could have discussed together at length and would have received his interest. That is: reflecting on the research results and the very phenomenon of transitions to democracy that took place in a number of countries along last decades is it possible to single out the key obstacles to a successful transition to democracy? In the next pages I try to reply to such a question by referring also to another work where I addressed this issue (see Morlino 2015).

2. Approaches to transitions

Before making the attempt of replying to the question I have just addressed, it can be helpful to recall the main theoretical approaches to the topic. The starting point is the widespread negative view on the possibility of achieving accepted theories. The overall prospects were gloomy, to say the least. In fact, one of the most authoritative statements on the issue was made by O'Donnell and Schmitter: "We did not have at the beginning, nor do we have at the end... a 'theory' to test or to apply to the case studies."¹ Several years later, McFaul echoed this statement: "the project of constructing a general theory of democratization may very well fail... The unique patterns generated by the fourth wave of regime change in the postcommunist world suggest that the search for a general theory of democratization and autocratization will be a long one."²

Actually with the hindsight we can realize that there are at least three different theoretical approaches to the study of transition to democracy. Thus, first, when asking about the main theoretical results in this field of research we can see that there is a dominant

¹ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 3).

² McFaul (2002: 244).

approach: the only way of conducting research and achieving salient empirical results on transitions seems to develop a theoretical framework where all possible actors and factors are included and, when empirically tested, each actor and each factor turns out to be combined in specific multidimensional configurations. Moreover, when over the years the focus has been switching more and more to democracy as a result of transition, a stronger attention has been devoted to democratic installations and related aspects.

Second, a number of authors made an additional step by trying to find recurring patterns of successful transitions. Among them two (small) groups emerged with different theoretical purposes. On the one hand, there is the goal of singling out comprehensive multidimensional ideal types or even typologies that characterize a small number of specific cases, usually very close in time and space, where the result is the focus on a combination of different set of factors and/or actors. On the other hand, at a higher level of abstraction and with possible regard to a broader area and a longer time span, ideal types or typology are proposed where one or more than one actor or factor is assumed as the key aspect, and the impact of it/them on the process or on the result of it is assessed and consequent patterns built. For example, a typology of transitions where the role of civil society is assessed or the role of international external actors is considered vis-à-vis domestic actors.

Third, for those who supported that theoretical approach suggesting that the search for and detection of key mechanism/s is the most important theoretical result that scholars of comparative democratization can and should achieve, then, the issue is to try to single out what is such a mechanism. Despite the empirical problems and difficulties, at least one key mechanism emerged in the research on transition, which at least contributes to explaining critically successful transitions and indirectly suggests why other transitions are unsuccessful. This is the learning process, that is characterized by the interaction between past, perceived experiences and the present opportunities and involve both leaders and people (see Morlino 2012, chap. 4).

3. Obstacles to successful transitions

With this in mind we can now ask what are the factors, or even the actors, which have prevented a successful transition to democracy by maintaining a non-democratic regime, the previous or a different one,³ or by stalemating it in a hybrid situation? This question has almost never been explicitly discussed in depth in the literature, except in the work edited by Stoner and McFaul.⁴

First, if the approach that stresses the necessity of developing a more or less detailed theoretical framework is taken (see above and Morlino 2015), then the explanation of the failure is in a specific multidimensional set of reasons that can partially or largely vary from one case to another. Accordingly, the simplest reply is to refer to the lack of conditions and aspects that assured the success of newly achieved democracies. In this perspective, there is not much to say except to analyse the specific cases with a reversed framework vis-à-vis the one adopted for the cases of success.

³ As happened in Egypt.

⁴ Stoner and McFaul (2013). Stoner and McFaul devoted to this question four chapters on Algeria, Iran, China and Azerbaijan. They are also two very distinguished experts of Russia, but curiously put this country, which was a well-established electoral authoritarianism in 2014, among the successful cases of transition, only considering the collapse of 1991 and the transitional phase of 1993.

Second, if alternatively we are able to single out patterns or models of transition with reference to specific set of few cases, then this is what Stoner, Diamond, Girod and McFaul actually do in the introductory chapter of Stoner and McFaul's work.⁵ In doing this they stress how a failed transition is usually an elite-led one, that the lack of three domestic factors, such as mass mobilization, indigenous civil society organizations and independent media and communications technology, is crucial to explain the failure, and that the absence of any external international help for a number of reasons⁶ is also a salient aspect.

The third theoretical path to reply to the starting question seems the most relevant and revealing one. In fact, if attention is devoted to the analysis of key mechanisms of change or, in an opposite perspective, to the mechanisms of continuity, then a few considerations are in order. To start with, when singling out the learning process as a such key mechanism at the core of transitions, the actual question is how elites and people change their minds, or do not, and choose or resist to the democratic path. The basic reply to this question is: through trial and error. Elites and people learn the negative effects of non-democratic arrangements and, with or without the help of external institutions and governments, they can come to try out democratic solutions that eventually appear more favourable and acceptable for everyone interested.

Maintaining this perspective, however, prompts a number of other important reflections. First, the learning process we have just mentioned may also work the other way: elites and people may follow other lessons and accept non-democratic solutions, or simply obey them. If we look back over past experience, it is very well known how, in the early 20th century and later on, Southern European or Latin American elites learned to stop changes toward a democratic direction by reflecting on their own experience or that of other nearby or related countries.

Second, there are ideologies and beliefs that retain strong identities and consequently set up serious, tough obstacles to changes in the mindset of people. The two strongest obstacles of this kind that we saw at work are religion – in recent years the Islam religion has been especially effective in this – and ethnic identities, particularly in several African countries. Such obstacles have usually been well institutionalized for years. This implies that beliefs and identities are powerfully strengthened by vested interests that support them. Of course, there are exceptional cases where a democratic, charismatic leader or small groups are able to overcome these obstacles. In South Africa in early 1990s Nelson Mandela was able to create a democracy in a situation where vengeance and conflict would have been broadly understandable and expected. With his moral authority and leadership abilities, he was able to win over other elites, the leaders closest to him included, and even to bring about a change in people's attitudes on the political direction to undertake. More recently, during the Arab Spring and later in Tunisia a democratic elite was able to find and follow a very narrow path by managing to have a mainly secular constitution approved in January 2014 and laying the foundations for a fragile, but possibly viable democracy.

Third, an unfavourable international context, such as being related to and dependent economically on a non-democratic country – as happened in 2014 in the Middle East and the Eurasian area with post-communist countries – and the related existence of an appar-

⁵ Stoner, Diamond, Girod and McFaul (2013), introductory chapter of Stoner and McFaul's work.

⁶ In the cases they analyze, the presence of oil altered the willingness of international actors to promote democracy (see Stoner, Diamond, Girod, McFaul, 2013, section on external influences).

ently successful non-democratic alternative, such as a number of non-democratic regimes in Middle East or Russia, form the basis for the failure of transition, if started.

Last, we should recall the most obvious aspect. The most robust basis for a failed transition is set up by the absence of a democratic elite. In other words, even a charismatic leader or a minoritarian elite – although, of course, not strongly minoritarian – can manage to bring about a successful transition within a favourable context (see above). But the absence of that leader or elite and an unfavourable cultural and international context dooms any transition to failure. It is a platitude to recall that, despite the positions of a very minoritarian elite, the largest part of the elite and the people who were active during the Egyptian transition were not democratic, and the goals of some of them were religious ones, although characterized by varying degrees of fundamentalism.⁷

4. Concluding remarks

Thus, especially on the basis of experience in the most recent years, singling out obstacles that make successful transition impossible can be done in connection with the different theoretical approaches and related goals that are set up. Thus, if referring to a theoretical framework, the failure is explained by the lack of conditions and aspects that assured the success of newly achieved democracies. If singling out patterns or models is the theoretical goal, then a failed transition is an elite-led one and the lack of mass mobilization, indigenous civil society organizations and independent media and communications technology, as well as the absence of international help, are key aspects, above all in the recent post-communist transitions. If the focus is on key mechanisms of continuity, then, in order to better understand the basic reasons of failed transitions, four aspects should be kept in mind: 1. the learning process, which was considered the key mechanism of change, may also work in the opposite way: elites and the people can work and opt for non-democratic solutions; 2. the two strongest obstacles to change are religion and ethnic identities, powerfully strengthened by vested interests; 3. an unfavourable international context and the related existence of a successful non-democratic alternative lay the basis for the failure of transition, if started; and finally, 4. the most robust basis of a failed transition is set up by the absence of a democratic elite, which may also be a minoritarian one.

Let us bear in mind that this is only the beginning of a reply. For more satisfactory results additional research and analysis will be necessary. There is no doubt that if Pietro would have become interested in this question he would have contributed a lot to much better results.

References

- Bermeo, N. (1992), *Democracy and the lessons of dictatorship*, in “Comparative Politics”, 24, pp. 273-291.
- Germano L., P. Grilli di Cortona, O. Lanza (eds.) (2014), *Come cadono i regimi democratici. Primi Passi verso la democrazia nei Paesi della “terza ondata”*, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica.

⁷ The cognitive heuristics Weiland (2012) discusses in his analysis of the Arab Spring is actually what I label the “learning process” here (see above and also Bermeo 1992 and Pridham 2000).

- Grilli di Cortona, P. (1991), *Rivoluzioni e burocrazie. Continuità e mutamento negli Stati rivoluzionari*, Milano, Franco Angeli.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2000), *Da uno a molti. Democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in Europa orientale*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2009), *Come gli Stati diventano democratici*, Bari, Laterza.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2011), *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona, P., B. Pisciotta, E. R. Terzuolo (eds.) (2016), *Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes. Lessons from the Third Wave*, Washington, New Academia Publishing.
- McFaul, M. (2002), *The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in the Post-Communist World*, in "World Politics", 54, pp. 212-244.
- Morlino, L. (2012), *Changes for Democracy. Actors, Structures, Processes*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Morlino, L. (2015), *Transitions to Democracy. What Theory to Grasp Complexity?*, in "Historein", 15,1, pp. 13-31.
- O'Donnell, G. and P. C. Schmitter (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, in G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds.), *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 53-56.
- Pridham, G. (2000), *The Dynamics of democratization: a comparative approach*. London: Continuum.
- Stoner, K. and M. McFaul (eds.) (2014), *Transitions to Democracy. A Comparative Perspective*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stoner, K., L. Diamond, D. Girod, M. McFaul (2013), *Transitional Successes and Failures: The International-Domestic Nexus*, in K. Stoner and M. McFaul (eds.), *Transitions to Democracy. A Comparative Perspective*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Weyland K. (2012), *The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?*, in "Perspective on Politics", 10, pp. 917-934.

Democracies in Transition

Political Change in Democratic Regimes

Luca Lanzalaco

UNIVERSITY OF MACERATA

*To Pietro,
Rare and precious person*

Introduction

Students of political change focus mainly on the transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones, and vice versa. Much less attention is devoted to the transitions *within* the same type of regime, in particular the political change of democratic regimes. When, why and how do democratic regimes change? Pietro Grilli di Cortona dealt with this topic in an article written in the turmoil of the Italian transition from the First to the so-called Second Republic (Grilli di Cortona 1995) and in a book published ten years later (Grilli di Cortona 2017) when the Italian endless transition was still open.

In these two pieces Pietro Grilli takes into consideration various aspects of this type of transitions. From a theoretical point of view, he distinguishes between the changes of *genus*, when the type (democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian) of regime is involved (inter-regime transitions), and the changes of species when the regime remains the same but some of its important traits are transformed (intra-regime transitions). He also underlines that this second type of changes are much rarer in democratic regimes than in non-democratic ones. And, as we shall see below, this is due to a specific characteristic of democracies. From a historical point of view, Grilli analyses the Italian case and its various institutional reforms from the Legge Acerbo (1923) up to the recent electoral and constitutional ones. Thirdly, in a comparative perspective Grilli contrasts the Italian transition (from 1993 up to nowadays) with the French (1958-1962) and the Belgian (1962-1993) ones. In the light of this comparison he proposes in the last chapter of his book an interpretative model of change within democratic regimes.

The two contributions of Pietro Grilli on democratic transitions are relatively short, less than two hundred pages on the whole. However, they are very dense. Full of hints of reflection, they open a relatively unexplored field of study. In particular, the analysis of Pietro Grilli goes far beyond the Italian context and it has wider implications. In what follows I focus on: i) the way in which political change within democracies can be conceptualized; ii) the possible extension of the concepts usually used in the study of inter-regime transitions to the analysis of intra-regime changes (i.e. transitions within democracies); iii) the need for a general theory of political and institutional change.

Democratic change as a continuum

Grilli distinguishes among three types of political change of democracies.¹ First, there may be a democratic breakdown and an involution toward a non-democratic regime, followed by a new process of democratization (Italy). This is a widely studied type of transition. Secondly, democratic regimes may change gradually in an incremental way, adapting to different domestic and the international challenges (Great Britain, United States, Scandinavian countries). This is the most frequent type of change: democratic regimes are much more flexible than non-democratic ones. In these cases, the relative stability of constitutional and electoral models is often compensated by barely visible and scarcely disruptive administrative reforms.² The third type of transition is characterized (a) by the *continuity* of the basic characteristics of a democracy in terms of civil and political rights but also (b) by *discontinuities* in the formal architecture of the regime, e.g. changes in the electoral system or in executive-legislative relations like in the case of France. The democratic *genus* remains unchanged, while the *species* of democracy may shift, for example, from a consociative to a competitive form of democracy, from a parliamentary to a presidential model of constitution, from a proportional to a majority electoral system or from a unitary to a federal form of state. This is just the type of change Pietro Grilli is more interested in for two reasons. Firstly, because his research question is whether the Italian transition is of the second or of the third type. Secondly, because the logics of these democratic changes are relatively obscure and understudied.

The typology proposed by Pietro Grilli is theoretically rigorous. It sharply distinguishes between the elements of continuity and those of discontinuity at the different levels of the political system. It also is historically well founded, since it is rooted in a comparative analysis of relevant case studies. But it needs a substantial update in the light of the recent evolution of the Italian case that highlights at least three new elements. First of all, transition within democratic regimes is actually an open-ended process and it may become an infinite transition. Secondly, transition can assume an oscillatory character: waves of reformism may alternate to phases of stasis or even to “return to the past” policies, as in the electoral system shifting from proportional to majority systems and then back to proportionality. And finally, recent events suggest that the distinction between the second and the third model of change is not so sharp as it could seem. What prevails in the Italian case is a form of *hybridization* of the original model of consociative democracy with elements of competitive one.³ In this form of change the distinction between evolutionary adaptation and the change of species with the democratic genus tends to blur.


