

SUSPECTS

Supply, Demand, and Communication of Conspiracy Theories in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

Conspiracy theories and people believing in them are increasingly shaping Western political landscape, by affecting democratic norms and contemporary communication environments. This article presents SUSPECTS, a PRIN-funded project involving the Universities of Turin, Bologna, and Milan, which aims at developing an integrated framework to study the demand, supply, and communicative diffusion of conspiratorial narratives. By combining original survey data, elite-level content analysis, and measures of media exposure and interaction, the project links individual predispositions, political actors' strategic use of conspiratorial cues, and the processes through which such narratives circulate in hybrid media systems. The article outlines the project's theoretical foundations, methodological architecture, and preliminary findings, and highlights the long-term research infrastructure that SUSPECTS led to: the resulting data, indeed, enable future comparative work, extending the project's relevance well beyond its original scope.

1. Introduction

Conspiracy theories have become a central object of inquiry for scholars of political behaviour and contemporary communication environments (Uscinski and Parent 2014, Sunstein and Vermeule 2014). Far from being marginal or episodic phenomena, conspiratorial narratives now occupy a stable position in public discourse, shaping perceptions of political conflict, fuelling distrust toward institutions, informing attitudes toward scientific expertise and minority groups (Douglas et al. 2017; Uscinski et al. 2016), and connecting with the larger issue of misinformation (Vosoughi et al. 2018, Vegetti, and Mancosu, 2020, Vegetti, and Mancosu, 2025). Research consistently shows that conspiracy beliefs correlate with political cynicism, populist orientations, and support for anti-establishment actors (Miller et al. 2016; van Prooijen & van Vugt 2018). At the same time, conspiracy theories increasingly circulate within hybrid media systems in which professional journalism, partisan communication, and user-generated content intersect, creating fertile conditions for the rapid diffusion and recirculation of those frames (Chadwick 2017; Bennett and Livingston 2020, Mattoni & Ceccobelli 2018, Fürst et al. 2025). Understanding the mechanisms that drive the production, adoption,

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and communicative spread of these narratives is therefore essential for assessing their implications for democratic norms and political contestation.

The SUSPECTS (StUdying SuPply, demand, and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories Western countries) project, funded through the Italian national PRIN programme, responds to this challenge by investigating conspiracy theories across three analytical dimensions – demand, supply, and communicative diffusion – through a coordinated research effort involving the Universities of Turin, Bologna, and Milan. While rooted primarily in the Italian context and committed to understanding the Italians’ relationship with conspiracy theories (see Mancosu et al. 2017, Mancosu et al. 2021, Mancosu and Vassallo, 2022), the project is designed with a comparative ambition: the project draws on cross-national survey items and analytical frameworks that allow inference beyond Italy. SUSPECTS brings together expertise in political science, political psychology, communication, and media studies to produce an integrated account of why individuals hold conspiratorial beliefs, how political and media actors strategically deploy conspiratorial narratives, and which narratives circulate and acquire meaning in contemporary information environments.

A key motivation for the project is the recognition that these three dimensions cannot be understood in isolation. On the demand side, individual predispositions – such as cognitive styles, need for closure, feelings of uncertainty, levels of interpersonal trust, etc. – shape receptivity to conspiratorial claims (Goertzel 1994; Kruglanski et al. 2013; van Prooijen 2017; Swami 2014). Yet such predispositions gain political significance only when they interact with an available repertoire of elite cues supplied by political actors, alternative media, and online influencers (Hameleers 2021; Klein et al. 2019). In turn, the communicative diffusion of these narratives depends on how individuals interpret those cues within increasingly hybridised media ecologies. Studying these components jointly is therefore indispensable for identifying both the conditions under which conspiratorial frames gain traction and the mechanisms through which they expand beyond their initial audiences (Petricini 2025).

This contribution proceeds in four steps. First, it outlines the theoretical foundations of the project, situating SUSPECTS within the broader literature on conspiratorial cognition, elite discourse, and diffusion of conspiracy theories, focusing mainly on psychological and political science literature (Jolley and Douglas, 2014). Second, it presents the methodological design of the project highlighting points of integration of different datasets collected. Third, it summarises the main empirical outputs generated so far, illustrating how the project refines existing approaches to the study of conspiracism. Finally, the conclusion reflects on the broader contributions of SUSPECTS, particularly the long-term research infrastructure it establishes and the future comparative avenues it opens.

