

The Broken Promise of Postmaterialism? Analysing Western European Parties' Emphases Through Manifesto Data (1990-2019)

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Abstract

The scholarly debate on the materialist/postmaterialist issue dimension mainly focuses on the demand-side of electoral politics, often asserting the well-known Inglehartian value-change thesis. This paper instead turns to the less studied supply-side, by empirically analysing the electoral supply of Western European political parties in first-order elections between 1990 and 2019. It relies on Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data on electoral manifestos to answer the research question on whether parties put greater emphasis on materialist or post-materialist issues. Specifically, it aggregates MARPOR categories in theoretically informed scores of materialism and postmaterialism to allow for cross-country and cross-time comparisons. In doing so, it empirically demonstrates that parties emphasise materialist questions significantly more than postmaterialist ones, throughout the entire timeframe. Such a finding is robust to various spatial and temporal checks, as well as several alternative aggregation specifications. It also holds in the particularly challenging context of Italy, which is illustrated in detail to reinforce the pooled conclusions. The presented results disconfirm postmaterialist arguments on the supply-side of electoral politics within the selected context of analysis, corroborating and extending in time previous work that went in this direction. This article contributes to the literature on electoral and issue politics, potentially opening up important research avenues.

1. Introduction

This article provides empirical evidence that materialist issues still constitute the main focus of political parties in their electoral supply, contrary to what is argued by the literature on postmaterialism. It does so by analysing Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data for all Western European parties contending national elections between 1990 and 2019, whilst answering the research question about whether materialist or post-materialist issues are more salient in such documents. The debate on the materialist/postmaterialist conflict constitutes a prolific research area, its most well-known theoretical argument being the so-called destructureation/dealignment or '*value-change*' (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995) thesis. This proposition posits that the more the changing conditions of advanced industrial societies provide greater satisfaction to the material needs of many, the more values, attitudes and political opinions will be shaped by non-material questions. Yet a sizeable portion of the scholarship insists that the traditional materialist, left-right axis remains the key determinant of political behaviour for both political parties and voters.

This article adds to this debate by focusing on the less studied supply-side of electoral politics. Given the ascertained multidimensionality of the Western European policy space, with several accounts depicting it to be made up of at least a socio-economic left-right and a non-materialist axis (Lorenzini, Hutter and Kriesi, 2016; Rovný and Polk, 2013; Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010), this paper tests the destructurement/dealignment thesis from a salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) viewpoint. That is, it seeks to verify whether the postmaterialist dimension rose in importance on the supply-side of electoral competition, becoming the main axis in such a multidimensional policy space. It provides a novel contribution, which also analyses recent periods previously not covered by the literature.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the scholarly contributions on materialism and postmaterialism. Section 3 illustrates the research design of the article by introducing its research questions and hypotheses, data and spatial-temporal framework, and employed method of analysis. Section 4 provides and discusses the results of the empirical analysis by focusing on a baseline model and testing the pooled findings on the especially challenging Italian case, whilst also presenting robustness checks based on several alternative specifications. Lastly, Section 5 concludes by elaborating further on the findings and contribution of this paper, pointing out avenues for potential and relevant future research efforts to be based on the present work.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. (Left-right) Materialism

For several decades, the materialist contraposition between economic left and right positions was assumed to be the main dimension of political conflict and party competition. This tendency dates back to the seminal work by Anthony Downs (1957) on spatial competition in party politics. Borrowing from Hotelling's (1929) location model of inter-firm competition, the Downsian framework postulates the general principle whereby parties will compete against each other by adopting strategic positions, according to the distribution of voters ordered along one single dimension. Such a continuum is interpreted by Downs as the degree of government intervention in the economy (Stokes, 1963), which crucially influenced numerous scientific analyses in subsequent decades.

More specifically, this conflict is also referred to as '*Leftist-Rightist Materialism*', of which Knutsen shows both conceptual characteristics and analytical relevance. Theoretically, he argues, the left-right materialist question centres around the distribution of economic resources and power (Lafferty and Knutsen, 1984; Knutsen, 1988, 1989, 1995). It does so given the nature of left-right semantics as a heuristic device for the simplification of political complexities (Laponce, 1981; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), by incorporating themes such as market economy versus state regulation, protection of workers' rights versus pre-eminence of private enterprise, and socioeconomic equality versus inequality. Moreover, this axis constitutes an issue dimension in itself, separate from and independent of additional ones. All of these attributes follow Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) traditional structure of political cleavages in Western European industrial societies.

Empirically, Knutsen's (1988) analysis is one of many demonstrating the primacy of the left-right materialist dimension in shaping political competition in Western Europe. He investigated the importance of this continuum vis-à-vis the '*new politics*' dimension (Inglehart, 1977) in structuring and polarising public opinion in ten Western European countries in the 1970s and 1980s. By doing so, he found that the materialist axis was confirmed as the principal determinant of party preference and vote choice. This proposition is confirmed by other classic studies, especially within the theoretical strand of salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983). According to this framework, voting is first and foremost shaped by those issues and values which dominate the political agenda of a specific party-competition arena. In this vein, Lijphart's (1984) investigation of the salience of issue dimensions in 21 Western democracies showed that the left-right materialist axis was the only one to be salient in every single country. Furthermore, this dimension had high salience in 18 such territorial units, far outnumbering any other alternative. Likewise, Budge and Farlie's (1983) examination of issue-types in 23 democracies worldwide since the end of World War II reasserts the dominance of left-right materialism in issue agendas, accounting for roughly half of the overall salience of all issues.

Following on from the fundamental role played by left-right materialism in structuring Western politics, scholars have also engaged in linking this issue dimension with other important perspectives on electoral dynamics and voting behaviour. For instance, the centrepiece of conventional class voting viewpoints (Heath et al., 1985; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) is the common economic interest stemming from affiliation to the same social group. This is crucial in times such as the post-war period, during which Western European democracies recorded high levels of party identification with political formations ideologically close to voters (van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983; Alford, 1967). Such a consideration was primarily based on economic motives. Another relevant strand of literature, which analyses economic voting (Sanders, 1995; Lewis-Beck, 1990; Gow, 1990), takes the dialectic on traditional left-right materialist issues to be the most decisive causal factor of voting behaviour. Crucial here is the theorised link between economic conditions and electoral outcomes. Overall, this review illustrates how central left-right materialism has been in understanding and analysing Western politics for multitudes of social scientists, spanning more than half a century.