Following these observations, a different form of treatment of the concept of political transitions within democratic regimes can be proposed. In particular, a classification can be replaced by a continuum (see Figure 1). In this continuum, adaptation, hybridization and change of the form of democracy are three types of institutional policies among which policy makers may shift depending on the cohesion of the dominant coalition and its capacity of consensus building upon specific reform projects.

¹ A comparison of the main institutional changes in democratic regimes from 1946 to 2000 may be found in Lanzalaco (2005, 32-44).

² Baldi (2000), for example, shows how democratic regimes may substantially change even if their constitution remains unchanged.

³ On this point, see Morlino (2014).

Figure 1. Political change within democracies as a continuum

stasis	evolutionary adaptation of the form of democracy	hybridization between models of democracy	change of model of democracy	democratic breakdown
<p>Increasing change</p> 				
	mainly administrative reforms	constitutional and electoral reforms		abolition of civil and political rights

Conceptual analogies

The second point I would like to focus on is the use that Pietro Grilli makes of some concepts excerpt from the theory of regime transitions. On the one side, both in his article and in his book Grilli underlines the difference existing between transitions *between* regimes (change of *genus*) and transitions *within* regimes (change of *species*). On the other side, however, he brought about important analogies between the two types of transitions in so far he utilizes many concepts usually suited for the study of the first type of transitions, for interpreting also the second ones. Is this a form of conceptual stretching, as Sartori called it, or does it open new perspectives of analysis?

The first conceptual analogy concerns the concept of *consolidation*, that as we know is well rooted in Linz, Stepan and Morlino’s studies of democratic transitions. In his interpretative model of transitions within democracies Grilli affirms that the timing of the process of consolidation of *a new model of democracy* is crucial for its stabilization. The quicker the process of consolidation, the more robust its stability. But, as we know from the study of democratic transitions, the success of the process of consolidation depends on the legitimacy of the new democratic regime. So, the question is: on what does it depend the legitimacy of a new form of democracy? And why did the old model lose its one? And, last but not least, what is the weight of the original model of democracy in determining the legitimacy of a new and different form of democracy? Whatever the answers given to these questions, my point is that the transplantedation of the concept of regime consolidation from the study of inter-regime transitions to the analysis of intra-regime democratic transitions is very fruitfully, even if not enough explored.

The second conceptual analogy concerns the concept of *gatekeepers*. One of the cornerstones of the theory of democratic transition and consolidation is that political parties are the gatekeepers of democracy. Only when democracy is the only game in town, political parties are the main players. The proposal Pietro Grilli advances, with his usual understatement, is to consider political parties not only as the gatekeepers of democracy *tout court*, but also of a *specific* form of democracy. Following this line of reasoning, Grilli distinguishes the traditional parties who were linked to the Italian transition First Republic from the new parties who tried to dismantle it. So, parties and party system assume a pivotal role in leading the process of transition within regimes, similarly to the role they play in transitions among regimes.

These are only two examples of the way in which Pietro Grilli has extended the use of concepts from one field of inquiry (inter-regime changes) to another one (intra-regime changes). The creation of a new semantic field proposed by Pietro Grilli paves the way for the search of a general theory of political and institutional change.

Incubation, adaptive evolution, punctuated equilibrium

As I already wrote at the beginning of this contribution, Pietro Grilli proposes in his book an interpretative model of transition within democratic regimes. This framework resembles what in organization theory is called incubation theory. The causal factors – whatever they be – remain at the latent level even for a long period of time. The political system seems to be operating with a satisfactory performance, even if elements of the crisis are already present. At a certain moment, there is a trigger, an external factor, often unforeseeable – such as an economic crisis, a challenge on the international arena, the initiative of the judiciary system – and then the crisis explodes and change seems to be necessary. But the external challenge is only the apparent cause of the crisis, it affects an already defective situation.

This is not the only model to interpret institutional change. Streeck and Thelen (2003) have proposed a well-known typology of evolutionary change and pointed that institutions change even if they seemingly do not change. In other words, the functions of political institutions may be subject to deep transformations, even if they may seem extremely stable at the formal level. This model of change recalls what Pietro Grilli termed adaptive change.

Finally, there is a model of change proposed some years ago by Sergio Fabbrini (2000) in a book dealing with the same topic of Grilli's contributions, namely political change within democratic regimes, in particular Italy and France. In his book Fabbrini utilizes the punctuated equilibrium theory, a model originally proposed in contrast to the traditional Darwinian approach of evolutionary change. In this model, gradualism and incrementalism are excluded: change entails a sort of “quantum leap” brought about by a new power balance between the political coalitions supporting or opposing institutional reforms.

Incubation, evolutionary adaptation, punctuated equilibrium. Three different ways of explaining political and institutional change within democratic regimes. Which of them is valid? This question obviously is still open both on the theoretical and on the empirical level. The merits of Pietro Grilli have been two. He has devoted a piece of his intellectual work to this relatively understudied topic. Secondly, he has shed light on what happens before (incubation of the crisis) and after the crisis (consolidation of a new model of democracy) and emphasized that these phases are much more important than the crisis itself. These phases decisively influence the more or less incisive impact the crisis may, or may not have, on the history of democratic regimes.

References

- Baldi, B. (2000), Il federalismo fra disegno costituzionale e pratiche paracostituzionali: una comparazione fra Stati Uniti e Germania, in L. Lanzalaco (a cura di), *Istituzioni, amministrazione, politica. Analisi istituzionale e apparati amministrativi*, Napoli, ESI, pp. 195-230.

- Grilli di Cortona, P. (1995), Seconda Repubblica o Prima Repubblica-bis? Osservazioni comparative sul cambiamento politico in Italia, "Quaderni di Scienza politica", 2, 3, pp. 469-494.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2007), *Il cambiamento politico in Italia. Dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica*, Roma Carocci.
- Fabbrini, S. (2000), *Tra pressioni e veti. Il cambiamento politico in Italia*, Roma-Bari, Laterza.
- Lanzalaco, L. (2005), *Le politiche istituzionali*, Bologna, il Mulino.
- Morlino, L. (2014), Transizione in stallo e conseguente instabilità, in M. Almagisti, L. Lanzalaco e L. Verzichelli (a cura di), *La transizione politica italiana. Da Tangentopoli a oggi*, Roma, Carocci, pp. 197-221.
- Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (2003), Institutional change in advanced political economies, in W. Streeck and K. Thelen (eds), *Beyond Continuity: Institutional change in advanced political economies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

When Political Science and History meet. 'Legacies of the Past and Democracy' in Pietro Grilli di Cortona's Research

Orazio Lanza

UNIVERSITY OF CATANIA

The birth of a Standing Group on 'History and Political Science' was only approved and formalized on 5 June, 2015 during the last SISP Executive Board meeting, chaired by Pietro Grilli di Cortona. Its founding Manifesto reminds us that, in Italy, unlike other countries, meeting and confrontation between Political Science and Historiography is still not a very widespread custom. In fact, 'Historical Political Science' ('Politologia storica' in the Manifesto) is still considered a neglected area of research. In reality, the phenomena is not new; the complicated relationship between Political Science and History has interested many other countries and the distrust between disciplines is reciprocal. As far as modern Political Science and History is concerned, the success of the complex 'movement' called *Behavioralism* ('Behavioral Approach') established between the 1930s and 1950s and centered in the USA, definitely had a fundamental role in this process. Some decades ago, Dahl pointed out that those mainly American scholars who were later called *Behaviorists* or *Behavioralists*:

shared a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical, and the descriptive-institutional approaches, and a belief that additional methods and approaches either existed or could be developed that would help to provide political science with empirical propositions and theories of a systematic sort, tested by closer, more direct and more rigorously controlled observations of political events (Dahl 1961, 766).

Among the results of the introduction of this approach into the Political Science field, was a low sensitivity, if not a clear-cut oblivion, toward history. More than a discipline the 'Behavioral Approach' reject a method, used by historians, described as individualizing or idiographic, considered incompatible to the generalizing or nomothetic one used by political scientists. From hence, derived a new political science, whose original features had a strong inclination toward a-historicity (Dahl 1961, 771) rather than anti-historicity (Pasquino 1971, 13). The focus on the scarce compatibility of the two methods echoed in one of the first Political Science manuals, published in Italy in the early 1970s (Urbani 1970, 41-42). Sartori himself, even though he considered History an immense deposit of experiences (but not of experiments) from which to draw, underlined how 'historical control' had an intrinsic weakness that limited its use in scientific analysis of politics (Sartori 1979, 248-250).

Forgetting history is not the only limitation of Behavioralism highlighted by those who gave the first account of its impact. Pasquino, for example, in his introduction to another important Political Science text book, in vogue in the early 1970s, referring to Dahl's (1961) observations regarding Behavioralism's unsolved problems, saw how the question regarding observable behavior and its measurement/quantification had swayed many behaviorists to choose marginal investigation subjects and precipitous retreats into 'methodologism' and technicality. In other words, they retreated toward the opinion that adoption and constant improvement in specific techniques for detecting and interpreting political behavior was more important than scientist creativity and imagination (Pasquino 1971, 20).

However, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, the awareness of the limitations of *Behavioralism*, the increase and widespread use of case-based comparative strategies, the development of approaches like Historical Institutionalism, encouraged even political scientists to revisit the question of the rapport between history and the social science, renewing interest for comparative-historical approaches and for systematic qualitative comparisons.

In the United States, thanks also to seminal works such as Barrington Moore Jr.'s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) and the advent of approaches like the above mentioned neo-institutionalism, the academic climate changed so the APSA established a 'Politics and History' section in 1989. In Europe, where 'Historical Political Science' has a rather significant tradition (just think, for example of Max Weber and Otto Hintze's contributions), a mainspring towards revisiting the relationship between political science and history was provided by Stein Rokkan's work, who, as we know, in attempting to understand and explain political development in Western Europe, turned his attention tenaciously to the weight of historical events.

As Morlino reminds us, Italy instead, witnessed a sort of paradox. On the one hand, the difficult rebirth of political science after the Second World War, made it almost mandatory to set discipline boundaries in respect to neighboring semantic domains (Philosophy Politics, Constitutional Law, History, Sociology). Furthermore, "...the most significant contributions came from the intermediate sectors themselves, midway between History and Political Science, between Economics and Political Science, between Sociology and Political Science" (Morlino 1989, 5).

The fact that an Italian 'History and Political Science' Standing Group was instituted 26 years after the United States and the contents of its Manifesto suggest that the Historical Political Science tradition still needs to be constructed and that its difficult genesis has left a legacy that not even founding fathers like Bobbio, Leoni, and Sartori were able to curb.

When the Historical Political Science tradition is developed in Italy as well, we are sure that Pietro Grilli will be listed as one of its forerunners. As Barbara Pisciotta's contribution in this issue reminds us, Pietro Grilli used History and long term, diachronic analysis as the underlying theme of his scientific contribution. Obviously, he was not a lone pioneer; Pietro Grilli had a sound competence in Political Science methodology. It is not by mere chance that he authored a chapter on the subject in a Political Science textbook (Grilli di Cortona, Lanza, Pisciotta and Germano 2016) used by various University courses. Moreover, in a Box on 'History and Social Sciences' he is noted in research work where he shows that the methodological boundaries between History and Social Sciences

have not always been so clear-cut; how the use of the comparative method often unites the two disciplines and that striving to formulate general laws like those formulated for Physics does not exclude that many social scientists are convinced that research -produced 'laws' often have 'local' characteristics. In other words, a spatio-temporally bounded application, often tends to fade (without annulling) the differences between Social Science and History, resizing Behaviorist a-historical drives (*ibid*, 38).

Pietro Grilli was fully aware of the unresolved academic controversies involving methods and approaches, used and usable in Political Science. He respected other people's convictions, different from his own, but he did have his preferences, defending them passionately but without elbowing anyone else, never allowing himself to be swayed by fads. Despite some extensive case studies, as Barbara Pisciotta points out, and diversity of topics, we see a second underlying theme in his constant recourse to comparative control, in his preference for qualitative analysis, in his attention to rigorous, accurate construction and treatment of concepts.

Finally, a third underlying aspect was seen when he had to choose research questions, facing Gilpin's dilemma, on explaining 'trivial issues exactly' or treating 'important issues imprecisely', he did not hesitate. Since his graduation thesis in 'Dottrina dello Stato' on *Stalin and after Stalin in the Soviet Union*, he preferred the second path, often facing questions, treated very little by Italian Political Science, like those relating to Eastern European political systems, even when collecting data was difficult and empirical sources were in short supply.

Therefore, the choice of studying *The role of legacies in European democratization processes after the Second World War* was the continuation of a path which Pietro had already begun (see, for example, Grilli di Cortona 2009). Curiosity regarding this subject was encouraged by the acknowledgement that a general democratization theory was – and still is- non-existent in Political Science (see in this issue the article by Leonardo Morlino). This is true, partly because it is rather difficult to report on a body of generalization processes which is distant both in time and in space. In the planning phase of Pietro Grilli's research, he tried to arrange the various factors that favor/influence the democratization boot processes and their outcomes, gathering them into two groups, not necessarily reciprocally exclusive: i.e. an international and an exquisitely national one. In addition, Pietro Grilli proposed a third group, the one labeled 'old regime legacies' which does not exclude the other two, assuming that some legacies were favorable and others contrary to democratization. So the working hypothesis for his research wanted explanations of differences in democratization outcomes, to pay particular attention to legacies that the past of each country transmitted to new political actors, thereby constraining their strategic choices and behavior.

The *legacies* choice meant measuring up against one of the main ambitions of Social Sciences: to explain social change, implying that, however relevant it might be, it is difficult to create a 'tabula rasa' of the past; even the greatest social and political changes in the end, prove to be less fluid than they seem at first and finally – the past is never really the past at all, because it reappears again under many forms.