2. State of the Art

If we take seriously the distinction between demand- and supply-side dynamics of conspiracism, it is clear that the demand-side perspective has been, so far, the dominant approach to the study of the issue (Hofstadter 1964; Douglas et al 2019). Previous research, indeed, conceptualizes conspiracist thinking as emerging from relatively stable individual predispositions shaped by psychological traits and political orientations.

Classic contributions emphasize cognitive and motivational factors – such as low interpersonal trust (Goertzel 1994), need for control and closure (Marchlewska *et al.* 2018), intuitive or intentionality-biased reasoning (Kelemen 2004; van Prooijen 2017), existential and epistemic insecurity (Douglas *et al.* 2017; van Prooijen and Douglas 2018), or feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap *et al.* 1999).

Politico-sociological perspectives further embed conspiracist worldviews in experiences of marginalization and, more in general, institutional distrust (Uscinski and Parent 2014), showing how social exclusion and declining social cohesion increase receptivity to conspiratorial narratives. Political science research complements this view by identifying the role of partisanship and motivated reasoning (Miller *et al.* 2016; Jamieson and Albarracín 2020), demonstrating that conspiracist beliefs sometimes align with affective polarization and identity-protective cognition.

More recently, scholars have underscored that conspiracism is not a monolithic attitude: individuals, indeed, vary in their familiarity with conspiracist narratives and their cognitive engagement with them (Stahl & van Prooijen 2018; Enders *et al.* 2022). This shift toward heterogeneity at the demand-side level directly motivates SUSPECTS's focus the differentiation of susceptibility profiles and their variation across national contexts (Uscinski & Parent 2014; Douglas *et al.* 2019; van Prooijen & Douglas 2017; Miller *et al.* 2016).

Compared to the extensive demand-side literature, research on the supply of conspiracy narratives by political actors remains markedly thinner. Existing studies nonetheless show that elites may strategically deploy conspiratorial cues, especially when seeking to mobilize distrustful constituencies (Hameleers 2021; Uscinski *et al.* 2018; Bergmann 2020). Early work in American politics highlighted the recurrent use of conspiratorial rhetoric by political entrepreneurs and out-party elites, with particular interest on those operating at the fringes of partisan systems (Oliver and Wood 2014, Bennett *et al.* 2020; Kubàt *et al.*, 2020). More recent contributions demonstrate that politicians might adopt such narratives to instrumentally undermine opponents and amplifying perceptions of threat or elite collusion among their potential voters (Bergmann 2018; Jamieson and Taussig 2017).

The (little) comparative research in this aspect suggests that the strategic incentives to employ conspiracist top-down communication might vary across party systems and media environments, with populist actors being particularly prone to articulating claims of hidden enemies or malevolent elites (Bergmann 2018). Yet empirical evidence remains fragmented, often limited to case studies or episodic analyses of specific campaigns. As a result, we still know relatively little about the systematic conditions under which political elites resort to conspiratorial frames, namely, how such messages circulate within contemporary communication ecosystems, and how they interact with citizens' predispositions. This gap motivates SUSPECTS' effort to map conspiracist communication comparatively and to embed elite strategies within a broader "communication market" perspective.

2.1. The communication ecosystem: platforms, incentives, and message diffusion

A growing body of work examines conspiracy theories not only as individual beliefs or elite strategies but as communicative products that circulate within complex digital ecosystems (Bennett & Livingston 2020, Vosoughi et al. 2018, Mancosu and Vegetti 2021). Research on online political communication shows that social media platforms create competitive attention markets in which visibility depends on algorithmic curation and emotional cues (Bakshy et al. 2015; Tucker et al. 2018). In such environments, conspiracy narratives often benefit from features that favor novelty, moral-emotional content, and antagonistic framing, facilitating rapid diffusion regardless of their factual accuracy (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018).

Scholars have highlighted how influencers and political actors jointly (but sometimes also ordinary users) contribute to the spread of conspiratorial content, creating hybrid infrastructures of communication that blur the boundaries between elite messaging and grassroots circulation (Chadwick 2017; Bennett and Segerberg 2012). This dynamic is further reinforced by selective exposure and echo chambers that intensify the visibility of congruent narratives (Vicario et al. 2016), while platform affordances (retweets, shares, threaded interactions, etc.) enable conspiratorial frames to be adapted and recombined across contexts (Marwick & Lewis, 2017, Starbird et al., 2019).