2.2. Postmaterialism

Yet the materialist hegemony as an analytical tool would come to be more and more challenged the further away in time scholars moved from the immediate post-war years. This is primarily due to Ronald Inglehart's (1971, 1977) '*silent revolution*': i.e., a deep and widespread transformation in value priorities amongst different generations of voters in Western countries, due to changing conditions in advanced industrial societies. Indeed, the Inglehartian theory posits that an irreversible shift in the hierarchy of values of Western electors, from materialism to *postmaterialism*, has occurred along a generational fault line (Inglehart, 2008). Specifically, those who spent their formative years in conditions of greater material security present a postmaterialist configuration of values. They thus prioritise issues such as the non-material quality of life, environmentalism, peace and disarmament, democratic participation and the expansion of freedoms and civil rights, among others. Hence, the younger and the more prosperous the individual, the

more postmaterialist their values, whilst the opposite is true for older and less secure cohorts, more attached to traditional materialist orientations.

Postmaterialism has been said to constitute a restructuration of political cleavages in Western societies (Inglehart, 1984), in a twofold manner. First is the change in how to conceive of the dimensionality of the political space, now seen as in need of both the traditional left-right materialist continuum and the integration of a vertical dimension. Second is the greater relative importance of the latter axis, compared to the former, in structuring value and electoral preferences in Western political systems. On the back of Inglehart's theoretical framework, several alternative and additional formulations of the same vertical axis have also been presented in the literature. Some authors focused on the *novelty* of the proposed electoral demand and offer, hence distinguishing between (post-materialist) new politics and (materialist) old politics (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Franklin, 1992). Others relied on attitudes towards political authority and freedoms, therefore naming their dimension of contestation 'authoritarian-libertarian' (Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003). Moreover, other works (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Bakker et al., 2012) expanded the postmaterialist intuition by constructing an elaborate 'GAL/TAN' axis. This opposes ecology, alternative politics and libertarianism on the 'GAL' pole to traditional moral values, opposition to immigration and defending the national community on the 'TAN' pole. Finally, in recent years the idea of a '*demarcationist*' cleavage has been introduced, with globalisation and its winners and losers at the heart of the conflict (Kriesi et al., 2006; Emanuele, Marino and Angelucci, 2020).

The far-reaching impact of the postmaterialist move captured the attention of the social sciences as a whole. As Promislo et al. (2015) underline, change deriving from the postmaterialist wave can be catalogued under several different categories. From a political viewpoint in particular, new parties, movements and forms of activism have emerged (Inglehart, 1997) as a consequence of the cultural shifts derived, in turn, from the changing values in Western societies (de Graaf and Evans, 1996; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Dalton, 1996). At the same time, existing political formations have often altered their organisational configurations. Several empirical studies also came to important conclusions concerning the implications of postmaterialism in structuring politics across the Western world. Kriesi (2010) demonstrates the effective existence of a value-based cleavage in Western Europe after the 1950s in terms of the three necessary elements to be classified as such, according to Bartolini and Mair (1990): a social divide, a sense of belonging to either of the two camps and an organisational structure of this conflict. Other sources confirmed that materialist left-right and postmaterialist values establish issue dimensions that are separate and independent from one another (for an overview, see: Lindell and Ibrahim, 2020). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that postmaterialist values are a powerful determinant of the rising vote for radical parties, both left and right, in Europe (Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

Nevertheless, for the present investigation, the key development deriving from this strand of literature is the very core of Inglehartian theory: i.e., the so-called destructure/dealignment or value-change thesis. This argument affirms the weakening of traditional cleavages, such as the class cleavage upon which left-right materialism rests, and of the voting patterns based on them. Consequently, in terms of value hierarchies and dimensions of political competition, we shall expect an increasing prominence of

postmaterialism in shaping public opinion, party positions and electoral outcomes. This should happen alongside a decrease in the importance of materialism. Indeed, such an occurrence is empirically observed in classic political science works on attitudinal and electoral change in Western advanced industrial democracies (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992). Clear generational trends were also observed, as hypothesised by this theoretical framework (van der Brug, 2010). More recent contributions highlight how materialist left-right positions are obscured by postmaterialist GAL/TAN attitudes when it comes to predicting support for European integration, in a postfunctionalist framework (Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011). Lastly, political competition seems to be increasingly structured around non-economic considerations, as the literature on the demarcationist issue dimension (e.g., Kriesi et al., 2006, 2012) suggests. In conclusion, a large number of sources provide robust and varied empirical evidence for the destructureation/dealignment thesis, especially on the demand-side of electoral politics.

3. Research design

3.1. Research question and hypothesis

The presented literature is largely centred around the configuration of public opinion and electorates in terms of values and attitudes: i.e., on the demand-side of political competition. Whilst contributions on the offer of political formations are also present (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Hutter, Kriesi and Vidal, 2008; Stoll, 2010), such studies are, however, less common than those concerning the electoral demand. Therefore, the present investigation aims at exploring whether the postmaterialist turn has occurred on the other side of the circuit of representation: the supply-side of electoral politics. In other words, this paper focuses on political parties, specifically with regard to their electoral supply. From this perspective, in light of the illustrated debate, it is possible to introduce the main research question [RQ1] surrounding whether postmaterialism overshadowed materialism in terms of party emphasis, with reference to the spatial and temporal framework analysed in this paper. Moreover, precisely in light of such a broad cross-sectional and longitudinal scope, it is also possible to ask a number of additional research questions [RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4] to explore fine-grained patterns more closely.

[RQ1]: Have Western European political parties placed more emphasis on materialist issues or postmaterialist issues in recent decades?

[RQ2]: How does the emphasis of parties on materialist and postmaterialist issues evolve over the investigated timeframe?

[RQ3]: Are there geographical differences in the patterns of emphasis on materialist and postmaterialist issues across Western Europe?

[RQ4]: Do different party families emphasise materialism and postmaterialism differently?