From a theoretical-methodological point of view, attention on legacies enhances history and the role of historical inertia, recalling what was theorized by historical neo-institutionalism, as it foresees the survival of norms and regulates institutions; taking into

consideration the role of routines, norms, procedures and what pre-existing organizational forms take in political processes (March and Olsen 1989).

Therefore, the *Legacies* theme links to two of the most well-known theoretical frameworks of *path dependency* (Pearson 2000). This tries to explain continuities by theorizing that, once former choices have become institutionalized in organizations: rules/norms, agreements, and prerogatives, it seems difficult to modify them and the actors involved tend to conform, almost complying to inertia. This theory also underlines discontinuity, believing that the past does indeed exert influence, but not necessarily producing movement that goes towards the same direction. Sometimes it causes totally opposite reactions, for example, fueling actors to break free from past constraints in any way they can.

Nevertheless, legacies have never been completely overlooked in the past by scholars of political change. Tocqueville, for example (1856), picked up the connection between the outcomes of the French Revolution and institutions, between processes and events dating back to the *Ancien Régime*, showing for the first time how the past that the revolution wanted to destroy (and surely destroyed in part) was not completely past and its weight and influence still continued to be felt. In addition, Skocpol (1976, 309-310) notes that, regarding the Revolution, “the old Regime’s legacy modeled post-revolutionary differences directly and indirectly” and that that changes were also due to “certain structural models of former regimes” (*ibid.*, 310). We have already mentioned Barrington Moore Jr’s work. Huntington (1991), who, in turn, reaffirmed that re-democratizations are more likely to succeed than democratizations because they are supported by a wealth of experience and a memory of the past, transmitted by institutions, collective actors and often by single political leaders.

In recent decades, Legacy studies of preceding authoritarian régimes have been concerned with inter disciplinary literature dealing with ‘coming to terms with the past’. Essentially this means considering the way new democracies measure up to the problems of the violence by the preceding non-democratic régime. This issue has found fertile terrain in some countries (see, for example, Hagopian 1993; Aguilar 1996 and 2008; Barahona de Brito, González Enríquez, and Aguilar 2001; Hite and Cesarini, 2004; Costa Pinto, 2006) and in some disciplines such as History and Legal Doctrine. Particular attention was placed on *historical memory* and *transitional justice*. This latter concept summarizes an area of research centered on how society faces human rights abuse, mass atrocities or other forms of severe social traumas, including genocide and civil wars of the former régimes, in order to build a more just and peaceful democratic future (Teitel 1997 and 2000; Elster 2009; Di Gregorio 2012).

In modern Political Science, studies on authoritarian legacies are few. Even though a volume on this subject was presented in 1982, by Herz, legacies has found some space on democratization studies’ agenda only in the past twenty years (see among others, Larsen 1998; Morlino 2003; Hite and Cesarini 2004; Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2011; Costa Pinto and Morlino 2013). One of the reasons why it was so unpopular is that past legacies are rather allusive and ambiguous; their definition and operationalization far from simple. An important seminal work on the subject was carried out by Leonardo Morlino (2003) who states:

I define as authoritarian traditions or legacies those behavioral models, rules, relationships, social and political situations, but also norms, procedures and institutions, that were introduced or reinforced by the authoritarian regime immediately preceding the democratic transition (...). The observable aspects of the authoritarian legacies are different. In the first place, an authoritarian legacy contains three elements, connected amongst themselves, but that can be present, even if only partially, in the new democratic settings. They are: *a*) a group of beliefs, values and attitudes; *b*) one or more public institutions, bodies or simple organizations; *c*) the behaviors derived from the relationships between the first two dimensions (...) (in substance), as suggested by the same definition, there are two fundamental types of legacies: *a*) those relative to values, to the institutions and to the behaviors desired by the authoritarian regime; *b*) those which reinforce precedent values and existing institutions, with new institutions, bodies or organizations and consequent behavioral habits. The second type of legacies is profoundly rooted in the political culture and tends to be stronger and more persistent (2003, 256-257).

Pietro Grilli di Cortona (2011a) noted that the few studies proposed by political science focused, above all, on the legacies of previous authoritarian régimes and that it would be useful to use other perspectives that did not set time limits. Therefore, he proposed a distinction between historical legacies (the ‘*trapassato*/past imperfect’) and inherently authoritarian ones (past). Historical Legacies, which are defined by the same terminology used for the authoritarian ones and involve factors such as values, memories, identities, norms, institutions, organizations, élites, behaviors, routines and practices, which, even though they are filtered, reinforced or weakened by the authoritarian régime, always have an influence on democratization and consequently, on the following régime (Pridham 2000, 42).

Furthermore, Pietro Grilli also advocated a thorough reflection on the concept of *historical memory*: its meaning, the different uses that political actors, called upon to build new democracies, could employ, and the concept of *political learning*, already embodied in some important studies on the subject (Bermeo 1992; Pridham 2000); in addition, Grilli also identified a series of ways in which the influence of historical legacies could be utilized. In particular, past history could contain the following elements:

1. *indirect influence* occurs when legacies affect the *non-democratic* regime, which in turn will influence the transition to democracy and subsequent establishment of a democracy;
2. *emulative reference* occurs when symbols of the pre-authoritarian or pre-totalitarian past, such as constitutions, norms, and institutions are restored, bringing back the previous stage;
3. *political learning* occurs when *learning* from past experiences and from previous mistakes have positive effects on democratization and its results.

As far as the operationalization of strictly authoritarian legacies is concerned, based on Morlino and Grilli’s definition we have three predominant dimensions: A) élites; B) political institutions and structures and the cultural models on which they are based; C) socio-cultural aspects. During research, these three dimensions were further disarticulated. Specifically, the category, ‘Institutions, political structures and organization models’

was further divided into: a) 'Institutions', b) 'Parties and Party Systems', c) 'Elites', d) 'Stateness and related Problems', while the socio-cultural dimension was divided into e) 'Statalism' and f) 'Mobilization, Political Culture and Civil Society'.

For empirical verification, Pietro Grilli identified an articulated series of indicators, sub-divided into each subject matter with the aim of empirically checking, in selected cases, the degree of reliability in the research's main hypothesis.

Regarding case choice, the research was projected as an area comparison, focused on the diachronic analysis of 11 Western European countries (France and Germany), Southern European countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) and Eastern countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia). The research objective was to explain the similarities and differences of their democratization processes, determined both by their political, economic and institutional legacies derived from former non-democratic régimes and by their widely-considered past history.

The research results published by *il Mulino* publisher (Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2011) confirm the strong incidence of legacies in democratization processes. Traces of the past always last; hence every neo-democracy must deal with them. The success or failure of democratization is also based on legacies, in particular on the ability of new régimes to control or neutralize those 'negative' traces; that is, those least compatible with a democratic set-up. 'Positive' traces, on the other hand, are those that lead to choices that can facilitate the establishment and consolidation of democracies.

The main problem that builders of democracies have to face, is that often the 'positive' or 'negative' characteristics of legacies cannot be determined *ex ante*, but only *ex post*. In fact, results often belie the evening's forecast. In the cases under-consideration, arenas in which the transmission of legacies is more frequent and relevant, and on which a comparison can be made, are the ones relating to institutions, party systems, issues regarding stateness, élites, the role of state in society and in economy, and political culture and civil society areas.

In addition to visible legacies (élites, institutions, organizations, political practices), we need to deal with invisible ones: mainly the *memory of the past* filtered by élites, mass media and institutions. This is a hard theme to circumscribe because of masses and élites' changing and oscillating perceptions of the past. However, it is obvious that invisible legacies are relevant to democracy policy: the re-actualization of events happening many years before may seem absurd, but it is part of daily politics, having positive and negative aspects. The Fascist, National-Socialist, Communist, Francoist, 'collaborationist', Nationalist past, as well as the complicity, the crimes and the responsibilities of the élites, continue to affect mutual legitimation between opposing political forces.

In building a durable and quality-style democracy, a fundamental role is played by the élite and protagonist groups dedicated to democratic revival, which often represent a minority of the population. The delicate task of finding a balance between extremes is up to them: between a memory that is learning and warning for the future and one that is made up of continual irruptions of the past into the present, that bring back political agendas, which revive a past that does not go away, thereby fueling conflict and opposition.

Finally, to conclude, I would like to share some of my personal memories. Although we occasionally met at academic events, my relationship with Pietro Grilli as scientific collaborator began at the annual SISP Conference held in Bologna in September 2006.

Together with Gianfranco Pasquino, he co-chaired the panel on ‘Parties and Party Systems in European Democracies’. I was at that time a *paper presenter*. In the following months, in order to prepare a handbook that we were compiling, we exchanged e-mails concerning opinions and suggestions on our respective chapters.

What came about, was an on-going synergy regarding work methods and academic report styles. A few months later, Pietro offered me a partnership, as local unit head of research, for the 2007 PRIN on the *Role of Legacies in Third Wave Democratization*. The collaboration was then followed by the writing of a Political Science Handbook for De Agostini editors, with the 2009 PRIN on *Why democratizing? The causes of non democratic regimes crisis and breakdown in the third wave*, and might have continued with a further PRIN project on *Stateness and Democratization*, which was only outlined, as Pietro, who was meanwhile elected President of the SISP no longer wanted to participate in competitive tenders.

I saw Pietro Grilli for the last time on June 5, 2015, one month and eleven days before he passed away. I was at Roma Tre University for a PHD/Doctorate Commission and Pietro was at the Department also to preside over the SISP Directive Board meeting convened for that afternoon. He was worn out due to his illness; we had a frugal lunch at a café near the Department with colleagues who worked with Pietro in Rome and we chatted about our children and our families. He confided to me that he would have rather be lying down in bed resting. But his work-ethic and his keen sense of institutional duty obliged him to be there. These were values that I had learned to appreciate; they were part of his rich culture and value baggage. Pietro Grilli was endowed with out of the ordinary analytical skills, scientific rigor, great working and leadership skills, noteworthy authoritativeness, needed to carry out scientific undertakings with great efficiency and lucidity. In addition to his various professional skills, I was also aware of his extraordinary personal qualities; in particular, innate politeness, cordiality, reliability, irony and generosity. For all these reasons, I was happy to be able to work alongside this man, considering myself lucky to have had this opportunity.

References

- Aguilar, P. (1996), *Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
- Aguilar, P. (2008), *Políticas de la Memoria y Memoria de la Política*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
- Barahona de Brito, A., González Enríquez, C. and Aguilar, P. (eds) (2001), *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bermeo, N. (1992), *Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship*, in “Comparative Politics”, 24, 3, pp. 273-291.
- Costa Pinto, A. (2006), *Authoritarian Legacies, Transitional Justice and State Crisis in Portugal’s Democratization*, in “Democratization”, 13, 2, pp. 173-204.
- Costa Pinto, A. and Morlino, L. (eds) (2013), *Dealing with the Legacy of Authoritarianism: The ‘Politics of the Past’ in Southern European Democracies*, Routledge, London.
- Dahl, R. (1961), *The behavioral approach in political science. Epitaph to a movement for a successful protest*, in “American Political Science Review”, 55, 4, p.763-772.
- Di Gregorio, A. (2012), *Epurazioni e protezione della democrazia. Esperienze e modelli di ‘giustizia post-autoritaria’*, Franco Angeli, Milano.

- Elster, J. (2004), *Closing the books: transitional justice in historical perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2009), *Come gli stati diventano democratici*, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2011a), *Il passato che non passa: il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni*, in Grilli di Cortona, P. and Lanza, O. (eds) (2011), pp. 11-39.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2011b), *Conclusioni. Eredità e democratizzazioni in prospettiva comparata*, in Grilli di Cortona, P. and Lanza, O. (eds) (2011), pp. 289-322.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. and Lanza, O. (eds) (2011), *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia*. Il Mulino, Bologna.
- Grilli di Cortona, P., Lanza, O., Pisciotta, B. and Germano L. (2016), *Capire la politica*, Utet-Università, Torino.
- Hagopian, F. (1993), *After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation, and the Democratic Future of South America*, in "World Politics", 45, 3, pp. 464-500.
- Herz, J. (ed.) (1982), *From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism*, Greenwood Press, Westport-London.
- Hite, K. and Cesarini, P. (eds) (2004), *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.
- Huntington, S. (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London.
- Larsen, S.U. (ed.) (1998), *Modern Europe after Fascism. 1943-1980s*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989), *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*, Free Press, New York.
- Moore, B. jr. (1966), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston.
- Morlino, L. (1989), *Introduzione. Ancora un bilancio lamentevole*, in Morlino, L. (ed.), *Scienza politica*, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Torino, pp. 5-52.
- Morlino, L. (2003), *Democrazie e democratizzazioni*, il Mulino, Bologna.
- Pasquino, G. (1971), *Prefazione all'edizione italiana*, in Charlesworth J.C. (ed.), *Teorie e metodi in scienza politica*, il Mulino, Bologna, (or. edit. Charlesworth J.C. (ed.) (1967), *Contemporary Political Analysis*, The Free press, New York).
- Pierson, P. (2000), *Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics*, in "American Political Science Review", 94, 2, pp. 251-267.
- Pierson, P. (2004), *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Pridham, G. (2000), *Confining Conditions and Breaking with the Past: Historical Legacies and Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy*, in "Democratization", 7, 2, pp. 36-64.
- Sartori, G. (1979), *La politica*, Sugarco, Milano.
- Teitel, R. G. (1997), *Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation*, in "The Yale Law Journal" 106,7, pp. 2009-2080.
- Teitel, R. G. (2000), *Transitional Justice*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Tocqueville, A., (1856), *L'ancien régime et la révolution*, Michel-Lévy frères, Paris.
- Urbani, G. (1970), *Metodi, approcci e teorie. Introduzione*, in Sartori, G. (ed.), *Antologia di Scienza politica*, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 31-53.

State building and nationalism: the lesson of Pietro Grilli di Cortona

Giampiero Cama

UNIVERSITY OF GENOA

Introduction

The related development of states and nationalism in Europe was one of Pietro Grilli's several fields of research. Also in this area of interest he showed his peculiar style, especially a peculiar ability to combine theoretical and empirical analysis and a skilful use of the historical comparative method. Pietro addresses this issue mainly in a very interesting and seminal book, *Stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa* (il Mulino, 2003), where we can find a remarkable and exhaustive longitudinal analysis of the birth and evolution of states and nations in our continent. In this work he shows, as usual for him, his skill to organize different and complex variables in clear and effective conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In my tribute to a dear friend and to a prestigious scholar I will try to illustrate some relevant implications of this specific contribution. Firstly, I think that the conceptual maps and the hypothesis used to explain different routes of state and nation development in Europe could be successfully employed in the study of non-European countries. Secondly, many theoretical insights contained in the book could be useful in order to address and understand some relevant issues of the contemporary world: the outbreak and solution of ethnic and civil wars, the uprising of neo-nationalism in western countries, the problematic relationship between democracy and nationalism. Some of these topics will be discussed in the following lines.