However, existing research lacks a systematic account of how supply- and demand-side dynamics interact within these communicative environments, and how conspiratorial messages compete with alternative frames. As stressed above, SUSPECTS builds on these insights by conceptualizing a structured “conspiracist communication market” where political actors and citizens dynamically shape the production and circulation of conspiracy narratives. The project aims to take seriously the interaction between the supply and demand of conspiracism by explicitly accounting for the internal heterogeneity of both the sides of the relationship. More specifically, on the demand side, SUSPECTS considers, as stressed above, differentiated forms of receptivity and cognitive engagement with conspiratorial claims; on the supply side, it examines how parties’ exogenous ideological tenets (their populist claims, for instance) might enable the strategic incorporation of conspiracy narratives within their communicative repertoire.

3. Project Objectives

While the literature has made substantial progress in describing citizens’ predispositions toward conspiratorial thinking and, to a lesser extent, in documenting the strategic use of conspiracist cues by political actors, these two strands of research have largely evolved in parallel. As a result, we still know very little about how the communicative behaviour of elites interacts with the differentiated cognitive and motivational profiles of citizens. SUSPECTS addresses this gap by conceptualising conspiracism as the product of mutually constitutive processes: from one side, the political actors selectively deploy conspiratorial messages to pursue strategic goals; from the other, specific segments of the public – depending on their epistemic sophistication, interpretive resources, and

psychological orientations – are more likely to recognise, process, and be influenced by such messages.

More specifically, from the supply-side, political actors such as populist leaders, anti-establishment parties, and ideologically radical organisations may find conspiratorial frames particularly useful for mobilising grievances, delegitimising opponents, or reinforcing identity boundaries (as stressed by Bergmann 2018; Hameleers 2021; Castanho Silva *et al.* 2020). The adoption/endorsement of conspiracist rhetoric from the demand side, however, is not universal: it depends on the congruence between citizens and parties exogenous ideological tenets, parties communicative style, and the strategic incentives it faces in a given political system: in other words, citizens are not passive recipients of conspiratorial narratives (Wood 2019). They differ significantly in how they understand, interpret, and engage with conspiracist claims, and these differences shape the extent to which conspiracist messages resonate or remain inconsequential. Bringing these two dimensions together is therefore essential for explaining the political and social relevance of conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent 2014; Douglas *et al.* 2019; van Prooijen 2020).


As a result, the idea of a *conspiracist communication market* – an arena in which elites, citizens, and media organisations compete for attention, legitimacy, and influence through the production, circulation, and appropriation of conspiratorial content – is based on these assumptions, and Figure 1 exemplifies the model on which the project is based.

3.1. Methodological aims

Methodologically, SUSPECTS aims at advancing the study of conspiracy theories by combining quantitative and qualitative approaches within a unified analytical framework. While political science, sociology, and psychology (Douglas *et al.* 2017; Uscinski *et al.* 2016; van Prooijen & Douglas 2017) have historically relied predominantly on quantitative evidence to investigate conspiracist attitudes and communication, the project incorporates a qualitative component that systematically analyses online interactions and political speeches (Bruns 2019). This enables the identification of narrative structures, discursive strategies, and contextual cues that are often invisible to survey- or text-as-data approaches, offering a richer understanding of how conspiracist claims are constructed, signalled, and interpreted.

At the same time, SUSPECTS seeks to strengthen comparative aims by developing robust, replicable cross-national indicators and harmonised datasets. Because the interaction between supply and demand varies across institutional configurations, media systems, and party landscapes, maximising cross-national variance is essential for identifying the conditions under which conspiracist discourse emerges and resonates. The project therefore adopts a broad comparative design, selecting diverse democratic contexts to capture systematic variation in elite strategies, citizen predispositions, and communicative environments.

Figure 1. The supply and demand of conspiracism



Source: own elaboration

4. Data

As stressed above, the main aim of SUSPECTS is to adopt an integrated analytical strategy designed to connect individual conspiracist orientations with the communicative behaviour of political elites and the broader dynamics of message diffusion. To do so, we need to address both the rhetorical patterns of the elite (mainly politicians) and the responses of the masses (our demand side, namely, citizens - a synthetic presentation of the datasets can be found in Table 1).