The theoretical framework illustrated here allows for the formulation of a key argument, in order to guide the subsequent empirical analysis. Indeed, as shown for the demand-side of electoral politics, whereas materialist issues seem to be prevalent in contexts of relative physical and economic insecurity such as the immediate post-war years,

the situation seems to be different afterwards. That is, the further away in time voting generations and scholarly contributions move from the period of post-war reconstruction, the greater the emphasis that electors are expected to put on postmaterialist rather than materialist questions. This occurrence is hypothesised to be primarily because of the progressive increase in material security of advanced industrialised societies over time. Due to the reasonable expectation of politicisation of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict in Western political systems, whereby party-voter congruence (Carrieri, 2020) on such issues should be found, we would assume that the same trend is reflected in the electoral supplies of political parties. Hence, given the spatial-temporal framework of this analysis as per the following section, it is possible to formulate a central hypothesis: in general, we expect political parties to put greater emphasis on postmaterialist issues than on materialist issues [H1]. Further, in response to the presented additional research questions, we expect both postmaterialism to be increasingly emphasised and materialism to be increasingly de-emphasised during the 1990s and 2000s. This trend should be less clear in the 2010s, given both the material insecurity brought about by the global financial and Eurozone crises and the expected greater salience of postmaterialism, mainly due to Europe's migrant emergency [H2]. Finally, postmaterialism should be emphasised more strongly in contexts such as Continental Europe [H3]. This is primarily because of the strong green and nationalist parties that have emerged in this geographical area, which in general are expected to be the greatest emphasisers of postmaterialism alongside special issue parties [H4]. Materialism, on the other hand, should have a competitive advantage in contexts where there is either a tradition of powerful labour representation or where strong green movements are lacking.

[H1]: Western European political parties will emphasise postmaterialist issues more than materialist issues in recent decades.

[H2]: During the 1990s and 2000s, postmaterialism will be increasingly emphasised, whilst materialism will be increasingly de-emphasised. This trend should be less clear in the 2010s.

[H3]: Postmaterialism will be emphasised more strongly in Continental Europe than in the remaining geographical clusters.

[H4]: Green, nationalist and special issue parties will emphasise postmaterialism more strongly than other party families.


3.2. Data and spatial-temporal framework

To answer the introduced research questions and test the presented hypotheses, this analysis will employ the data on electoral manifestos provided by the *Manifesto Project* (henceforth 'MARPOR').¹ Such documents, which are produced by parties ahead of electoral campaigns, have become a standard source of supply-side data in electoral studies, for two reasons. Firstly, electoral manifestos are crucial documents for political competition and party democracy, because of the essential functions that they fulfil during campaigns (Eder, Jenny and Müller, 2017). Indeed, they provide the official stances of a party, which are then often reflected in policy outputs at the governmental level (Brouard et al., 2018), they streamline the party efforts during campaigns, and they are

¹ The Manifesto Project Dataset version employed at the time of the analysis is 2020a.

used as campaign material. Secondly, the MARPOR is one of the largest research projects in comparative political science worldwide. It supplies scholars with content analyses of electoral manifestos according to a coding scheme that consists of seven domains and 56 categories. Through this framework, the project examines around 4650 documents of almost 1200 parties, covering more than 750 elections from 1920 up to the present in 56 countries spanning five continents (Volkens et al., 2020). For the present purpose of analysing whether parties place more emphasis on postmaterialist rather than materialist issues, these features and tools make the MARPOR better equipped compared to the main alternatives of expert surveys. Furthermore, the MARPOR adopts a salience theoretical framework (Budge and Farlie, 1983) which is ideal for answering the research question at hand; hence, a theoretical perspective that will also be adopted here.

Figure 1. Distribution of elections per country covered by the MARPOR



Source: own elaboration

The spatial focus of this paper is the entirety of Western Europe, defined according to conventional criteria in empirical political science (see, for instance, Emanuele, 2018; Lago and Montero, 2014; Caramani, 2004). Consequently, the territorial units under scrutiny amount to 20 nations, further grouped into four geographical clusters: the British Isles and Continental, Northern and Southern Europe.² Timewise, the empirical focus of this article is on the three decades following the political watershed of the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). Therefore, it considers all elections for which MARPOR data is available between 1990 and 2019. With regard to the relevant scholarly debate, this choice of time period allows for an extension of Stoll's (2010) article, in which the author performs a comparable supply-side analysis of manifesto data from 1950 to 2005. Hence,

² Complete list of countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. *Clusters*: a. British Isles: Ireland, United Kingdom; b. Continental Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland; c. Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden; d. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain.

such a choice would allow not only for confirmation or rejection of prior conclusions, but also for generating novel findings related to a period which is more recent and so far not covered. Stemming from the introduced spatial-temporal framework, all the available electoral manifestos for all party systems are analysed, in every election covered by the MARPOR: i.e., a total of 1159 documents by 307 parties over 146 elections. The distribution of elections per country is presented in Figure 1.

3.3. Method of analysis

The empirical test of the presented hypotheses will be conducted by employing MARPOR data. Specifically, the scores of both the postmaterialist and the materialist MARPOR categories will be aggregated, so as to allow for comparing the percentage of each analysed electoral manifesto devoted to either of the two types. In this way, it will be possible to assess which of the two kinds of issues is more emphasised by political parties in their electoral supply. The main hypothesis of this paper [H1] will be tested against several different specifications: that is, the aggregation of the MARPOR categories belonging to either of the two poles will be undertaken according to different theoretical indications. This will ensure the robustness of the findings of this empirical analysis, by checking whether they hold in alternative models.

The baseline specification (*'Spec 1'*) sees, on the one hand, the materialist themes operationalised by employing most of the MARPOR categories that either belong to domain #4 on the economy in the coding scheme of the project (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015); or deal with material economic themes such as, for instance, the welfare state and labour rights and retribution. On the other hand, postmaterialist issues will be made operational by employing those MARPOR categories that better represent the GAL/TAN issue dimension. This specification will be the main focus of the ensuing analysis: additional models are included for robustness checks only and the details about these, such as the related aggregations, are reported in the *Appendix*. The GAL/TAN dimension was chosen as it was considered better positioned, compared to alternative theoretical specifications including Inglehart's own (1977), to operationalise postmaterialism within the boundaries of the MARPOR coding scheme. This is because, by being spelt out in greater detail and specificity, the GAL/TAN conceptualisation makes it possible to identify more relevant MARPOR categories to be employed than any other alternative. It thus allows for a more complete test of the presented hypothesis.