The conceptual and theoretical framework

Before illustrating the theoretical framework, it should be specified that there are two types of nationalism: state nationalism (or nationalism of majorities) and nationalism of minorities. The first one is characterised by states willing to create a single and homogeneous nation, based on common identity. This goal needs progressive reduction of cultural and linguistic differences (the path followed by France). The book's focus, however, is on the nationalism of minorities, that holds out against centralisation and assimilation processes put forward by political centres. The latter is generated especially by stateless nations, that aspire to get political sovereignty or, at least, some form of self-rule. This type of nationalism is important because, as we will see later, it seems not doomed to decline in the contemporary world, but, instead, to transform its features, adapting to evolving circumstances.

The book singles out the set of variables (related to each other) – the first two bringing together the principal independent variables, the third the intervener variables – that have variously shaped the evolution of state and nationalism in Europe.

The first set concerns the state building configuration. In this regard Pietro underlines the timing of state building along with the strength and precocity of nation building; and the type of relationship between centre and periphery. Both variables, then, are connected to different models of state building: states that originate from a centralistic process, following a top-down project (centralistic model) and states arising as a result of voluntary agreements among different political communities (federal model). The centralistic model is less inclined to recognise and accept internal differences, while the federal model is ready to arrange them through institutional compromises. The relation between model of state-building and nationalism is not linear, but, nevertheless, precocious federal states are assumed, more likely, to limit nationalism and successfully defuse domestic conflicts.

The second set pertains the sequences between state-building and nation-building. When state-building precedes nation-building and are both chronologically close, national mobilisation is supposed to decrease in number and frequency.

The intervener variables that can modify, deviate and diversify the effect of the dependent ones are three. The first intervener variable refers to the international system. Even when international events seem to be favourable, nationalist movements have to achieve a sufficient level of legitimacy that enable them to get consensus or, at least, not hostility from great powers. The second intervener variables relate to the emergence of mass politics and democracy. Because of them, nationalism becomes a mass ideology, it undergoes a radicalisation process and amplifies its mobilising thrust. Democratisation, moreover, transforms nationalisms conveying them toward party politics and giving them new opportunities of political participation and ideological expression. The third intervener variable, lastly, is the influence of other cleavages. When they overlap (or cross-cut), territorial cleavages can amplify (or mitigate) the politicisation and mobilisation of the nationalism of minorities. This variable, that refers to the Rokkan works, explains why simple linguistic and ethnic differences are not sufficient to trigger a conflict. Religious rivalries and economic antagonisms often have a decisive role depending on whether they were overlapping or cross-cutting with regard to ethnic-linguistic conflicts.

In summary, the analysis of the complex relations between state and nation-building clearly shows as nationalism has exerted a double pressure towards states. On the one hand, it has been a powerful factor of state-building, but, on the other hand, it has contributed many times to dismantle and break up long-standing experiences of unified states, with volatile combinations of disruptive and constructive effects.

Civil war, ethnic-religious conflicts and terrorism: the relevance of this theoretical framework

We believe that the contribution of this book could be appropriate in order to better understand some of the problems that are plaguing our time, particularly the spread in contemporary world of civil wars caused by ethnic and religious conflicts and the proliferation of terrorism. The conceptual map and the set of hypotheses suggested by Pietro Grilli can help us to clarify the origin and development of various conflicts that characterise many pluralistic states today, especially in African and Asian countries.

A large number of non-European countries, indeed, are an example, on the one hand, of countries without coincidence between state and nation (that is, housing pluralistic

societies), and, on the other hand, of stateless nations (like Kurdish and Palestinian people). In both cases the European history – illustrated in the book with abundance of empirical examples and analytical acuteness – has often anticipated problems and issues successively faced by the rest of the world.

The cases of non-coincidence between state and nation, for instance, are subdivided by Pietro into various subtypes (in their turn diversified on the base of other institutional and socio-economic details), that could be used to understand many situations characterising our day. The first one is the “predominant” model, in which a stronger nation has been the driving force of state-building, while other nations have endured, or even opposed to, this process (a potential source of future troubles). The second one is a sort of “equal model” where state-building is led by diverse nations, without the domain of any of them. This route usually generates multinational states, resulting from a compromise based on institutional features able to mutually ensure different social identities. In these cases the success (or, vice versa, the failure) of peaceful coexistence is only measurable in the long-term and relies on more specific, and often complex, set of factors well illustrated in the book. The third sub-type includes cases in which no coincidence between state and nation is due to a state that contains only part of the nation that carried it out. This situation can provoke a sort of “step by step” state-building, sometimes doomed to remain at length unfinished or prolonged. This, in turn, is supposed to stir up waves of mobilisation aiming at completing the state-building process and to bring about, obviously, political tension with neighbouring countries.

Equally interesting is the manner in which the cases of stateless nations are examined, one the most important determinants of ongoing political instability. Firstly, in this regard, he distinguishes, on one side, region-nations striving for founding their own states and, on the other side, region-nations aiming only to escape from unwanted sovereignty (mainly to unify with kinship states). The implication arising from the two situations in terms of international relations can be, of course, very different. Secondly, we can find a helpful enumeration of elements that could cause success or failure of stateless nations’ claims: intensity of political mobilisation (that can be weakened by socio-economic conditions or by migratory phenomena); impact of religion, when it supports resistance of peripheries and preservation of their traditions and identities; coexistence in the same territory of more opposing nations, a factor that makes peaceful solutions of antagonistic aspirations particularly difficult; availability (or not) and desirability (or not) of alternative solutions to remain in the hosting state. One final element is not related to domestic politics, but to the international system. In particular, he underlines the geo-political location of region-nations and, above all, the possible existence of a foreign country taking up the task of supporting and safeguarding interests and goals of a minority nation. Also the general conditions of the international system are relevant, especially when it faces a transitional process in the balance of power, a situation that creates a window of opportunity for new political settings.

The problematic links between nationalism and democracy

The long and rich experiences in European history also illustrate the complex relation between nationalism and democracy. In his analysis Pietro Grilli highlights the concurrent presence of areas of contiguity and antagonism in this respect, helping us to

better understand and address many current political troubles. He treats democratic regimes both as independent and dependent variables.

In the first case, he investigates the role of democracy in conflict prevention and solution. In this regard, the relation is not linear. Liberalisation and democratisation are not ever the best way to avoid the outbreak of nationalistic conflicts. Sometimes, on the contrary, they create more problems than they solve. Claims for autonomy and collective rights, indeed, can provoke crises in the original polities and even their fragmentation, with risks for democracy itself. The European experience teaches us that when state and nation-building successfully anticipate democratisation, ethnic and national conflicts are less likely. When they are incomplete or weak, on the contrary, democratisation can probably trigger strong nationalist mobilisation.

Democracy can be evaluated, moreover, on the ability to manage and solve already existing nationalistic cleavages. In order to clarify this issue Pietro identifies three configurations: states with consolidated democracies, states that have undergone regime instability (with alternation between democracy and authoritarian rule), and states suffering from discontinuity (following the breaking of their unity). The empirical analysis shows that in consolidated democracies nationalistic mobilisations achieve concrete results that, in the end, make the mitigation of political tensions easier. Authoritarian regimes, instead, limit themselves to coercively freeze cleavages (often favouring a single ethnic or linguistic group), paving the way for future radicalisation of conflicts. Other interesting cases are those in which, like in many areas of crisis today, the processes of democratisation and state-building have been concurrent and overlapping. These contexts are supposed to generate a sense of insecurity among ethnic and linguistic groups, that, in turn, jeopardise their pacific coexistence. Even if democracies encourage political élites to pursue negotiated solutions and institutional compromises, the book underlines, however, that there is no lack of important exceptions, such as the cases in which (like Northern Ireland and other European countries) a minority group feels threatened by groups that could take on predominance in the near future. In these circumstances (like others pointed out in the work), therefore, also democracies encounter serious difficulties to peacefully settle nationalistic disputes.

Democracy has been considered by Pietro as a dependent variable as well. Like other scholars he highlights the problematic relation between this type of regime and ethnically divided societies. In particular, he contends that it is impossible to consolidate democracy without first setting a negotiated and consensual solution of state-building process, further evidence that nationalistic conflicts are the most difficult to handle also for democratic regimes.

The lesson of method

This book, like many other works, illustrates the peculiar approach of Pietro to his fields of research. In general, he was very close to the “classic tradition” of Political Science, that of the great masters of the discipline, from Weber to Rokkan, etc. From them he took up the taste for wide-ranging studies and for comparative analysis. Within this framework he shows, moreover, specific and remarkable skills.

Above all a peculiar attitude to manage complex sets of variables, without losing analytical clarity. In this way, he was able to elaborate useful systems of classification and

insightful middle-range theories for every topic he addressed. He was not very inclined to find out a general theory concerning his principal areas of interest, preferring instead a configurative approach, more appropriate, in his view, to the complexity and fluidity of political phenomena. That does not mean the abandoning of any theoretical ambition. He always tried, through his typology and his middle-range hypotheses, to make the apparently chaotic flow of political events intelligible.

Finally, he had another peculiar ability, that to make large cross-country comparative analysis using mainly a qualitative approach. At a time when cross-country studies are mostly carried out through quantitative approach, this aspect is in my opinion appreciable. Pietro did not dislike quantitative methods, on the contrary he was interested in them and curious about their use in comparative politics. But his works, like that examined in this text, proves the usefulness of this traditional approach and its complementarity with the new ones.

The study of change and institutional persistence in ‘Rivoluzioni e Burocrazie’ by Pietro Grilli di Cortona

Rosalba Chiarini

ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY, ROME

Professor Pietro Grilli di Cortona passed away on 16 July 2015, but for all those who had the good fortune to work alongside him, as I did, his rigorous and independent thinking, his generous, measured academic style, and the warm, gracious way in which he unfailingly engaged with others represent an immense legacy. We first met in 2002, the year in which Grilli asked me to take on some temporary teaching in Public Administration at the Roma Tre University. I accepted his invitation with great pleasure, and it marked the beginning of a relationship of reciprocal understanding, which matured above all from 2007, following my transfer from the University of Calabria to the Faculty of Political Science at Roma Tre. At the time, Grilli was director of the Department of International Studies, and his scientific and academic prowess, combined with his teaching skills and human qualities, were apparent to me from the very start. So it is an honour for me, on this occasion, to look back on one of his many scientific contributions, which have enriched political science in Italy and further afield. The work in question is *Rivoluzioni e burocrazie. Continuità e mutamento negli Stati rivoluzionari* (Grilli di Cortona 1991), which perfectly reflects an intellectual passion for studying and understanding phenomena of crisis and regime change that would distinguish his entire output.

The book focuses on a number of important questions concerning the role of revolutionary processes in relation to the bureaucracies of the old and the new regime. They are dealt with by investigating the relationship between revolutions and bureaucracies in a number of countries where a revolutionary process took place in the course of the twentieth century: the communist revolutions of Russia and China, and the Nazi one in Germany – the so-called “great revolutions”, together with the political, economic and cultural repercussions they had in Europe and Asia – and the four “small revolutions” of Algeria, Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua. The Algerian revolution was anticolonial in inspiration, the ones in Cuba and Nicaragua combined anti-Western sentiment and a longing for national liberation with elements of social freedom and renewal, while in Iran religion was the key factor in revolutionary mobilization. The seven revolutionary processes were marked by profound differences, which impacted on the institutional outcomes of the revolutions.

The first step in Grilli’s research is to define *revolution*. A recent disciplinary work (Calise, Lowi, Musella 2016) proposes two analytic dimensions for the study of this concept: the outcome of the change (political/social) generated by the revolutionary process

and the type of change (greater openness/closure of the system) that results (Paparo 2016). In the first dimension a distinction is made between *political* revolutions, which simply transform the political organization of a State, and social revolutions, which overthrow both the political and social organization and entail a broader and deeper change. The second dimension takes into account the direction of change, and distinguishes between *liberal* and *authoritarian/totalitarian* revolutions: in the first case, civil liberties and political rights are recognized, and the revolutionary process sets out to establish a polyarchic regime (Dahl 1972); conversely, in the second case dissent and competition are strongly limited (authoritarian regimes), if not totally suppressed and replaced by an absence of political pluralism and by the high mobilization and ideological penetration of society (totalitarian regimes).

This framework helps to make it clear that Grilli chose to focus on revolutions that led to authoritarianisms and totalitarianisms – the former capable of overthrowing the political order, the latter of sweeping away the social one as well. After signalling 1789 as a decisive watershed in establishing the more recent meaning of the term, he writes: “I consider revolutions to be those processes that entail, on the one hand, the crumbling and fall of a political regime and its juridical order, *by internal means, in illegitimate and violent forms* and through phenomena of mass mobilization; and on the other, *the establishment of a new juridical political regime*” (Grilli di Cortona 1991, 20). It is with this meaning, comprising both a “revolutionary situation” and a “revolutionary outcome” – which assimilates the lesson of Fisichella (1987) but looks also to the contribution of Huntington (1968) – that the three fundamental components of any revolution emerge: the process of discontinuous transition from one regime to another, political mobilization and the presence of violence. Grilli’s comparative analysis of revolutionary bureaucracies goes on to examine these dimensions, given his stated aim to “formulate generalizations about the relations between, on the one hand, the nature of revolutionary change, the characteristics of political mobilization and the type and amount of violence produced; and, on the other, the qualitative and quantitative features of the bureaucracies that emerge (and/or partially survive) in the revolution” (Grilli di Cortona 1991, 29). The research thus looks at revolutions from the point of view of their effects on state administrative institutions, and the second phase of the research involves framing the revolutionary phenomenon in the ambit of the modern State.