4.1. Comparative mass survey dataset

A central component of SUSPECTS is the construction of a large comparative survey dataset spanning eight contemporary democracies. The contexts were designed to maximise cross-national variance in both the demand- and supply-side conditions surrounding conspiracy theories, and were fielded strategically around major electoral events. For five countries – Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden, and Poland – we administered the surveys in the two weeks following the June 2024 European Parliament elections. For France and the United Kingdom, the unforeseen timing of the French snap legislative elections and the UK general elections – held on 7 and 4 July 2024, respectively – offered an ideal opportunity to situate our data collection within similarly intense political moments. In the United States we chose to field the survey in the second half of November 2024, immediately after the presidential election cycle.

Across all eight countries, we relied on large sample sizes of approximately 2,500 respondents per country, ensuring sufficient statistical power for both within- and between-country analyses. The questionnaires included modules capturing a wide range of constructs relevant to the SUSPECTS framework. These comprise measures of conspiracist belief, cognitive and affective susceptibility to conspiratorial narratives, political trust and institutional evaluations, ideological orientations, perceptions of elite behaviour, together with scales that are regularly used in political science research (PTVs, left-right self-placement, issues, etc., see Bakker 2015). Additional batteries addressed social identities, support for democratic norms (Vegetti and Littvay, 2022), and attitudinal correlates associated with populism, anti-elitism, and political cynicism (e.g. Akkerman *et al.* 2014). The structure of these modules was harmonised across countries, drawing on the shared codebooks, to ensure maximal comparability while allowing for context-specific adaptations where necessary.

Given the project's ambition to analyse conspiracist demand across diverse political systems, we required a robust comparative measure of conspiracy beliefs – one capable of capturing meaningful cross-national variation without collapsing complex orientations into overly generic constructs. Existing tools, notably “conspiracy mentality” scales, provide convenient cross-country indicators but tend to rely on abstract, decontextualised items that privilege dispositional scepticism over concrete conspiratorial thinking (Imhoff & Bruder 2014; Stojanov & Halberstadt 2019; Bruder *et al.* 2013). While useful for broad psychological comparisons, such instruments risk underestimating the substantive content of conspiracist belief and offer limited leverage for understanding how individuals engage with actual conspiratorial narratives. For a research design centred on the interaction between political supply, elite rhetoric, and citizens' capacity to recognise and interpret conspiratorial cues, these limitations are particularly consequential (Uscinski *et al.* 2018; Enders & Smallpage 2020; Hameleers 2021).

To address this gap, SUSPECTS developed a new comparative conspiracy belief scale, drawing on recent methodological advances and the conceptual foundations laid out in our measurement paper (see Mancosu *et al.*, 2025). The development process combined theoretical selection of items representing core conspiratorial themes with empirical testing across the eight countries included in the project. Item selection was guided by three criteria: substantive grounding in widely circulating conspiratorial claims, conceptual coverage of different facets of conspiratorial reasoning (e.g., hidden collusion, malevolent elites, orchestrated deception), and adaptability across national contexts without relying on domestically specific events. The scale underwent extensive psychometric validation. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to assess dimensionality and identify the most coherent structure of conspiratorial content across countries. We then tested for cross-national measurement invariance, employing multi-group confirmatory models to evaluate the comparability of factor loadings and intercepts. We established partial invariance of the scale, enabling meaningful comparative analyses while preserving country-specific variation in item endorsement.

This validated scale thus provides the methodological backbone for the demand-side component of SUSPECTS, allowing us to examine not only levels of conspiracist

belief across democracies but also how these beliefs interact with exposure to and recognition of conspiratorial communication from political elites.

4.2. The supply-side: discourses and politicians' top-down communication

To analyse the supply side of conspiracist communication, SUSPECTS required systematic data on how political actors articulate, signal, and strategically deploy conspiratorial cues. Political discourse – particularly in its routine and high-salience forms – constitutes the most direct channel through which elites may introduce or legitimise conspiratorial narratives. For this reason, the project constructed two complementary datasets: a large-scale corpus of politicians’ social media communication and a qualitative collection of political speeches.