Practically, for the baseline model (*Spec 1*) the MARPOR items were aggregated as per Figure 2.³ Additionally, this paper will present the results of an alternative model

³ Firstly, the issues falling under the labels *per401* to *per415* (all within the 'economy' domain) were considered as materialist, in addition to the categories on expanding or reducing public expenditure for welfare state and educational provisions (*per504* to *per507*) and on how to relate to workers and farmers (*per701* to *per703*). Secondly, the following MARPOR categories and their related positional opposites in the coding scheme, where available, were aggregated as postmaterialist. These are *per416* on environmental sustainability and *per501* on environmental protection, *per202* on alternative versus traditional forms of democracy, *per201* on freedoms, *per603* on promoting traditional values (versus its positional opposite, *per604*), *per608* on negative attitudes toward diversity (versus *per607*), and *per601* on promoting national values (versus *per602*). The *per503* on equality was not included in the model, as its ambiguous formulation makes it impossible to distinguish between its materialist (redistribution of resources) and postmaterialist (equal rights and against discrimination) components. Furthermore, some caveats apply to the *per416* on environmental sustainability. This item, which also refers to anti-growth

(‘*Spec 2*’), which operationalises materialism in the same way as *Spec 1*, whilst approaching postmaterialism differently. Indeed, the latter is made operational by looking at Inglehart’s very definition of postmaterialism. This is centred specifically on democratisation, rights and freedoms, making life more humane, improving the quality of life and focusing on the non-material necessities of the individual. Hence, this model tests the presented hypothesis against a more direct definition of postmaterialism in relation to Inglehart’s work. It constitutes a supplementary check vis-à-vis the results of the empirical analysis, thus enhancing their robustness. Finally, further specifications (‘*Spec 3*’, ‘*Spec 4*’ and ‘*Spec 5*’) which implement the aspect of political ideology in the analysis will also be presented. Here, political ideology is intended as the semantic opposition between left and right poles concerning the attitudes towards three fundamental questions: inequalities, social change and human nature (White, 2011, 2013; Bobbio, 1997; Anderson, 1998; Lukes, 2003). Indeed, according to this conceptual definition, both materialist and postmaterialist questions can potentially assume an ideological value, according to whether they fit these theoretical prescriptions. The significance of such specifications for the robustness of the findings will be illustrated upon presentation of the results.

Figure 2. Spec 1 Aggregation

Materialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 1

per401 - Free Market Economy
per402 - Incentives: Positive
per403 - Market Regulation
per404 - Economic Planning
per405 - Corporatism/Mixed Economy
per406 - Protectionism: Positive
per407 - Protectionism: Negative
per408 - Economic Goals
per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
per410 - Economic Growth: Positive
per411 - Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
per412 - Controlled Economy
per413 - Nationalisation
per414 - Economic Orthodoxy
per415 - Marxist Analysis: Positive
per504 - Welfare State Expansion
per505 - Welfare State Limitation
per506 - Education Expansion
per507 - Education Limitation
per701 - Labour Groups: Positive
per702 - Labour Groups: Negative
per703 - Agriculture and Farmers

Postmaterialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 1

per201 - Freedom and Human Rights
per202 - Democracy
per416 - Anti-Growth Economy and Sustainability
per501 - Environmental Protection
per601 - National Way of Life: Positive
per602 - National Way of Life: Negative
per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative

Source: own elaboration

politics, was included in its entirety because, by design of the MARPOR coding scheme, it is impossible to separate the scores for the anti-growth and sustainability parts for large parts of the dataset. The smaller *per416_2*, which is solely on environmental sustainability, was not considered instead, as it would have resulted in many missing values, given that it only covers a small portion of the MARPOR dataset. Moreover, the positional opposite of *per416*, i.e. *per410* on the positive role of economic growth, was not aggregated to the postmaterialist pole, but rather to the materialist one. This is because, as per the description provided in the MARPOR codebook, this category is specifically and solely centred around the economy and material production. Instead, the focus of *per416* is political rather than economic, in light of which this decision appears justified. Figure 2 illustrates the MARPOR categories of the baseline model.

4. Results

4.1. Baseline model (Spec 1)

The empirical analysis of this paper provides us with surprising results. Indeed, the central finding of this investigation as a whole is an outright rejection of the main hypothesis derived from the literature [H1]. That is, Western European political parties emphasise materialist issues significantly more than postmaterialist ones in their electoral manifestos, during the selected timeframe (1990-2019). This is evident when analysing how many manifestos dedicate a larger space to materialism or postmaterialism, by looking at the sums of the raw percentages provided by the MARPOR dataset for the categories referring to either of the two poles. Indeed, focusing specifically on the baseline model (*Spec 1*), the number of electoral manifestos placing greater emphasis on materialist themes than they do with postmaterialist ones is 997 out of 1159, with only 172 documents emphasising postmaterialism more than materialism. Percentagewise, this translates into 85.16% of all analysed manifestos favouring materialist over postmaterialist issues, and only 14.84% vice-versa. Such a ratio of almost 6 to 1 indicates that, in recent decades, materialism has still been considered more salient than postmaterialism on the supply-side of electoral politics in roughly six times the number of documents than those that opt for the opposite approach. This conclusion is in striking contrast with previous well-known arguments made by several scholars, substantively as well as in terms of magnitude. Moreover, whilst this result and its proportions might seem a direct consequence of the imbalance in the number of MARPOR categories making up the two poles, with the materialist end far outnumbering the postmaterialist one, controlling for such a fact provides reassurance. Indeed, when the percentage of manifestos favouring either of the two poles is weighted by the percentage of a document that each related set of MARPOR items would occupy, in the ideal situation where all 56 of them are emphasised equally, the finding is confirmed.⁴ In *Spec 1* a majority of manifestos (51.16% versus