The development of legal-rational bureaucratic apparatuses is the principal element in the formation of the modern State (Weber 1922). Precisely because they are constitutive of state power (Poggi 1978), administrative structures are so indispensable that it seems hard for them to be attacked by revolutionary processes. The analysis of individual cases begins at this point, exploiting data drawn from history to reconstruct the changes undergone by military and civil bureaucracies following their impact with revolution. So, for instance, the transition from the Russian bureaucracy to the Soviet one displays elements of both discontinuity and continuity. The former includes quantitative and qualitative differences in the recruitment base, a party apparatus parallel to the state apparatus and predominant over it, and a distinguishing between civilian and military roles. Elements of administrative continuity between Tsarism and communism include entrenched inequalities within apparatuses, high administrative centralization and strong State involvement in running the economy. In China, in the switch-over from the imperial mandarin state to

the communist administration, a fundamental contribution was made by the USSR and the Chinese Red Army. The break with the past was profound: the new communist officials came from previously excluded social orders; mobilization was intense and frequent changes were made in the administration; every level of the administration was subordinate to the power of the Chinese Communist Party; and there was a big expansion of the bureaucracy. In this case too, however, it is possible to discern elements of continuity, such as the strong centralization of power, the close link between the armed forces and the masses, and even the system of reciprocal surveillance and the educational practices of the old regime, onto which the communists grafted their own indoctrination and re-education programmes.

In Hitler's regime as well, the transformation of the State was accompanied by the retaining of certain structures and procedures, which would curb the processes of internal Nazification, in turn hindered by war abroad and by the fear that the professional capabilities of the bureaucracies might be negatively affected by excessive politicization and ideologization. In all three of the cases included in the "great revolutions" category, the revolutionary process played on the weakness of the old political set-up: Russia was fighting the Crimean War; China saw the collapse of its empire in 1911; and Germany, from 1918 onwards, experienced a climate of civil war. Moving on to the four countries exemplifying the "small revolutions", Grilli notes that in Third World nations "not all revolutions are Communist"; he also observes that there are differences in the revolutionary outcomes, but: "while it is true that States and their bureaucracies are the main target of revolutionary movements, it is also true that the latter subsequently make use of state and bureaucratic structures to complete change, consolidate results and protect their power (Grilli di Cortona 1991, 179-180).

It is with history and comparative analysis, his favourite methodological choices, that Grilli sheds light on a further key feature of change: it does not occur in a *vacuum*, nor is it totally unanchored from a pre-existing set-up. As a clear demonstration of his enduring interest in phenomena of political transformation, exactly twenty years later he wrote that "no form of change takes place on a *tabula rasa*, and no attempt to understand its real scale and causes can ignore the role played by the past, which expresses itself in different shapes and forms: by creating obstacles for, slowing down and rendering more fraught the change itself, and by conditioning and channelling change in certain directions. Tackling 'heritage' therefore means, at least to some extent, 'obscuring' and downplaying the role and implications of great changes" (Grilli di Cortona 2011, 11). He is constantly urging us to attend to the past and its institutions, even when events acquire a profoundly innovative and discontinuous dimension, as in the case of revolutions.

The discussion of the results, above all ones relating to differences in revolutionary outcomes, is dealt with in the final chapter of the book, which offers a synthesis and a comparative analysis of the impact of revolutions on bureaucracies in the countries considered. They range in time from 1917 to 1980, and take in various continents. First of all, he surveys the shared dimensions of revolutionary change: the change of the élites and the upward mobility of previously excluded groups and classes; the transformation of the public apparatus and the possibly central role of the single party; political mobilization and the politicization of society; the growth of state interventionism and of bureaucratic personnel. Secondly, he singles out strands of continuity with the pre-revolutionary set-up.

Generally, their impact becomes apparent over the long term, not in the period of the revolutionary crisis. They consist of things like the persistence of cultural and structural models, the emulation of the administrative organization of the ex-colonizing nation, processes of modernization put in motion before the revolution, the conditions of development of the old bureaucracy and the degree of violence of the revolutionary process. Finally, with regard to the different effects of revolutions on bureaucracies, four factors seem to require consideration: the role of ideology, the structure of the revolutionary army, the type of leadership (charismatic or otherwise) and the presence in society of institutions capable of curbing the revolutionary drive (for instance, the Catholic Church in the case of Nicaragua).

Grilli concludes that “the more totalitarian political power is, the more bureaucracy will be subject to that power, and that there is no rigid relationship between revolutions and the growth of bureaucratic powers. Indeed, the majority of cases considered here show, besides a quantitative development (...) of state administrations, a reduction in the autonomy of the post-revolutionary bureaucracies” (Grilli di Cortona 1991, 217). The lack of autonomy of state institutions is all the greater where a very strong role is played by ideology. The reclassification of the cases at the end of the book identifies Russia, Germany, China and Iran as analogous cases, where the single party is articulated as a parallel bureaucracy, besides being the principal decision-making actor; in the case of the Iranian regime, there is also the supreme authority of the religious leader over the entire state apparatus, the single party and the revolutionary militias.

It seems possible to say, then, that these conclusions are closely bound up with the reflections on power and on the structures of political authority and their degree of institutionalization. This is a crucial theme in politics and political science: institutions are fundamental for converting power into political authority, supported by legitimation and autonomous from the control of the resources pertaining to social actors (Ieraci 2003; 2015). Pietro Grilli dedicated his working life as a political scientist to studying regime crises and changes, and to processes of democratization, in the awareness that understanding the actors, processes and structures of power and political authority is fundamental in keeping at bay, as far as possible, the risks and dangers facing democracy, that most extraordinary of human inventions.

References

- Calise, M., Lowi, T.J., Musella, F. (eds) (2016), *Concetti chiave. Capire la Scienza politica*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Dahl, R.A. (1972), *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Fischella, D. (1987), *Totalitarismo. Un regime del nostro tempo*, Roma, Nuova Italia Scientifica.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (1991), *Rivoluzioni e burocrazie. Continuità e mutamento negli Stati rivoluzionari*, Milano, Franco Angeli.
- Grilli di Cortona, P. (2011), *Il passato che non passa: il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni*, in P. Grilli di Cortona and O. Lanza (eds), *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 11-39.

- Huntington, S.P. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Ieraci, G. (2003), *Teoria dei governi e democrazia. Ruoli, risorse e arene istituzionali*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Ieraci, G. (2015), *Revolutions and Democracy*, in “Quaderni di Scienza Politica”, 22, 2, pp. 319-338.
- Paparo, A. (2016), *Rivoluzione*, in M. Calise, T.J. Lowi, F. Musella (eds), *Concetti chiave. Capire la Scienza politica*, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 223-232.
- Poggi, G. (1978), *La vicenda dello Stato moderno*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Weber, M. (1922), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, Mohr (en. tr. *Economy and Society*, Berkeley, CA., University of California Press 1978).

Parties and party systems in Pietro Grilli di Cortona's research

Antonino Castaldo

UNIVERSITY OF LISBON

Luca Germano

ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY, ROME

Parties and party systems, intended as key democratic institutions, represented a central subject in Pietro Grilli di Cortona's research. His focus on these topics has been rich, innovative and continuous during all his career. His approach to the study of political parties and party systems has always been comparative, with a great relevance given to their historical evolution and the connections with the cleavages structures present in European societies.

Although Pietro's contribution to the study of parties and party systems has mainly been framed within a more general research stream on the processes of democratization, he has also given a broader contribution to the explanation of the transformations currently affecting the main European countries. In this brief note we will try to trace the key features and steps of Pietro's work in this field.

In *Da uno a molti. Democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in Europa orientale* [From One to Many. Democratization and Rebirth of Parties in Eastern Europe] (Grilli 1997), Pietro focuses on the rebirth of democracy and multi-party politics in Central and Eastern European countries.

The book's aim is twofold: on the one hand, to retrace the shift from a monoparty to a multiparty system during the transition occurred from 1989 to the first half of the 1990s; on the other, to identify all the causal factors affecting each analyzed case's (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia – Czech Republic and Slovakia since 1993 – Poland, Romania and Hungary) own evolution and development. After describing the specific transitions from Communism to democracy with regard to each selected case, the focus is then shifted to a thorough analysis on how each party system has been changing accordingly. The main explaining factors for the variance that can be observed across the national cases taken into account are identified with the cleavages inherent the party system's birth/rebirth and with the different ways in which the democratic transition has taken place. The in-depth analysis regarding the historical roots of the conflicts that had generated the party alignments as they appeared before the spread of Communism makes it possible to analyze them and their main features, and to outline continuities and discontinuities between the former party systems and the ones originating from Communism. Three degrees of

* This text describes briefly the main points of my on-going research on Italian MPs elected abroad: reconstruction of Italian deputation profile and the kind of representation enjoyed by Italian migrants.

continuity/discontinuity are thus delineated, respectively related to the party families, to the cleavage systems and to the single parties.

Pietro's analysis shows that, whereas a certain degree of continuity may be found with respect to party families, relevant discontinuities are to be traced as for the single party units and, above all, for the cleavages. Particularly, his findings on the changes affecting cleavages are worth mentioning, since, according to Pietro's analysis, Eastern European countries present a new and different cleavage structure. The first socio-political conflict, crucial during the democratic transitions, is related to the struggles between innovators and democracy supporters on the one hand, and conservatives only moderately inclined toward the democratic transition, on the other. The second cleavage, which gains more relevance after the transition, is related to the conflict between "libertarians" pro-market and "authoritarians" anti-market. Finally, the last cleavage that became relevant in Eastern Europe is centred on the conflicts among nationalities, since consistent ethnic minorities are present in almost all Eastern European countries. With regard to the cleavages originally elaborated by Rokkan, in his analysis Pietro demonstrates that the class cleavage disappears, being only in part incorporated by the pro/anti-market conflict. Moreover, the urban/rural and state/church cleavages have been decisively weakened by the consequences of fifty years of communism, being to some extent relevant only in a few cases.

The focus on the Eastern European countries, to which Pietro devoted a constant attention during all his career, led him to focus on the subject of nationalism which, as mentioned above, represented one of the most interesting phenomena emerging from the previous research. In *Stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa* [States, Nations and Nationalisms in Europe] (Grilli 2003), he focuses on the phenomenon of nationalism in both Western and Eastern European countries, devoting a special attention to the nationalist parties and their impact on party systems. According to Pietro, there are four possible types of relationship between nationalism and political parties. The first is *indifference*: the nationalist cleavage is not dominant and does not lead to the formation of a nationalist party; in fact, the party system is structured by other cleavages. Secondly, *confluence* represents the case where the nationalist cleavage is more relevant, though still insufficient to favour the emergence of a nationalist party; parties originating from different cleavages incorporate the nationalist issue in their own political programmes. Thirdly, there can be a *sectionalisation*, that is the development of a party system at the sub-national instead of the state level, as it happened in the Belgian case where a duplication of the party system in the francophone and Flemish regions occurred. Finally, the presence of a nationalist party generated directly by the ethno-territorial cleavage constitutes a case of *direct expression*.

In this last scenario, Pietro identifies three types of nationalist parties: a) ethno-nationalist parties, representing the interests of an ethnic (or ethno-linguistic) group which can be either dispersed in the state territory or concentrated in one specific region and whose members share a common identity (history, religion, language); b) regionalist parties which represent the interests of a specific region, where the sense of belonging to a territory is more relevant than any other ethnic tie; c) populist and xenophobic parties, whose key issue is a high degree of intolerance towards immigrants, external groups and any other national minorities. With regard to the last type, Pietro clarifies that it is not

always possible to consider populist parties as true nationalist parties. In terms of impact on party systems, Pietro identifies the cases where nationalist parties are concentrated in a specific region as the ones with more chances to become relevant at the systemic level.

There can be a situation, which Pietro calls *hegemony*, where a single nationalist party is able to monopolize the vote of the entire ethnic group: in this case, there will be a clear distinction between the party system at the state and local levels. A second situation, defined *fragmentation*, refers to cases where more than one nationalist party tries to represent the interests of the dominant ethnic group in a specific region: as in the previous case, there will be a party system at the local level clearly distinct from the one at the state level, but in this case the competition among nationalist parties will weaken the chances to reach their goals. Finally, in the third situation, nationalist parties may represent a *minority* in the region, limiting the differences between party systems at the local and national levels.

Pietro's interest towards parties and party systems has focused on the Italian case as well. In his book *Il cambiamento politico in Italia* [The Political Change in Italy] (Grilli 2007), focused on the two big transitions affecting the Italian democratic experience (the first of *genus*, from fascism to democracy, the second of *species*, from the First to the so called 'Second Republic'), he provides for key arguments on the role of parties and of party systems in the change and transformation of the Italian political system, keeping an eye on the compared dimension. Moving from evidence already emerged from previous studies on the Italian case (Morlino 1998, 2006), Pietro identifies parties as the main causal link between the first and the second transition. Formerly, they are the main structures of the democratic consolidation following the first transition, but then, by expanding their role in the society, they get to "occupy" social and economic sectors and thus limit the role of other collective actors.

Parties' intrusiveness, associated to the decision-making deficit which was due to the lack of political turnover and to an irresponsible competition (Sartori 1982), contributes to a generalized crisis, that will last all over the First Republic (Cotta and Isernia 1996). Nonetheless, it is in the very party system that the new transition towards the Second Republic is going to take its roots. According to Pietro, the electoral earthquake and the party system's break-up, occurring after the mid 1990s' crisis (Cotta 1996) are the most notable outcomes of an ongoing transformation and the key explaining variables for a transition for a brand new political system, different from the previous one but whose results, however, are still hard to be clearly identified.

Pietro selects parties and party systems as one of the key dimensions also within his compared research on the role of the legacy in European countries' processes of democratization, published in the book, co-edited with Orazio Lanza, *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia* [Between old and new regime. The weight of the past in democracy building] (Grilli and Lanza 2011). It is in the very parties that such legacies may have a stronger impact.

In particular, the attention is focused on former ruling parties or "successor" parties and their fate after the democratic transition: do they survive? If so, what is their degree of capacity of adaptation? How much relevance are they able to obtain? The analysis of some of the most relevant European cases show a consistent variance of outcomes (Grilli 2011a; 2011b). For example, in the German case the former ruling party disappears after World

War II due to the strategies implemented by both the occupying forces and the national democratic elite. Pietro underlines also that successor parties may hand down legacies even if they disappear or become marginal at the systemic level: in the Italian case, for instance, the mass party model introduced by the National Fascist Party is adopted by the main Italian political parties after the transition. In post-communist countries, the former ruling parties survive the transition and became relevant actors of the new regime. According to Pietro, the survival and success of the ruling party after the regime change is largely due to its capacity to maintain and exploit the resources controlled before the transition.