We thus obtained approval from X/Twitter to retrieve the complete timelines of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 2019 to 2024, thus covering a full legislative cycle culminating in the 2024 European elections. The dataset includes tweets from both outgoing and newly elected MEPs – reflecting the different compositions of the legislatures – and allows us to track how conspiracist cues appear, intensify, or decline as political competition fluctuates. Building on insights from our conspiracist communication paper, the X/Twitter corpus is particularly suited to detecting cue-based messaging: subtle allusions to hidden plots, insinuations about elite collusion, or narrative frames that directly evoke conspiratorial logics.

In the final phase of the project, we initiated a systematic collection of political speeches delivered by party leaders, ministers, and prominent parliamentary actors across our countries. These speeches – gathered from institutional websites, party archives, and media repositories – will provide a distinct vantage point on conspiracist communication. Unlike tweets, speeches are typically more structured, rhetorically coherent, and closely tied to formal political agendas (Charteris-Black 2011). They therefore enable a richer analysis of how conspiratorial narratives are embedded within broader ideological frames, programmatic themes, and identity constructions. The corpus is currently undergoing qualitative coding, with the aim of integrating supervised machine-learning techniques and inductive content analysis to capture both explicit conspiratorial claims and subtler discursive patterns.

Table 1. Empirical products of the research

Dataset	Data type & unit of analysis	Coverage (country / time)	Main content (key variables)	Typical uses after project end
Survey data	Cross-national survey; individuals	8 countries, post-election 2024	Conspiracy beliefs; political attitudes; trust; uncertainty; media use; conspiracism in various forms; other pol sci standard scales	Compare prevalence and structure of conspiracist thinking across countries; study correlates of susceptibility; analyze cross-national patterns in beliefs and attitudes

X/Twitter data	Social media posts; individual messages (tweets)	6 countries, ~5 years	Posts by political actors (MEPs); conspiratorial frames; issue topics; engagement metrics	Analyse elite rhetoric over time; identify when and how actors deploy conspiratorial cues; compare strategies across countries and party families
Speech data	Political speeches and statements; documents	6 countries, ~5 years	Full speech texts; rhetorical structures; presence of conspiratorial elements; context/venue	Examine offline elite discourse; compare message styles across settings; link speech rhetoric to broader political and communicative dynamics

Source: own elaboration.

5. Results

SUSPECTS is expected to generate a set of interrelated theoretical and empirical contributions that advance the comparative study of conspiracy theories. A first major output concerns the development and validation of a comparative conspiracy belief scale, which provides a cross-nationally invariant stimulus for the analysis of conspiracist orientations. This measurement tool – already available as a working paper (Mancosu *et al.*, 2025) – addresses longstanding concerns about the limitations of widely used “conspiracy mentality” instruments (Bruder *et al.* 2013; Imhoff & Bruder 2014), which tend to rely on abstract, dispositional items and therefore obscure meaningful variation in substantive conspiratorial belief.

A second key result arises from the study of conspiracist sophistication, which demonstrates that susceptibility to conspiratorial narratives is not uniform across individuals or contexts. This paper shows that conspiracist thinking is multidimensional, involving differences in familiarity with conspiratorial repertoires, cognitive engagement, and the ability to navigate conspiratorial logics. These insights resonate with emerging work on the heterogeneity of conspiracist reasoning (Enders *et al.* 2022; Ståhl & van Prooijen 2018) and contribute to a growing shift away from treating conspiracism as a unitary predisposition. In doing so, SUSPECTS offers a more nuanced account of how specific groups within the electorate may be more likely to recognise, interpret, or respond to conspiratorial cues embedded in elite communication.

Another set of important findings stems from examining how conspiracy-related and populist attitudes – viewed as facets of anti-establishment sentiment – relate to concerns about various crises. Prior scholarship has demonstrated that crises can induce fear, uncertainty, and feelings of powerlessness, thereby increasing individuals’ susceptibility to both conspiracism and populism, which provide straightforward narratives for otherwise complex phenomena. However, existing studies have largely conceptualized ‘crisis’ as a monolithic category, whether focusing on Covid-19, economic turmoil, or migration flows, failing to account for the potentially distinct ways different crises resonate with the public. In a working paper, we advance this line of inquiry by examining citizen

concerns across five specific crisis domains: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, immigration pressures, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and energy security. We assess how each crisis uniquely shapes anti-establishment attitudes. Leveraging the comparative survey data we gathered, our analysis uncovers meaningful variation both in how citizens perceive these different crises and in the strength of their connections to conspiracist and populist orientations. These differentiated patterns underscore the importance of crisis-specific analytical frameworks for comprehending their political ramifications.