⁴ The rationale for the weighting procedure is controlling for the effects deriving from a potential imbalance in the number of MARPOR categories making up the materialist and postmaterialist poles in different specifications, which in itself is only determined by the specific theoretical framework of reference and how this fits the pre-existing MARPOR coding scheme. Indeed, a greater emphasis on either of the two poles in a given manifesto might not necessarily derive from the fact that, for instance, materialist themes are more emphasised than postmaterialist ones, but from the document presenting more materialist than postmaterialist MARPOR categories, hence the resulting aggregate emphasis being greater. To apply such a control, the weighting procedure artificially creates the situation whereby all MARPOR categories are emphasised equally in any given manifesto. There being 56 MARPOR categories to cover 100% of the space of any given document, the percentage that any MARPOR category should occupy is $100\%/56 \approx 1.79\%$. This is subsequently multiplied by the number of categories making up the materialist and postmaterialist poles for any given specification. These values become, then, the denominators of the ratios which see as the numerators the sum of the emphases on the categories belonging to, respectively, the materialist and postmaterialist poles in any given manifesto. The results of such ratios are the weighted emphases on materialism and postmaterialism. Therefore, if we are affirming that a manifesto emphasises materialism more than postmaterialism, this result is only robust to the weighting procedure if also the weighted emphasis on materialism is greater than the weighted emphasis on postmaterialism.


48.23%) still emphasise materialism over postmaterialism, even after this procedure.⁵ This weighting procedure is replicated with every additional model.

Further elaborations illustrate more facets of the presented finding. The bar chart in Figure 3 shows the pooled mean values of the emphasis put on both materialist and postmaterialist issues as a percentage of each document, across all the analysed electoral manifestos. As is evident, on average, materialist themes are emphasised twice as much as postmaterialist ones in any given manifesto. In itself, this constitutes another strong result and challenge to the destructure/dealignment thesis. Materialism is usually almost half of the focus of any document (39.55%), reasserting itself as a very important component of the electoral supply. On the other hand, whilst postmaterialism also appears as relevant in electoral manifestos, accounting for one-fifth of the overall emphasis (19.72%), it is still significantly trumped by its materialist counterpart. A look at the evolution over time of the emphasis on materialism and postmaterialism across the employed dataset further confirms and enriches this conclusion, whilst contradicting [H2]. As per Figure 4, the gap between the focus on the two poles is reinstated by this longitudinal perspective. Indeed, the distance between the salience put on materialist and postmaterialist MARPOR items consistently remains sizeable over the selected timespan. This is surprising, as it appears that the global and European financial crises in the late 2010s did not have a significant impact on the balance between materialism and postmaterialism in the electoral supply of parties. Materialism and postmaterialism are closer, although still rather apart, only in the early-to-mid-1990s, the very period of Tony Blair and John Prescott's mantra: '*we are all middle class now*'. Furthermore, on average, postmaterialist emphases hover around 20% with no discernible trend, if not in the late 2010s. As expected, there is a steep increase in the salience of postmaterialism during this period, which can potentially be linked to the 2014 European migrant crisis. Moreover, the increasing relevance of the debate surrounding the environment might also be a contributing factor. Still, mean materialist emphases present a clearer and more marked linear increasing trend throughout the analysed timeframe. This finding is reinforced by a strong positive correlation between election year and mean emphases on materialism, with *Pearson's r* = 0.745 at 0.01 significance level; whilst the correlation between time and mean emphases on postmaterialism is weak (*Pearson's r* = 0.299).⁶ Once more, this also comes in stark contradiction to many influential theoretical arguments. Indeed, not only does the salience of materialism not decrease, but it rather increases whilst, instead, postmaterialist emphases remain mostly stable, without growing significantly. As a result of this, the rift between the two poles actually widens over time.

⁵ The following consideration could also be added: the fact that the MARPOR codebook includes more materialist than postmaterialist items by design also constitutes a noteworthy descriptive finding in itself.


⁶ See *Appendix*.

Figure 3. Pooled Mean Emphases on Materialism and Postmaterialism



Source: own elaboration

Figure 4. Evolution of Pooled Mean Emphases over Time



Source: own elaboration

Figure 5 shows a more fine-grained picture of how the pooled mean emphasis put by the analysed parties on materialism and postmaterialism in their manifestos developed over each decade. It can be observed that, whilst the salience on materialist issues


increases constantly, the focus on postmaterialist themes decreases from the 1990s to the 2000s and increases in the 2010s. Interesting patterns emerge when breaking down the temporal evolution of materialist and postmaterialist emphases from a spatial viewpoint, as they tend to move together across the different areas of Western Europe.⁷ Indeed, as a general trend, materialism is more emphasised than postmaterialism in the 1990s, especially in the last years of the decade, whilst the opposite is true in the 2000s. In the 2010s, it is possible to speculate about the impact of the economic and migrant crises. The former hits between the late 2000s and early 2010s and coincides with a spike in materialist emphases in the first half of the decade. However, as the traumatic outbreak of the economic crisis fades away, this seems to be replaced from 2014 onwards with Europe's migrant crisis, which instead corresponds to a complete reversal of the precedent trend in the second half of the 2010s. During this period, indeed, the most decisive rise yet in the relevance of postmaterialist policy positions is observed, at the expense of materialism. The illustrated data shows that this is both a clear and ongoing trend: therefore, it will be interesting to see whether it will continue in the future. As an exception to the outlined trends, Southern Europe appears to constitute a spatial outlier, given that it only follows the illustrated patterns in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the emphasis on materialist issues by Southern European parties clearly increases, whereas it decreases in the early 2010s, remaining stable in the second half of the decade. The 2010-2015 period also sees an increase in postmaterialist emphases not registered elsewhere; whilst in the other periods, including from 2015 onwards, Southern Europe follows the general patterns of salience of postmaterialism. In light of the illustrated trends, the Southern European case remains counterintuitive and puzzling. Hit the hardest by the economic turmoil and with three countries undergoing international financial bailouts (Greece, Portugal and Spain), the diminished salience of materialism throughout the 2010s counters expectations, making it particularly difficult to interpret. Perhaps the anticipated emphasis on materialist questions in the 2000s, probably due to already weaker economic outlooks in the area, gives way earlier to the prominence of postmaterialist questions, already arising in the early 2010s, including, especially, the issue of mass migration, which is most salient in this area. Nevertheless, due to its peculiarities and counter intuitiveness, Southern Europe surely demands a closer look, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