In this regard, the more continuous and peaceful was the transition the more the former ruling parties have been able to keep direct control over the crucial resources. Former ruling parties may constitute both positive and negative legacies for successor democracies. Pietro underlines how these outcomes are largely influenced by the strength of former ruling parties before the transition and the degree of genuineness of their conversion to democracy after the regime change. Hence, former ruling parties are more likely to represent a negative legacy for successor democracies when they have not entirely rejected the communist ideology or become nationalist parties (Slovakia, Romania). In cases like Poland the former ruling party's genuine conversion to democracy represented a positive legacy for the democratic consolidation.

Nonetheless, as said before, Pietro's interest towards parties and party systems is not only framed within the broader research area of democratization: an in-depth review of the various changes affecting them in the European experience can be read in the book, co-edited with Gianfranco Pasquino, *Partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee* (Grilli and Pasquino 2007). Here Pietro draws the conclusions of a comparative research on the state and evolution of parties and party systems in eight countries representative of Central (Great Britain, France, Germany), Southern (Spain, Portugal), Northern (Sweden) and Eastern Europe (Poland, Russia). For instance, according to Pietro, despite the many signs of crisis the thesis of a party decline cannot be confirmed; on the contrary, political parties remain crucial players of every democratic regime, yet with changing roles and functions. Moreover, the thesis of a strong connection between political parties and social cleavages seems to be confirmed: while they may emerge also thanks to the role played by political entrepreneurs, their institutionalization and survival in the long run need an anchoring with interests and groups coming from civil societies.

With regard to party systems, a different evolution between "old" and "new" systems can be detected. In the former, a "de-freezing" process led bipolar systems to be increasingly threatened by third poles in United Kingdom, France and Germany around anti-immigration and anti-Europe issues, as well as localist and regionalist tendencies, also present in Spain. In the latter, the tendency until the first part of 2000s was the opposite, with systems consolidating centripetal, bipolar tendencies, with a decreasing ideological polarization (Portugal, Spain, Poland). Hence, empirical evidence supports the thesis of a decreasing relevance of Sartori's polarized pluralism (Sartori 1976; 1982), while the moderate pluralism type became widespread. However, the former type did not become useless at all. According to Pietro, polarized pluralism may return to be a diffuse type of party system in Europe if the degree of ideological polarization and the support for anti-system

parties raise again, a prophecy confirmed by recent developments in most of the European countries and even more so outside Europe.

The frame so far depicted inevitably sketches only a partial and incomplete outline of the rich and various legacy that every work by Pietro represents to political science, made of a lucid analysis and of an objective capacity to easily interpret and explain phenomena of no simplicity at all. His untimely death not only deprived us of a careful and generous *Maestro*, but first and foremost of a dear Friend we will miss, now and forever.

References

- Cotta M. (1996), La crisi del governo di partito all'italiana, in Cotta M. e Isernia P. (eds.), *Il gigante dai piedi d'argilla. La crisi del sistema partitocratico in Italia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 11-52.
- Cotta M. and P. Isernia (eds) (1996), *Il gigante dai piedi d'argilla. La crisi del sistema partitocratico in Italia*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona P. (1997), *Da uno a molti. Democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in Europa Orientale*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona P. (2003) *Stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona P. (2007). *Il cambiamento politico in Italia*, Roma, Carocci.
- Grilli di Cortona P. (2011a), Il passato che non passa. Il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni, in Grilli di Cortona P. and O. Lanza (eds), pp. 11-40.
- Grilli di Cortona P. (2011b), Conclusioni. Eredità e democratizzazioni in prospettiva comparata, in Grilli di Cortona P. and O. Lanza (eds), pp. 289-322.
- Grilli di Cortona P. and G. Pasquino (2007), *Partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Grilli di Cortona P. and O. Lanza (eds) (2011), *Tra vecchio e nuovo regime. Il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia*, Bologna, Il Mulino.
- Morlino L. (1998), *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Morlino L. (2006), Le tre fasi dei partiti italiani, in Morlino L. e Tarchi M. (eds), *Partiti e caso italiano*, Bologna, il Mulino, pp.105-144.
- Sartori G. (1976), *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Sartori G. (1982), *Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano*, Milano, Sugarco.

Pietro Grilli di Cortona and Argentina

María Matilde Ollier

UNIVERSITY OF SAN MARTÍN

Oswaldo Iazzetta

Hugo Quiroga

UNIVERSITY OF ROSARIO

Pietro Grilli di Cortona shared with us a desire for understanding the challenges faced by contemporary democracy across national borders. In the last years of his life, Pietro participated in a joint academic venture involving Roma Tre University – which he was part of – and a group of Argentinian researchers belonging to *Las nuevas formas políticas* (a research team at University of Buenos Aires' *Instituto Gino Germani*) and University of San Martín's School of Politics and Government.

The first academic meeting in that exchange program was held in Rome (2014) and hosted by Pietro. In 2015, the second meeting took place in Buenos Aires, but Pietro excused himself for not being able to travel and sent us his article. Soon after that, we were told he had passed away. Our joint venture, however, lived on, and the articles discussed in both meetings were gathered in 2016, in a book that obviously included Pietro's work and was published *in memoriam* for him. This book was launched at Roma Tre in November 2016,¹ giving us the opportunity to pay tribute to him with his closest relatives and fellow researchers.

Pietro had already earned renown and respect for his work both in Italy and beyond. In 2013, he had been elected as chairman of the *Società Italiana di Scienza Politica* (SISP) and authored a vast array of books and papers on democratization, democratic regimes, and the fall of non-democratic regimes. The books he wrote or co-wrote with other prestigious Italian authors will continue to be a key source of knowledge for those who share his interest on those issues.²

We could mention all the subjects he broached along his academic career, but we find ourselves specially attached to the article he prepared for our meetings, which was finally included in the book we launched in Rome (2016). Under the title *¿Crisis o transformación? Cómo cambia la democracia* [Crisis or Transformation? How Democracy Changes], he wrote a solid scholarly chapter that brilliantly, yet disappointedly, addresses the main challenges facing contemporary democracy. His deep insight into the world around us strikes us as much as his sensitivity throughout the discussion of such challenges. Pietro

¹ Oswaldo Iazzetta and Maria Rosaria Stabili (eds), *Las transformaciones de la democracia. Miradas cruzadas entre Europa y América Latina*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Prometeo, Università Roma Tre, 2016.

² For a detailed review of his work, see Barbara Pisciotta's article in this volume.

identifies the main sources of unrest hurting contemporary democracy, and he notices that, rather than a crisis, a transformation is taking place which will gradually and systematically redirect it towards a new dimension for its liberal features.

Major threats no longer come, as they used to, from external enemies that openly oppose democracy, but from self-proclaimed democrats who seek to transform it from within. It seems paradoxical that these dangers are lurking in a period when democracy is spreading all across the world as a successful model and few people dare to explicitly question its value.

Growing citizen dissatisfaction with democracy's institutional performance and with its meager results is a breeding ground for such threats. There are multiple signs of unrest and discontent over old democracies, stemming not only from their representatives' failure to comply but also from the systemic limitations faced by democracy in a globalized world where politics have become less central and have proven to be powerless in avoiding the transfer of decision-making processes to domains that fall outside the scope of democratic control. This is bringing into crisis some key democratic institutions, such as elections, which are seeing an increase in citizen abstention. Indeed, Pietro poses the following question: How can we expect constituents to still believe that voting is useful, effective, and essential for a democracy while elections are becoming increasingly irrelevant when it comes to defining the course of the policies adopted by our governments?

These concerns, expressed by Pietro in the article he wrote in 2015, have turned out to be premonitory, as they anticipate with an insightful perception some of the events that would later shake the democratic scene in Europe and the United States, such as Brexit, president Trump's victory, Mr Renzi's defeat in the referendum on Italy's political reform, and the specter of populism spreading its wings all over Europe. All of them are signs of public discontent and they account for an anti-establishment cleavage that feeds on said discontent.

There lies the key worth of his article, and we suggest that it be read in this tone. Although there is a sense of disenchantment hovering over Pietro's concerns, he is wise enough to recognize that democracy is no longer –and will never be– what it used to be, while still trying to find new ways to understand and exercise it as a condition to provide it with some relevance and density in today's world. Pietro's hopeful disenchantment is a goodbye of sorts, a true legacy that deserves to be valued in its full dimension.

Book Reviews

Section edited by Carla Monteleone

ELISABETTA DE GIORGI, *L'opposizione parlamentare in Italia. Dall'antiberlusconismo all'antipolitica* (Rome: Carocci, 2017). 148 pp., €15,00 (paperback), ISBN: 9788843085835

Parliamentary opposition is a key actor in democratic political systems. Although opposition parties are often unable to actually shape policy-making outcomes, the conduct of those political groups that are present in parliament but do not participate in the government may be crucial for the functioning of legislative assemblies and, more in general, for the overall quality of democracy. Except in cases of minority government, executives do not need the votes of opposition members to ensure the passage of their measures in parliament; however, even when a government controls a majority of parliamentary seats, a minimum level of cooperation from the opposition is commonly required to guarantee adherence to the rules of the legislative process. Moreover, opposition parties may play a crucial role in the democratic circuit of representation and accountability, as they voice political opinions not represented in the government, expose the latter to public challenge and oversight, and offer alternatives to the policies implemented by the incumbent cabinet.

The behavior of legislative minorities may also reveal important information about the type of democracy a given country resembles most. In spite of its relevance, parliamentary opposition is a rather neglected topic in the political science literature. Much greater attention has usually been paid to the study of executives, especially in parliamentary regimes like Italy and other European countries. In this respect, however, Italy offers a particularly interesting case to be investigated, as the role of the Italian parliamentary opposition and its relations with the government have dramatically changed in the last 25 years.

Aiming to fill this gap, Elisabetta De Giorgi's book focuses on parliamentary opposition in Italy, analyzing its behavior during the lawmaking process and its overall function in the political system. Not only the author discusses how the role of the opposition in the Italian parliament has evolved over time; she also provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the patterns of opposition behavior observed in the so-called bipolar phase (1994-2013) of Ital-

ian political history. In addition, the author analyzes the characteristics and actions of Italian opposition parties in the most recent period (i.e. after 2013) in light of some fundamental developments that are currently affecting the structure of party systems in Europe. Among these, the ever-growing Europeanization of policymaking, the repercussions of the economic crisis, the unprecedented electoral success of anti-establishment parties and the emergence of new dimensions of party competition.

Although primarily interested in the Italian parliamentary opposition, the volume touches on a number of more general research topics, many of which are relevant not only for the analysis of the Italian case but also in a comparative perspective. Besides government-opposition relations, this work deals with the hurdles encountered during the Italian transition from the so-called First Republic to the Second Republic, with the comparison among different legislative instruments and behavioral styles, and with the role of national parliaments in the multi-level decision making of the European Union (EU). Other themes addressed by the book are crisis politics, parties' current dilemma between responsiveness and responsibility, the rise of Eurosceptic parties and the evolving structure of party competition in Europe.

The volume is organized as follows. The first chapter is devoted to conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues. The author defines parliamentary opposition as a political subject comprising one or more parliamentary party groups, whose actions in the legislative arena are intended (a) to check and contrast the government's actions, and (b) to present itself in front of voters as a real alternative to the government in office. An encompassing theoretical framework is then outlined and used to generate hypotheses about the behavior of opposition parties in the Italian parliament. The author's general expectations emphasize the importance of parties' policy preferences and of the content of the legislation examined by parliament. In the most recent period, opposition behavior is also hypothesized to be deeply shaped by the Europeanization of domestic policymaking, especially after the start of the economic crisis. Furthermore, the author conjectures that new opposition parties like the Five Star Movement (M5S) should behave differently from mainstream opposition parties. In light of these expectations, an appropriate research design is specified.

The second chapter sketches the evolution of the Italian parliamentary opposition throughout the post-war era, tracing how the composition and role of opposition have changed as Italy moved from the First to the Second Republic, and from the latter to the period following the 2013 general elections. Italian parliamentary opposition during the First Republic is defined by De Giorgi as a "halved opposition". On the one hand, the two main legislative minorities in the Italian parliament – the communist PCI and the post-fascist MSI – used to control and harshly criticize the executive. On the other hand, up to the Nineties they did not actually represent a government alternative to the DC-led coalitions: they did not act at all as a "government in waiting". At the same time, however, lawmaking was characterized by high levels of cooperation between the government parties and the communist opposition.

Owing to the establishment of bipolar competition and the actual occurrence of alternation in government, during the Second Republic the Italian opposition was expected to perform its role in a more adversarial style. In the author's view, this did not happen not only because of the permanent fragmentation of the opposition camp, but also because of three specific reasons. These are the absence of constitutional and legislative rules clearly formalizing the role of the opposition, the lack of will – on the part of key political actors – to change the existing rules, and parties' decision to center their campaign strategies on a pro- or anti-Berlusconi position rather than on alternative programmatic proposals. The elections held in 2013, with (perhaps) the end of bipolarism, seem to have moved Italian government-opposition relations further away from a majoritarian model.

Focusing on the Second Republic, the third chapter explores which factors can make Italian opposition parties more or less prone to support government-sponsored legislation. Rather than emphasizing the role of systemic factors, whose explanatory power has been shown to be limited, the author formulates a set of hypotheses that rely on opposition parties' policy-seeking and vote-seeking incentives. The key explanatory variables are the policy distance between opposition and government, the salience that opposition parties attribute to bills, whether or not legislative proposals correspond to the programmatic priorities of the government, and the wider or narrower scope of legislation. The author's expectations are largely supported by the data on how opposition parties voted on government-sponsored bills in the Chamber of Deputies between 1996 and 2011.