A fourth major outcome is a line of research that integrates the project's core theoretical ambition: linking supply-side strategies with demand-side predispositions within a unified framework of conspiracist communication. Building on our large corpus of political tweets and speeches, this article – also presented at conferences and soon to be submitted – demonstrates how political actors deploy conspiratorial cues with varying intensity and structure, depending on ideological alignment, strategic incentives, and the competitive context. It further shows that the resonance of such cues among the public depends on citizens' prior knowledge, susceptibility, and media engagement. This work contributes to the limited but growing literature on elite-driven conspiratorial communication (Bergmann 2018; Wirth et al. 2021) by offering systematic cross-national evidence and by conceptualising the interaction as a structured “conspiracist communication market.”

Beyond these core outputs, SUSPECTS is going to generate additional analyses and research products leveraging its unusually rich data infrastructure. The breadth of the survey modules enables investigations into the relationship between conspiracism and affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019), perceptions of victimhood and grievance politics (Salmela & von Scheve 2018, Armaly and Enders, 2022; Mancosu et al., 2024), attitudes toward climate change and science denial (Hornsey & Fielding 2017), and crisis perceptions linked to anti-establishment orientations or populist sentiment (Mols 2015; Pedrazzani and Sumbul, 2025). The project's European focus also provides fertile ground for analysing how EU-related conspiracies emerge and circulate, particularly in contexts of institutional contestation or differentiated integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2019).

In addition to scholarly publications, SUSPECTS will deliver long-term value to the research community by releasing two major datasets: the harmonised eight-country survey dataset and the five-year corpus of MEP tweets, along with the coded speech collection. Once anonymised and accompanied by documentation and code, these datasets will constitute a valuable resource for scholars interested in political communication, public opinion, and the role of conspiracy theories in contemporary democracies.

6. Discussion and Implications

This article has outlined the conceptual rationale and empirical architecture of the SUSPECTS project, designed to investigate conspiracy theorising through an integrated analysis of demand, supply, and communicative dynamics. The project has advanced a perspective that links individual predispositions, cognitive-motivational styles, and socio-political orientations (van Prooijen 2017; Kruglanski et al. 2013) with the narrative

structures and communicative strategies that sustain conspiratorial meaning-making (Hameleers 2021).

Beyond the substantive insights offered in each section, the most enduring contribution of SUSPECTS lies in the creation of a novel empirical infrastructure. The data generated – linking psychological profiles, political attitudes, measures of epistemic and existential uncertainty, and indicators of conspiratorial reasoning and communication – constitute a resource that will continue to yield analytical opportunities well after the formal conclusion of the project. Notably, the structure of the dataset lends itself to the development of a repeated cross-section, allowing researchers to track longitudinal shifts in conspiratorial demand (Uscinski & Parent 2014; Enders et al. 2022). Such an infrastructure would support systematic comparisons across political cycles and generational cohorts, while also facilitating Italy's inclusion in broader cross-national programmes.

In addition, the conceptual and coding frameworks developed for the supply-side analysis offer a basis for more ambitious comparative research on the dissemination of conspiratorial narratives by political actors. By operationalising key dimensions of conspiratorial communication (Bergmann 2020), SUSPECTS provides a replicable theoretical toolkit that can be deployed in different political and cultural settings to detect cross-national variation in the structure, targets, and rhetorical functions of conspiratorial claims.

The project also opens further avenues for research on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at mitigating conspiratorial thinking and communication. The integration of psychological, attitudinal, and behavioural measures creates opportunities to design experimental and quasi-experimental studies capable of identifying heterogeneous treatment effects across socio-political profiles and media ecologies (van Prooijen & Douglas 2017). Such evidence would be valuable for informing the development of targeted communication strategies and public-facing initiatives designed to reduce susceptibility to conspiratorial narratives (Douglas et al. 2019).

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