With specific reference to [RQ3], Figure 6 also illustrates the pooled mean emphases on materialism and postmaterialism in the various clusters. Throughout every geographical grouping, materialist issues are, on average, given greater salience than postmaterialist ones. This confirms that the main finding of this study is spatially robust. Nevertheless, some interesting differences emerge from the graph. It is noticeable that the distance between the two poles is narrower in Continental Europe, where materialism is at its lowest and postmaterialism at its highest, hence confirming [H3]. This outcome is not surprising, as we can expect to find relevant political formations emphasising postmaterialist issues in this geographical area, such as radical right (e.g. Front National in France and Alternative für Deutschland in Germany) and green parties (e.g. in Austria, Belgium and Germany), on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Charalambous, 2015; Ignazi, 1997; van Haute, 2019; Müller-Rommel, 1994). On the contrary,

⁷ Supporting figures are included in Section d) in the *Appendix*.


the gaps in the remaining groupings are very large. Speculating on the reasons why such differences occur is challenging: however, as per [H3], one might notice how certain trends are associated with the presence of powerful labour representation (e.g. British Isles and Northern Europe) or to the absence of strong green movements (e.g. Southern Europe).

Figure 5. Pooled Mean Emphases per Decade



Source: own elaboration


Figure 6. Pooled Mean Emphases per Territorial Cluster



Source: own elaboration

Very interesting findings are provided by looking at differences between different party families, in response to [RQ4]. Figure 7 displays bar charts with the pooled mean emphases across the analysed dataset per party family, according to the MARPOR classification. It is immediately evident that this is the only test providing a partial disconfirmation of the presented general conclusion. This is because green parties emphasise postmaterialist issues more than materialist ones in their electoral manifestos. The explanation to this exception is logical and convincing, given the focus of such formations on questions related to the environment. However, the gap between the salience of these two poles varies between different party families, and such a variation could be accounted for descriptively along the same lines. Indeed, the other two groupings which present a much more balanced configuration of emphases compared to the rest are nationalist and special issue parties. Again, this makes sense in light of their focus, respectively, on the ‘TAN’ side of the postmaterialist axis and on questions that escape the logics and boundaries of traditional, left-right materialist politics. This confirms [H4], which is further reinforced by the very large rifts recorded for mainstream parties, including socialist and social democratic formations, due to their strong emphasis on materialist issues related to traditional economic-left issues.

Figure 7. Pooled Mean Emphases per Party Family



Source: own elaboration

4.2. The Italian case: a challenging test

The Italian case provides a demanding test of the illustrated main finding, as it constitutes a particularly fertile breeding ground for postmaterialism from a political and historical viewpoint.⁸ Several scholarly contributions analyse the dimensionality of the

⁸ Further visual references for the Italian case are provided in the *Appendix*.


Italian policy space in recent decades (see, for instance, Giannetti, Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2016; Di Virgilio et al., 2015), highlighting in all cases a multidimensional, and at least bi-dimensional structure of competition. Among these works, Giannetti, Pedrazzani and Pinto (2018) point to the rise of a cultural, non-materialist axis of competition at the expense of the declining salience of materialist issues in parties' electoral supply between 2001 and 2018. Further, these empirical conclusions are reinforced by some historical peculiarities of the Italian case. Specifically, differently from other Western European democracies, the class conflict in Italy was always played down by the inter-class, social market economy-based worldview and political agenda of the hegemonic Democrazia Cristiana (DC) up until the 1990s. Coupled with the unique proximity and political influence of the Catholic Church, such a context contributed to scaling down the class conflict, whilst at the same time generating extremely intense conflicts on non-economic issues. These included postmaterialist questions centred around quality of life, such as civil rights (e.g. abortion and divorce). Moreover, in recent times the importance of postmaterialism for Italian political competition resurfaced through the rise and action of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) (Conti and Memoli, 2015). Indeed, M5S's traditional focus prominently features postmaterialist themes such as alternative forms of (direct) democracy and safeguarding the environment, to which it dedicates two of its five core commitments ('stars'). In light of all these, the Italian case constitutes a particularly demanding context on which to test the prevalence of materialist over postmaterialist issues in terms of party salience, as we expect the latter to be particularly relevant. Do the pooled findings of this paper hold in Italy too?

By replicating the analysis in full, its core result is fully confirmed in this particular context: in the last thirty years, Italian parties have emphasised materialism much more than postmaterialism in their electoral manifestos. In Italy, materialist MARPOR items trumped their postmaterialist counterparts in 86.17% of documents (81 out of 94), with the opposite scenario only occurring in 13.83% of the examined instances (13). As regards the pooled analysis, this conclusion is robust to the aforementioned weighting procedure. After this step, more than twice as many manifestos still feature materialism (68.09%) more prominently than postmaterialism (31.91%): respectively, 64 versus 30 documents. The mean emphases on the two poles are also in line with the pooled findings, as materialist MARPOR categories occupy, on average, 36.86% of any given manifesto. Postmaterialist emphases, on the other hand, only constitute, on average, 15.23% of any document, yet again more than doubled by the focus on materialist themes.

The temporal evolution of the relevance of materialism and postmaterialism is also coherent with the pooled analysis: indeed, whilst the emphases on the former increase more visibly over time, those on the latter only follow suit ever so slightly. At the same time, the rise in postmaterialist emphases in the 2010s can be linked to both the relevance of the migration and environmental debates, shared with the rest of Western Europe, and to the aforementioned emergence of M5S. However, a close-up of party families confirms the main finding of the pooled analysis in that the partial exception to it is the grouping of the greens (which includes the *Federazione dei Verdi* and *Il Girasole*), which is the only one to favour postmaterialist emphases over materialist ones. This means that even special issue parties, to which the M5S belongs, present a wide drift between the two poles, although the MARPOR dataset only reports two observations (2013

and 2018) for this party. Finally, as per Figure 8, it is Italian social democracy that, despite longstanding commitments on left-wing materialist questions, presents the closest configuration of materialist and postmaterialist issue salience after the greens. In the MARPOR dataset, this party family includes many and varied political actors, among which the principal ones are the *Partito Socialista Italiano*, *L'Ulivo* and *Partito Democratico*. While one can only speculate about this curious facet, we are reminded here of the argument that in Italy a fully-fledged, Scandinavian-like social democratic movement never truly came to fruition (Pasquino, 2013), a fact of which this may even be a side-effect. In conclusion, the main results of this study are strongly confirmed and reinforced by this probe into the case of Italy: i.e., a particularly challenging context for the prevalence of materialist emphases, because of the reasons outlined above.