The fourth and fifth chapters assess the role of more general political factors related to the EU involvement in domestic policymaking, the impact of the crisis and the evolution of national party systems in Europe. In particular, the fourth chapter analyzes how Italian opposition parties have reacted to the increasing Europeanization of domestic lawmaking, a process that has been intensified during the recent crisis in the Eurozone. Data from a survey administered to legislators show that Italian opposition members have become more Eurosceptic. By the same token, after the start of the crisis opposition parties are found to be less likely to support governmental bills, especially in those domains that are more deeply Europeanized. Empirical evidence then demonstrates that Italian opposition parties are increasingly using Euroscepticism as a prominent opposition strategy, which makes the pro/anti-EU dimension overlap more and more with the government-opposition divide.

The fifth chapter focuses on the legislative behavior of the M5S, taken as a prototypical case of what has been labelled by Peter Mair as the "new opposition". In so far as they do not participate in the government, new anti-establishment (and often Eurosceptic) parties can well express citizens' opinions and are hence highly responsive to their voters. In contrast, mainstream opposition parties, which are just temporarily in the opposition, are less responsive but more responsible; in times of economic hardship they can be electorally punished by voters. In Italy, the (non-responsible) M5S can be expected to act differently from other (more responsible) mainstream opposition parties. Beppe Grillo himself stated that the M5S would have opened the Italian parliament as a "tuna can". Indeed, data on legislative votes during the 2013-2016 period show that Five Star deputies tend to oppose all government initiatives,

not only those with a programmatic content. However, if compared to other Italian opposition legislators, members of the M5S are not found to introduce a higher number of bills, parliamentary questions, interpellations or motions.

On the whole, De Giorgi's book expands in an original way on the literature on lawmaking in the Italian parliament. However, the implications of her study will be valuable not only for legislative scholars. The book contributes to our understanding of the evolution of Italy from a pivotal political system to a democracy based on bipolar alternation, and from the latter to a new system whose traits are still to be clearly defined. Furthermore, the findings of this book can be particularly relevant for analyzing the ongoing changes in European party systems and their relations with the crisis and the multi-level decision-making processes in the EU.

Andrea Pedrazzani, *University of Bologna*

* * *

SERGIO FABBRINI AND RAFFAELE MARCHETTI (EDS.), *Still a Western World? Continuity and Change in Global Order* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017). 162 pp., €110,00 (hardback), ISBN: 9781857438703

Still a Western World? deals with a core issue in international relations theory and in the study of the contemporary international system: the factors that contributed to the formation of the present international order and the factors that may contribute to its change and continuity. The editors' introductory chapter ("The Debate on Global Order in a Changing World") summarizes the causal mechanisms that led to the stability of the international order from the main theoretical perspectives in international relations. Their summary serves to demonstrate that the notion of international order is a deeply contested one. Furthermore, the editors focus on the factors that help bring about order even under anarchy, an issue that is believed to be of great relevance in situations of political transition. They argue for the relevance of this by citing the end of the Cold War as a seminal moment that led to dramatic shifts in power distribution. Moreover, the steady process of the globalization of international affairs is also regarded as an important factor in this context.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that the debate on the fundamental features of the contemporary international order and of the consequences of its possible change has been very lively. This edited volume is a valuable contribution to this debate due to the variety of perspectives it adopts (combining a systemic perspective with Western and national ones) and the outstanding profile of the scholars that have taken part in the project. The contents of the book pertain to two main topics: (i) the stability, or the instability, of the international order and (ii) the factors that complicate the international order.

A core issue that has recently received a lot of scholarly attention is whether the principles, rules, and political structures underpinning the international order are well functioning and stable, thereby keeping international conflicts under control.

This book offers very useful contributions to this debate. On the one hand, the chapter by Robert Jervis (“Our New and Better World”) supports the idea that the international system has become more stable and peaceful after the end of the Cold War. The leading states of the system – namely the great powers belonging to the still well alive Western security community – do not compete for existential stakes and do not pose security threats to one another. This may well result in the proliferation of a variety of secondary conflicts related to *milieu goals*.

Yet, it is the lack of fundamental divides among the leading states of the system the most relevant novelty in international politics, by which large-scale wars have become extremely unlikely. Also Mario Telò is supporting the view the international order is not a stake. His chapter (“Regionalism and global governance”) focuses on the causes and consequences of current processes of regionalisation that are unfolding in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas. He comments on the growing number and scope of regional arrangements and shows the rising relevance of bottom-up factors. Even though regionalism can be thought to be at odds with multilateralism and/or to be a defensive reaction to globalisation, Telò argues regionalism is a factor of the global order and contributes to the stability of the international system.

On the other hand, Bertrand Badie offers a more problematic assessment of the current international order. In Badie’s chapter (“Uncertain Global Governance”), the global order is not characterized by cooperative solutions bargained by sovereign actors who struggle to defend their autonomy; rather, it is characterized by rules and practices by which common international goods are pursued and shared values are defended. Badie comments on the four methods nation states have used to defend their sovereignty (concert of powers, condominium of superpowers, association, and connivance).

In the context of these cooperative practices, he suggests, global governance is a radically new phenomenon that results from four significant current trends: the inclusion of all political communities in international relations, the increasing intensity and symmetry of relations of mutual dependence, the growing relevance of common goods to the international agenda, and the proliferation and rising influence of non-state actors. Such a fundamental change in the stakes and factors of the global order, he concludes, cannot but meet resilience and be doomed to great uncertainty.

If the stability of the international order should not be taken for granted, it is important to know the factors that could cause uncertainty. This volume also offers useful insights into this topic. For instance, even if one agrees with Jervis’ claim about peaceful relations among the leading nation states of the system, one could nonetheless surmise that their perceptions about common threats and mutual relations may not be fully consistent. The chapter “Western Public Opinion Looking East” by Linda Basile and Pierangelo Isernia shows that Europeans and Americans who perceive China as a possible threat assess the transatlantic relations positively; but European élites, especially economic élites, and American élites alike think that Asia is more important than their transatlantic partners. At the mass level, moreover, European and American public opinion significantly diverges—the former

considers the U.S. to be its main partner, but the U.S. does not think of Europe in the same manner.

Of course, the fate of transatlantic relations depends largely on the goals and policies pursued by the leader of the Atlantic Alliance. The chapter by Walter Russel Mead (“The American Perspective on Global Order”) suggests that contemporary U.S. foreign policy has become highly uncertain. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S.’s international relations are believed to have benefitted from the exceptionally peaceful coexistence of the domestic schools that traditionally compete to influence foreign policy. On the contrary, 9/11 is believed to have widened the divide between these domestic schools. Both Jacksonian nationalism and Wilsonian idealism supported military operations, whereas Jacksonian opposition to rising government expenditures and Jeffersonian fear of external engagement opposed them. In Mead’s view, Bush Jr.’s grand strategy was not effective in enabling these schools to arrive at a consensus. Obama’s efforts involved reaffirming the country’s position as an international leader while, at the same time, reducing its foreign presence in the Middle East and Europe and stimulating trade and economic relations in Asia. Thus, tensions with partners and allies soared, and the Jacksonian tradition, to which Obama was unable to speak, became a domestic force against the country’s international relations and the foreign policy élites. Therefore, the contributions made by the U.S. toward the establishment of the global order cannot be taken for granted.

Vittorio Emanuele Parsi’s chapter (“The European Perspective on The Global Order Crisis”) also suggests that the European Union’s (EU) ability to effectively contribute to the global order has recently weakened. Parsi emphasizes the role the EU played in the establishment of the Western liberal order, to which it mainly contributed as a civilian and economic actor. However, the 2008 global economic crisis undermined the cohesion of the EU and its ability to manage internal economic and social crises. Notwithstanding the enormous contribution the EU made to the political transition in Central and Eastern Europe in the ’90s, a more complex external environment and a more inward-looking EU seem to combine to undermine the EU’s international political credibility as well as its contribution to the global liberal order.

Sergio Fabbrini further complicates the international roles of the U.S. and the EU by focusing on their policy-making process. In his chapter (“Dysfunctional Domestic Politics: Dilemmas for the U.S. and the EU in a Changing World”), Fabbrini underlines the dysfunctions that make U.S. decision-making incoherent and that of the EU inconsistent in the context of the international crises of the 2010s. As for the U.S., the radicalization of political competition in the context of a divided government resulted in uncertainty and paralysis. For the EU, the intergovernmental character of policy-making led to the division of its member states and the formation of *directoires*. The international roles of the leading nation states of the Western order have been severely weakened by domestic processes also.

If one looks at the main emerging powers, other factors that may lead to international disorder can be noted. In “The Chinese Perspective on Global Order,” Shaun Bresline and Silvia Menegazzi maintain that China presents a mixed posture toward the international order. The country has traditionally maintained a low profile

by prioritizing domestic issues and economic development, while, at the same time, integrating into and benefitting from the (Western) international order. More recently, however, China has been following a full engagement policy characterized by (i) its rising assertiveness at the regional level and (ii) its contestation of the decision-making of universal organizations (e.g., the IMF) and of universal political principles (e.g., human rights) at the systemic level. Therefore, one can neither speak of a revisionist posture nor of a status quo posture. Overall, China accepts the international order as a means to safeguard its position, but, at the same time, along with the differential growth of its power, it affirms the principles and rules of the Chinese view of the global order.

Similarly, in “The Russian Perspective on Global Order,” Richard Sakwa maintains that Russia cannot be considered a status quo power. While the U.S. and its allies conceived of the end of the Cold War as a victory, and accordingly dealt with Russia as the defeated enemy, Russia affirmed its parity with U.S. Russia did not reject the Western international order (that in fact led to many benefits for the country), but it rejected the view that it had to change its identity to take part in it. The resulting neo-revisionist Russian posture has thus become a factor that led to the post-1989 instability at the regional level and, possibly, at the global level.

In summary, one might think that international politics, which is currently characterized by peace, is challenged by several factors nonetheless. Moreover, the idea of what the international order should be is contested. Raffaele Marchetti further highlights this fragile nature of the contemporary order. In “The Role of Ideas in Global Order,” he regards nation states as great powers based on their ability to frame normative models of the international order. He also shows that the great powers do not share the same master frames about the international order. It is difficult to ascertain all the relevant factors that may cause disorder; it is also difficult to clearly relate them to one another. This volume strives to fulfill both these aims and gives a vivid sense of why and how the (Western) international order is such a puzzling issue in contemporary dynamics.

Marco Clementi, *University of Pavia*

* * *

IOLE FONTANA, *EU Neighborhood Policy in the Maghreb. Implementing the ENP in Tunisia and Morocco Before and After the Arab Uprising* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017). 198 pp., £90,00 (hardback), ISBN: 9781857438703

An overwhelming majority of analysts agree that the EU’s Mediterranean policy, carried out since the 1990s, has not been terribly successful, to put it mildly. None of the goals set in the Barcelona Declaration, adopted in November 1995 as a cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), has been truly implemented. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) introduced in 2003, the Union for the

Mediterranean that relaunched the Barcelona Process in 2008 as well as other instruments that followed did not improve the situation, either.

Nowadays, the European Union southern neighborhood is deeply destabilized, and it generates numerous challenges and threats for the European countries, among which illegal immigration and terrorism stand out. Faced with a daily influx of thousands of refugees and illegal immigrants arriving from Africa and the Middle East at the northern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and recurrent terrorist attacks, just like the one in Barcelona's La Rambla in August 2017 that resulted in the death of at least fourteen and more than 140 injured, the European Union seems at a loss as to how to respond.

Why has not the EU policy in the Mediterranean region succeeded? Why hasn't the EU Mediterranean policy lived up to its original expectations? Why has there been so little progress made in accomplishing the EU Mediterranean policy aims? Those questions, which have baffled analysts for several years, produced a significant amount of scholarship with oft-convincing explanations. Thus far, however, none of these explanations took into account the role of local actors in implementing the ENP goals, and none of them focused on the willingness and the capacity of the southern neighborhood countries to implement the ENP reforms. This research gap was successfully filled by Iole Fontana.

In her book *EU Neighborhood Policy in the Maghreb. Implementing the ENP in Tunisia and Morocco Before and After the Arab Uprising*, Fontana concentrates on the greatest challenge in the EU external policy, which she calls "the struggle for implementation" (p. 1). Noting that the subject literature "does not take into account conditions and actors on the ground" (p. 15), Fontana elects not to present the issue through the EU lenses. Instead, she chooses to explain "how EU's external policies are implemented in the domestic context of the recipient countries" (p. 2). By adopting a local, home-grown perspective, she sets her eyes on explaining "the obstacles and facilitating conditions that affect implementation on the ground" (p. 3).

Analysis of the implementation of bilateral reform programs financed through the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in Morocco and Tunisia is the main subject of Fontana's comparative study. Fontana's argues that the implementation of the ENP reform programs in Morocco and Tunisia has been affected by a triad of domestic political actors, administration, and civil society. As a result, she concludes, a country where there is a high "degree of misfit between the goals of domestic political actors and those promoted by the ENP" and where "administrative capacity" as well as "autonomous and independent civil society" are weak, such country is more likely to experience an implementation gap (pp. 179-182).

Fontana's comparative study of Morocco and Tunisia reads like a fine confirmation of this statement. Moreover, her research reveals, among other things, that although in 2007-2010 both countries had a good absorption capacity of EU funds, after the Arab uprising in 2011 the EU's evaluation of two countries participation in the ENP changed: Morocco has been losing its positive reputation of a poster child of the ENP whereas Tunisia has improved its reputation by progressing its absorption capacity and policy dialogue (p. 185). Fontana explains this divergence by

pointing out that, in terms of domestic political actors, administration, and civil society, changes that have taken place in both countries since 2011 worked in favor of Tunisia. In her detailed analysis, the author shows that *Ennahdha*, which emerged as a new Tunisian political domestic actor after the Ben Ali regime's collapse, was much more open and well-disposed toward cooperating with the EU than the Moroccan *Parti de la Justice et du Développement* (PJD).

Political actors in Tunisia “were eager and committed to implement the ENP programs, which fully respected post-revolutionary goals as redefined by people needs”, while in case of Morocco “even if the PJD approach matched with the one promoted by the EU, the goals of the Moroccan relative stronger actor prevailed, with the royal establishment opposing the reform and in turn hampering the implementation of the corresponding ENP programs” (p. 181). Moreover, after 2011, the Tunisian administration recovered more quickly than the Moroccan, which allowed the former to implement the ENP reforms more effectively and capably. Last but not least, in the aftermath of the Arab uprising, civil society gained a high degree of autonomy and independence vis-à-vis the state whereas in Morocco state-civil society relations worsened and the divide between the state and the civil-society actors widened.