Figure 8. Mean Emphases per Party Family in Italy



Source: own elaboration

4.3. Robustness checks

The complete replication of the pooled empirical analysis with the alternative specifications, in order to test the robustness of the illustrated findings, provides convincing results. Table 1 reports the percentages of how many electoral manifestos emphasise materialism over postmaterialism and vice-versa, per every model. For the *Spec 2* model, which operationalised postmaterialism by following Inglehart’s definition and materialism in the same way as the baseline model (*Spec 1*), the results are confirmed. Indeed, in 89.3% of all analysed manifestos greater emphasis is put on materialist rather than postmaterialist issues, the opposite case occurring in 10.7% of all documents. This is reinforced by the same weighting procedure as above, which confirms the conclusion reached. Therefore, not only is the initial finding backed up by this alternative specification, but it is also incremented in its proportions. This indicates that the baseline model

(*Spec 1*) actually constitutes a conservative estimate, with favourable amplifying effects towards postmaterialism. The pooled mean emphases on the two poles are also in line with the findings: the value for postmaterialism amounts to 17.78% for any given manifesto, and the score for materialism stays at 39.55%. The additional checks in terms of the spatial-temporal framework and party families also confirm the robustness of the results, whilst concurrently exacerbating the predominance of materialism over postmaterialism. Indeed, with this specification the greens too emphasise the former more than the latter, given the absence of MARPOR categories on environmentalism in this aggregation. All the checks are available in the *Appendix*.

Table 1. Percentage of Manifestos with Prevalence of either Materialism or Postmaterialism per Model

Model	Materialism > Postmaterialism	Postmaterialism > Materialism
Spec 1	85.16%	14.84%
Spec 2	89.30%	10.70%
Spec 3	92.40%	7.60%
Spec 4	77.50%	22.50%
Spec 5	81.40%	18.60%

Furthermore, specifications that account for the dimension of political ideology whilst analysing materialist and postmaterialist questions have been included, to provide additional theoretical refinement to this study. The first of such models, *Spec 3*, presents altogether different operationalisations of materialism and postmaterialism. However, the following two specifications, *Spec 4* and *Spec 5*, operationalise postmaterialism in the same way as, respectively, the *Spec 1* and *Spec 2* models. Indeed, they include the issues indicated by GAL/TAN (*Spec 4*) or Inglehart himself (*Spec 5*) as postmaterialist. Yet they do so whilst still sharing the same operationalisation of materialism as *Spec 3*, and thus decreasing the number of MARPOR categories making up the materialist pole compared to the previous two specifications. By design, this should result in a relatively favourable bias towards postmaterialist issues, hence contributing to the reduction of potential gaps. This element is very important, as it comes into play when looking at the results. Indeed, all three models confirm tout-court the findings of the analysis.⁹ In particular, this is also true for the two specifications where the number of materialist MARPOR categories included was reduced without changing the postmaterialist pole, which stayed either GAL/TAN (*Spec 4*) or Inglehartian (*Spec 5*). These report scores related to the percentage of documents emphasising more materialism than postmaterialism of, respectively, 77.5% versus 22.5% and of 81.4% versus 18.6%. Additionally, the mean emphases on the materialist and postmaterialist poles amount to, respectively, 27.28% versus 18.06% and 27.28% versus 15.14%.¹⁰ To summarise, the findings of this paper are wholly confirmed even when penalising materialist scores through specific aggregation choices. This contributes to providing full reassurance about the robustness of the presented results.

⁹ It should be noted that *Spec 4* is the only case in which the weighting procedure provides a different finding, as it results in a majority of manifestos emphasising postmaterialism more than materialism (52.98% versus 46.25%).

¹⁰ The complete checks are available in the *Appendix*.

5. Conclusions

This paper analysed the research puzzle surrounding whether the destructurement/de-alignment thesis can find empirical confirmation from the less studied supply-side of electoral politics. It sought to test this hypothesis from a salience theory viewpoint, within the framework of the Western European multidimensional space of political competition. Hence, it asked the research question about which of the two poles of the materialist/postmaterialist issue dimension is more emphasised by the key actors of the electoral supply, i.e., parties. Specifically, it looked at MARPOR data on electoral manifestos for all political formations contesting an election in Western Europe between 1990 and 2019. After reviewing the scholarly contributions on materialism and postmaterialism and the related debate, it introduced the hypotheses to be tested here. Based on large parts of the specialised literature, given the historical developments in Western European societies and the selected timeframe of analysis, the main expectation was that political parties would place greater emphasis on postmaterialist rather than materialist issues, in line with the destructurement/de-alignment thesis. The article conducted empirical tests on the MARPOR data, developing aggregated scores for materialist and postmaterialist issues in line with the theoretical prescriptions. The analysis provided an outright rejection of the main hypothesis, showing how almost all Western European parties have emphasised materialist questions significantly more than postmaterialist questions in the past 30 years; and increasingly so over time. This result is robust to several spatial and temporal checks, as well as to alternative model specifications based on different theoretical prescriptions. Moreover, all the findings were confirmed when the challenging Italian context was scrutinised, further reinforcing their applicability. This paper contributes to the empirical literature on electoral and issue politics. It considerably extends the temporal reach of comparable works on this topic (Stoll, 2010) whilst further confirming their results, which pointed to a predominance of the (materialist) socioeconomic dimension in Western European electoral manifestos.

The picture provided here, though, is only partial, as its specific focus was the electoral supply of parties. What about the demand-side of electoral politics? From this viewpoint, new questions are opened up by this contribution: do these findings also hold among electorates and public opinions? Does one side of the circuit of representation represent a good indication of the other, or not? And if not, why is there no congruence between the two? Surely, the theoretical stakes of such dilemmas are clear and important. On the one hand, were my findings to be confirmed also on the demand-side of Western European electoral politics, this would mean that the postmaterialist value-change thesis is to be fully rejected. Such an exploration is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even a superficial look at the European Election Studies' Voter Study data for the spatial-temporal framework analysed here (EES 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019) casts doubt on the postmaterialist arguments. Indeed, the '*most important issue*' for European electors in terms of salience is always a materialist question on either the economy or unemployment and by quite some margin. On the other hand, matters would be made even more complex if the findings of this paper were rejected on the demand-side. This occurrence would signify a lack of politicisation of the materialist/postmaterialist conflict in European political systems, given the absence of party-voter congruence. It would, therefore, lead to questions as to why parties are not

responsive (Mair, 2009), which would require and deserve causal analyses in future research efforts. Moreover, would this misalignment be because of the increasing affluence of Western European societies, as per the postmaterialist thesis? Would it be due to a generational effect or to more of a period effect, linked to exogenous factors such as inflation and unemployment at a given time? Or do parties simply have strategic incentives based on configurations of issues that ensure the best electoral performance (De Sio and Weber, 2014), potentially transcending coherent dynamics on issue dimensions? These important questions are fertile ground for future research contributions, which can build upon the empirical findings of this paper as a departure point.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the editors of Italian Political Science and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on this article, which greatly contributed to its improvement. I am also indebted to Dr. Vincenzo Emanuele for his precious suggestions and feedback.

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Appendix

A) Aggregations of alternative models

Spec 2 Aggregation

Materialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 2

per401 - Free Market Economy
per402 - Incentives: Positive
per403 - Market Regulation
per404 - Economic Planning
per405 - Corporatism/Mixed Economy
per406 - Protectionism: Positive
per407 - Protectionism: Negative
per408 - Economic Goals
per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
per410 - Economic Growth: Positive
per411 - Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
per412 - Controlled Economy
per413 - Nationalisation
per414 - Economic Orthodoxy
per415 - Marxist Analysis: Positive
per504 - Welfare State Expansion
per505 - Welfare State Limitation
per506 - Education Expansion
per507 - Education Limitation
per701 - Labour Groups: Positive
per702 - Labour Groups: Negative
per703 - Agriculture and Farmers

Postmaterialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 2

per201 - Freedom and Human Rights
per202 - Democracy
per301 - Decentralisation: Positive
per302 - Centralisation: Positive
per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
per606 - Civic Mindedness: Positive
per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative
per705 - Underprivileged Minority Groups
per706 - Non-economic Demographic Groups

Spec 3 Aggregation

Materialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 3

per401 - Free Market Economy
per402 - Incentives: Positive
per403 - Market Regulation
per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
per412 - Controlled Economy
per413 - Nationalisation
per414 - Economic Orthodoxy
per504 - Welfare State Expansion
per505 - Welfare State Limitation
per506 - Education Expansion
per507 - Education Limitation
per701 - Labour Groups: Positive
per702 - Labour Groups: Negative

Postmaterialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 3

per104 - Military: Positive
per105 - Military: Negative
per201.2 - Human Rights
per601 - National Way of Life: Positive
per602 - National Way of Life: Negative
per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
per605.1 - Law and Order: Positive
per605.2 - Law and Order: Negative
per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative

Spec 4 Aggregation

Materialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 4

per401 - Free Market Economy
 per402 - Incentives: Positive
 per403 - Market Regulation
 per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
 per412 - Controlled Economy
 per413 - Nationalisation
 per 414 - Economic Orthodoxy
 per504 - Welfare State Expansion
 per505 - Welfare State Limitation
 per506 - Education Expansion
 per507 - Education Limitation
 per701 - Labour Groups: Positive
 per702 - Labour Groups: Negative

Postmaterialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 4

per201 - Freedom and Human Rights
 per202 - Democracy
 per416 - Anti-Growth Economy and Sustainability
 per501 - Environmental Protection
 per601 - National Way of Life: Positive
 per602 - National Way of Life: Negative
 per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
 per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
 per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
 per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative

Spec 5 Aggregation

Materialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 5

per401 - Free Market Economy
 per402 - Incentives: Positive
 per403 - Market Regulation
 per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
 per412 - Controlled Economy
 per413 - Nationalisation
 per 414 - Economic Orthodoxy
 per504 - Welfare State Expansion
 per505 - Welfare State Limitation
 per506 - Education Expansion
 per507 - Education Limitation
 per701 - Labour Groups: Positive
 per702 - Labour Groups: Negative

Postmaterialist MARPOR Categories – Spec 5

per201 - Freedom and Human Rights
 per202 - Democracy
 per301 - Decentralisation: Positive
 per302 - Centralisation: Positive
 per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
 per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
 per606 - Civic Mindedness: Positive
 per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
 per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative
 per705 - Underprivileged Minority Groups
 per706 - Non-economic Demographic Groups

B) Correlation analyses

Correlation Between Election Year and Pooled Mean Emphases on Materialism

```
. pwcorr avg_mat year, star(.01)
```

	avg_mat	year
avg_mat	1.0000	
year	0.7447*	1.0000

Correlation Between Election Year and Pooled Mean Emphases on Postmaterialism

```
. pwcorr avg_postmat year
```


	avg_po~t	year
avg_postmat	1.0000	
year	0.2990	1.0000

C) Weighting procedure




Percentage of Manifestos with Prevalence of Emphases on either Materialism or Postmaterialism After Weighting Procedure

	Manifestos Where Mat>PM (Emphasis)	Manifestos Where PM>Mat (Emphasis)
Spec 1	51.16%	48.23%
Spec 2	59.88%	39.52%
Spec 3	88.27%	10.70%
Spec 4	46.25%	52.98%
Spec 5	59.02%	40.29%

D) Visual references for temporal breakdown across clusters






E) Visual references for the Italian case






F) Robustness checks in full




Spec 2



Spec 3



Spec 4



Spec 5