The logical division of the book allows the reader to follow author's ideas and presentation seamlessly. Fontana divides her study into seven chapters. The first, introductory chapter outlines the book's themes, objectives, structure and author's expected contribution to the research field. The second chapter introduces Fontana's analytical tools and methods, and it explains the author's reasons for selecting a governance approach as a main theoretical framework of her analysis. The core chapters of the book deal with the empirical dimension of her study. Here, the author presents the role of local Tunisian and Moroccan actors in implementing the ENP programs: chapters three and four concentrate on role of domestic political actors before and after the Arab uprisings, chapter five presents the role of administration and its capacity, and chapter six highlights the role of civil society. The closing chapter provides conclusions, recommendations concerning applications of her study to the Eastern dimension of the ENP (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia) and suggestions for further research.

Fontana has made an original and valuable contribution to our understanding of the EU policy in the Mediterranean region. Not only does the book provide comprehensive and detailed information on implementation of ENP reforms in Tunisia and Morocco; it pays attention to the role of local actors in implementing the EU programs on the domestic level. Undoubtedly, this fresh perspective helps to further understand the determinants of the ENP's success and failures. Fontana's book should be highly recommended to anyone interested in the EU's Mediterranean policy, including ENP, the EU's external policy in general as well as oft-unexpected outcomes of transformations in Tunisia and Morocco.

Justyna Zajac, *University of Warsaw*

* * *

MARIA TULLIA GALANTI, *Sindaci e manager nel capitalismo municipale. Saggio sui vestiti nuovi dell'imperatore* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2016). 224 pp., €20,00 (paperback), ISBN: 9788815263490

Some topics, for their relevance in everyday life, are heavily debated often also among the public opinion but they may be quite neglected by scholarly research. This book addresses one of these under-explored topics in political science: the relations between local authorities (municipalities and mayors) and the private-law companies in the provision and management of local public services.

Those relations are multifaceted and extremely complex and Galanti tries to disentangle them by employing some traditional analytical distinctions and concepts of the public policy analysis. By exploring four major cases in the Italian context, this book provides an insight on the new forms of corporatization in Italy and on their cha(lle)nging relations with (and within) the local powers.

The so-called municipal capitalism – that is the ownership and control of enterprises by local (mainly municipal) governments acting as the main shareholder – was the consolidated pattern in the recent past. Within this context, the privatization of the most important local public services (water and energy supply, waste management) occurred since the 1990s and hence the rise of private-law companies owned by municipalities (*partecipate*) replacing the traditional municipal firms (*municipalizzate*), both reshaped the public/private relations and challenged the *status quo* of local power. Moreover, in the last decade, the trend towards consolidation, by aggregating several companies in big multi-utility corporations, rendered also the private side much more complex and articulated.

This current situation is thus fit to be analyzed by exploiting the dual nature of the involved subjects: these private-law companies for local public services are actors in more arenas of power and an arena of power themselves. Arenas of power are doubtless a central concept in political science and a pivotal one for public policy scholars. Galanti's book explicitly employs this perspective and provides an insightful and accurate portrait of the Italian situation and of the four representative cases investigated, also relying on a remarkable bulk of often-difficult-to-retrieve data.

The first chapter devotes to the theoretical part by stressing the pivotal concepts, which will build the overall framework of the book. The relational nature of power, the garbage can decision-making model, the decision-making process in itself are the main public policy analytical tools to be employed. But also, the analytical steps are displayed: the role of the municipalities, in particular of the big cities, and the role of the mayors between municipal capitalism and personalization, do shape the set where the local public services' private-law companies are analyzed in their dual nature. As actors, Galanti argues those companies are hybrid entities: partly committed to public service and partly prone to market logics, as well as torn between accountability towards the relevant local authorities and the striving for increasing autonomy. As arenas, private-law companies for local services are definitely public decision arenas, where also representation and oligarchic relations are at stake.

The second chapter provides the portrait of the Italian situation and the starting conditions on which this study relied on and on which the previous theoretical assumptions and aims will apply. The first starting condition is the new role of the mayors in an era of crisis of political parties and their power, on the one hand, and of presidentialization of politics (with the empowerment of executive roles) and of personalization of politics where leadership features become more and more important, on the other hand. This first condition is crucial to understand the changing municipal capitalism. The second starting condition are the reforms enacted in the public administration sector, which led to two major process of change in local public services: the corporatization (internal change) and thus the separation, differently from the traditional municipal capitalism, between management and regulation of the public services; and the liberalization (external change) and the consequent competition on the market. The first process broke the tight and privileged bond with the local authorities, promoting (partially) the New Public Management and corporate governance's principles and putting municipalities in a more and more ambiguous position between public and private. The second process of liberalization occurred within a national normative blurriness and a EU normative discretion, which determined strong conflicts between centre and periphery as well as differentiated implementation of these changes at the local level. These two processes frame the research design.

The third and fourth chapters gather the empirical evidence and go into details of the four cases by scanning them systematically as actor and as arena, respectively. The four cases chosen for the field research are the main multi-utility companies operating in the Centre-North of Italy (A2A, ACEA, HERA, IREN). After the analysis of these private-law companies as actors – and thus with their environment and their relevant degree of autonomy – the author draws the conclusion that a generalized striving for more autonomy, although in different degrees, is detected in all cases: the relations with the market, with the stakeholders and with the public authorities respectively determine in all cases both a territorial expansion out of the original core territory (even abroad) and a business expansion in other sectors. Instead the analysis of the multi-utilities as arenas of power and on “who decides” in them, focused on the relations between mayors and top managers under the perspective of the municipal capitalism's evolution. These relations turned out to be reversed in comparison with the past: the more stable the top management, on the one side, and the more fragmented the (public) stakeholders, on the other side, the more the top managers overcome the mayors in the arena of power.

The fifth and final chapter discusses the remarkable quantity of quantitative and qualitative data gathered in the research and proposes – by combining the actor perspective (the degree of autonomy) and the arena perspective (“who decides”) – four different models of the *new municipal capitalism*, that is the governance of the private-law companies delivering local public services.

The book is extremely dense and rich of in-depth investigation. Nonetheless the accuracy of the field research and the systematic and consistent presentation of the evidence, if allowing to appreciate both this thickness and the complexity of the studied phenomenon, also permits the reader to find his/her own way through this

nest and to appreciate the interesting author's final stances on this topic. True, this particular topic is hard and puzzling and empirical research on it is particularly hard. But this is exactly the reason for it is worth exploring it, and Galanti's book definitely accomplishes this task.

Silvia Bolgherini, *University of Naples Federico II*

* * *

MARIA GRAZIA GALANTINO AND MARIA RAQUEL FREIRE (EDS.), *Managing Crises, Making Peace. Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 297 pp., \$79,99 (e-book), ISBN: 9781137442246

In this age of crisis, state and non-state actors, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, international, regional and supra-national institutions, are all faced with changing threats, as well as old and new security challenges. The multi-dimensional nature of threats to global stability and security urge the actors involved to rethink policies and instruments to identify effective measures. In such a complex context, the European Union strives to perform as a 'crisis manager'.

Since the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the wars in the former-Yugoslavia and the redefinition of the EU neighbourhood, both academic and diplomatic circles have been exploring new EU roles in the changing global system. The EU has tried to adapt its global roles to the new security challenges – *inter alia* – with the decision to give institutional form to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, promoting a strategic vision with the adoption, in 2003, of the European Security Strategy 'A secure Europe in a Better World', and implementing the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular with the establishment of the European External Action Service. However, due to political and institutional constraints, its achievements have been often regarded as uneven and below expectations.

The book edited by Maria Grazia Galantino and Maria Raquel Freire entitled *Managing Crises, Making Peace. Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defence* tackles the controversial issue of the EU's (in)capacity to develop a strategy to effectively shape and influence Europe's security environment. The book investigates the EU's ambition to act as a crisis manager by reorganizing and reinforcing its ESDP, and explores the prospects of a comprehensive EU approach to crisis management that relies on intertwined military-civilian operations. More recent crises, the financial crisis of 2008, the Arab protests in 2011, or the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, have relaunched this debate, which is still ongoing also thanks to the new *élan* resulting from adoption of the European Union Global Strategy in June 2016.

The book is divided in two parts. Part I is devoted to 'Conceptual Approaches to EU Crisis Management'; Part II – entitled 'The EU in the Field' – addresses specific crisis areas. By combining a sociological and politological approach, the book contains conceptual contributions on the EU as a peace keeper/builder/maker

(Battistelli), analyses of public opinion about the common security and defence policy (Galantino), research on the EU's practice of informality (Drent), studies of the role of women (Carreiras) or stakeholders and interest groups in peace operations (Tsevetkov), and enters into the theoretical debate by providing factual analysis of ESDP operations deployed by the EU. In 10 years, the EU has gained considerable experience in crisis management; several EU missions have been conducted, and are examined in detail in the book: EULEX in Kosovo (Malesic, and Juvan and Vuga), EUMM in Georgia (Freire, Lopes and Nascimento), EUROFOR in Chad (Churruca), EUTM in Mali (Rouppert), and multilateral peace operations in Afghanistan (King).

Managing Crisis, Making Peace is not just another book on the EU as a crisis manager. Far from being prescriptive, this edited book combines theoretical and empirical analysis to explain why, in some cases, the EU engages in crisis response or, conversely, does not commit. By combining quantitative and qualitative analyses, it identifies the EU's undisputed expertise in specific areas. But it also acknowledges that – short of a supra-national policy framework – the common security and defence policy has always been (and still is) the EU's Achilles' heel. It offers political and institutional critical explanations, and identifies EU shortcomings in the management of security issues (e.g. Hellendorf on the management of natural resources).

Moreover, it acknowledges that the construction of a common strategic culture is challenged by a diversity of views on the use of force, different defence traditions and diverging geopolitical interests among EU member states; different perceptions of threats and attitudes towards instruments to address them can weaken the establishment and implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach.

This is not a normative book on the reasons why the EU should respond and how. Relying on empirical research, this book addresses the key question 'Why does the EU commit or not?' The dilemma 'to intervene or not to intervene' deserves careful contextual analysis, paying attention to the local dimension and to exit strategies, alongside a clear definition of mandates. Embedded in a well-established field of research, the book depicts the real capabilities of the EU when faced with regional crises.

Despite the institutional constraints that limit the EU's capability to respond, due to the lack of a more integrated European defence and security policy, the EU has its *niche* of action and can deploy its expertise. Peace operations is one of these sectors, and human security represents a common framework supported by EU member states' shared agreement. These are insightful future research paths for investigation.

Stefania Panebianco, *University of Catania*

* * *

LEONARDO MORLINO AND FRANCESCO RANIOLO, *The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European Democracies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 142 pp., €49,99 (hardback), ISBN: 9783319523705

The financial crisis that started in 2007-2008 has left serious economic and political scars. The crisis has also marked one of those watershed moments for the social sciences when established beliefs are called into question and new knowledge is produced. Since the start of the crisis, economists, political scientists and sociologists have been in the front line to identify the origins of the crisis and assessing its consequences. *The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European Democracies* makes a useful contribution to this line of inquiry. Specifically, Leonardo Morlino and Francesco Raniole's lucid analysis takes the reader through the travails of democracy in southern European countries from 2008 till present. The authors focus on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain with the purpose of investigating the way in which – and the mechanisms through which – the financial and economic crisis has affected patterns of participation and competition in domestic political systems.

The focus on participation and competition allows the Authors to examine the consequences of the crisis for the quality of democracy in the countries under investigation. In particular, the Authors argue and illustrate that the crisis has had a major impact on both conventional and unconventional modes of participation as well as on competition. As for participation, the book sheds light on the decline in electoral turnout and other forms of institutionalized participation across the countries under investigation. Whereas in Portugal the crisis has mainly led to voters' alienation or simply indifference and apathy, in Greece and Spain one major outcome has been the resort to non-conventional participation through protest movements or parties. Over time, non-conventional participation has become increasingly institutionalized, as the cases of Syriza (Greece), Podemos and Ciudadanos (Spain) attest. Furthermore, even in the absence of unconventional participation, new parties have emerged gathering the protest support – as was the case in Italy with the Five Star Movement.

Competition has also been altered since the start of the crisis. Specifically, a strong anti-establishment position has taken center stage –although moderate policy positions sometimes lay behind highly radicalized discourse as is the case with Ciudadanos and Podemos. Furthermore, the book reveals the signs of weaknesses in the intermediation of interests and the poor performance of concertation in the countries under investigation. Beyond these changes, the book draws attention to the long-lasting consequences to the party systems that stem from the formation of new parties. In particular, the Authors highlight the transformation of bipolar systems into tripolar ones. Such transformation is already quite visible in Italy and Greece but also in Spain following the December 2015 elections.

The analysis of the transformations in participation and competition is driven by a solid theoretical framework. This framework emphasizes the non-automaticity of the variable 'crisis' to explain the important political consequences triggered the economic malaise. Specifically, the main contention of the book is that the impact of the crisis could hardly be explained without taking into account the "background conditions" of the countries under investigation. That is, the Authors argue that,

contrary to the classic Shumpeterian hypothesis in economics that crises bring about innovative destruction, an economic crisis can only magnify and accelerate latent trends already present within the political system. From this perspective, the Authors consider the impact of the economic crisis in terms of a “catalyzing effect”.

That is to say, the economic crisis magnified latent trends that were already present within the party systems and in the patterns of relationships between citizens and institutions in southern European democracies. In the countries under investigation, the crisis struck in a context where the de-structuring of the social roots of the main traditional parties had already started. The pre-existing crisis of traditional parties was then accelerated by the crisis, which, in turn, deepened the delegitimation of existing political actors paving the way for the emergence of new political ones. In short, the crisis aggravated the already known crisis of traditional parties.

The book provides extensive support for the “catalyzing effect” of the crisis in the three main empirical chapters, which are devoted to the impact of the crisis on parties, movements and intermediation of interests respectively. In doing so, the book provides a quite comprehensive picture of the major political consequences of the recent economic crisis by focusing not only on voting and elections but on the political consequences for citizens at large.

Manuela Moschella, *Scuola Normale Superiore*